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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Grain production and marketing are of vital importance to Iowa's and 
the nation's economy. Iowa ranks as one of the nation's leading producers 
of corn and soybeans. In 1978, Iowa's production accounted for 21 per­
cent of the nation's 7.08 billion bushel corn crop and 15.6 percent of 
the nation's 1.84 billion bushel soybean crop. 
The marketing of these grains plays an important role in agriculture. 
The Warehouse Division of the Iowa Commerce Commission reports that as of 
January 15, 1979, approximately 850 firms were legally licensed to store 
grain in Iowa. These firms had a total storage capacity of more than 400 
million bushels. In Iowa, as in many grain marketing states, the 
majority of the firms licensed to store grain are cooperatives. 
Problem Statement 
A cooperative association is an organization of firms which is 
controlled by those who use it and is operated for their mutual benefit 
as patrons. The cooperative association represents an extension of 
each member firmes operation in which the member firms operate the 
cooperative jointly to improve their separate operations. 
A cooperative association differs in its operation from a proprietary 
corporate enterprise because of its organizational structure and principles 
of operation. In a cooperative, the financial benefits flow to the patrons 
on the basis of patronage, while in a corporate enterprise the financial 
benefits flow to the owners on the basis of investment in the enterprise. 
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Another distinguishing characteristic of cooperatives is the basic 
principle that ownership and control is in the hands of the member 
patrons who use the services of the cooperative. This differs from 
corporate enterprises where ownership and control is based on invest­
ment. 
Cooperative associations also differ from corporate enterprises 
because the former operates on a cost basis rather than for a profit for 
investors. Any revenues realized over and above expenses (net savings) 
belong to the member firms who patronize the cooperative. Net savings 
are often realized because costs cannot be estimated accurately in 
advance. The patrons normally pay the competitive price for the goods or 
services they obtain from the cooperative, then receive adjustments at 
the end of the cooperative's fiscal year when costs are known. The 
adjustment goes back to the member-patrons as refunds based on patronage. 
This refund allocation thus allows the cooperative to operate at cost. 
Another distinguishing characteristic of cooperative associations is 
izne iimitieQ return on ccipitdl- xxit; xectj"r'ix Oii caDitaj. x5 the fznancâ.al 
benefit or profit giver, for investing capital in the firm. In 
proprietary corporate enterprises the return on capital is the primary 
purpose for investing in the firm. In cooperatives, the members are 
primarily interested in the benefits they derive as patrons. These 
benefits may be either financial or in the form of services performed. The 
returns are distributed on a basis of patronage instead of on a basis of 
capital investment. Because the returns are allocated in this irianner, 
the return based on capital investment is either very little or nonexistent. 
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Another characteristic of cooperatives is the obligation of member 
firms to provide the needed capital. Since returns based on capital 
investment are limited, there is no profit motive for providing capital 
as investors. Tine meiiiber-palirons tlierefore assuiric tlie responsibility 
of providing the required capital. 
Cooperatives also differ from corporate enterprises in the instru­
ments available for providing the required capital. Corporate enter­
prises use primarily debt, common stock, and preferred stock. Coopera­
tive associations have all these instruments plus that of deferred 
patronage dividends. Patronage dividends are the excess of revenues over 
costs experienced in operating the cooperative. The dividends are paid on 
a basis of a percentage of the patronage dividends paid in cash at the 
end of the fiscal year and the remainder paid in cash in a later period. 
The portion paid in cash in a later period is the deferred patronage divi­
dend. The percentage of patronage dividends held for deferred payments and 
the periods and manner in which they are held may vary among coopéra-
form of member investment in the cooperative. 
Cooperatives also differ from corporate enterprises in the treatment 
of common stock. In the corporate enterprise, the price of common stock 
is determined in the market place and is dependent on the earnings of 
the firm and the capitalization rate associated with the firm. Coopera­
tive association coiriiron stock is almost always fixed in price in the articles 
of incorporation of the firm and does not vary with the earnings of the 
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corporate enterprises is most commonly done by maximizing the value of 
each share of common stock in the firm. Since cooperatives are assumed 
to operate at cost and have a common stock price fixed by decision­
makers, a different maximand is needed in which the common stock 
price is a choice variable. 
The distinguishing characteristics of cooperatives create a 
need for a difference in the analyses of pricing and production poli­
cies. The cooperative enterprise has not had the extensive study 
which corporate enterprises have had in this area. Hardie (25), 
Helmberger and Hoos (25) , Ladd (33) , and Royer (42) have all developed 
differing optimizing models for cooperative pricing and production poli­
cies. These models have the objective of maximizing either the price 
paid to the member-patron, total sales, or member profits. The unique 
operation of cooperatives in any of these methods dictates the use of 
special treatment differing from that cf corporate enterprises. 
The distinguishing characteristics of cooperatives also create a 
need for the analysis or cooperative financial Structure Lo differ from 
the analysis of financial structure in corporate firms. The difference 
in the treatment of common stock, the addition of deferred patronage 
dividends as an instrument for capital financing, and the principle of 
limited return on capital all indicate the need for specification and 
analysis of an appropriate objective for analyzing cooperative financial 
structure which will differ from the objective of the corporate firm. 
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Prior Research 
Research dealing with the topic of this study has been scarce. A 
AUTiiber of studies have focused cn the cconc~.i£3 of size and spatial 
distribution of grain elevators. In 1959, Halverson (24) studied the 
economies of scale in Iowa's country elevators. He developed an 
engineering cost equation for in-plant operations and combined this with 
a derived assembly cost equation to determine the economies of scale. 
Mikes (35) conducted a similar study in 1971 in which he developed a 
forecast for grain production in 1980 and combined this with his study on 
economies of scale to determine the structural adjustments he felt should 
take place in Iowa's grain industry. Other studies have used similar 
methodology in analyzing the feed (36) and fertilizer (40) industries. 
Another area of research has focused on optimizing models for 
pricing and production in cooperatives. Early literature on coopera­
tives used the idea that the central economic units for analysis were 
the ".ember firzic. Emcliancff (17) viewed the cooperative association 
as an organization of economic units, each having their own economic 
independence while coordinating their business activities through the 
cooperative owned and controlled by them. An important element of this 
earlier work was the absence of a decisior-maker in the cooperative. 
Robotka (41), Phillips (38), Aresvik (5), and Trifon (47) all embraced 
the idea of no decision-maker in the cooperative. 
Because of a lack of a cooperative decision-maker, the objectives 
of the cooperative received little attention. The idea that cooperatives 
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operated for the benefit of it's member-patrons was as far as the defini­
tion of the objective went. Clark (11) developed a model for the 
cooperative to minimize the cost of operation. This was a useful 
formulation because one of the fo^ onding principles of cooperation was 
to give service at cost. With the Clark model, the cooperative sup­
plies goods and services to the members and markets their output. The 
cooperative operates at the point where minimum average cost is at­
tained. This model was criticized by Aizsilnieks (2), who argued that 
the cooperative does not have an independent output decision because 
it must market what the member firms demand of it. 
Savage (44) was one of the first to challenge the nonexistence of a 
decision-maker in the cooperative. He argued that failing to recognize 
the cooperative as a "firm" ignored the conception of the cooperative 
which farmers and cooperative leaders had. Enke (18) was one of the 
early researchers to embrace the cooperative decision-maker idea. His 
model was of a consumer cooperative association in which the decision­
maker ::iake:r decisions concerning the operation of the cooperative. He 
argued that the cooperative decision-maker should have the objective of 
maximizing the members net consumer surplus. With this the cooperative 
decision-maker would set the product price equal to the marginal cost 
of producing it. 
Helirberger and Koos (25) embraced the cooperative decision-maker 
idea in a -cdsl of a single product firrr.. This model provided a 
theoretical basis for maximizing the price paid to the member firms in a 
single product marketing cooperative. The framework of the model 
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implies that when net savings are maximized the price paid to the member 
firm for the product is maximized. Hardie (25) extended this model to 
the multiproduct cooperative. He formulated a linear programming model 
and argued that the shadow prices he derived from it should determine 
the method for distributing cooperative net savings. Ladd (33) used 
the arguments of the Helmberger and Hoos model to extend into a dif­
ferent multiproduct cooperative model. His model contained three 
services - the sale of an item used as a productive input by members and 
nonmembers, an excludable public good provided only to members, and a 
bargaining service benefiting both members and nonmembers by affecting 
the price they receive for their raw product. Ladd considered the 
alternative objectives of maximizing the raw material price received by 
members and the quantity of raw material marketed through the cooperative. 
Ladd showed that optimizing conditions for these two objective functions 
differed substantially from one another and from those of a profit 
maximizing firm. 
his general nonlinear model for cooperatives. He did this by distinguishing 
members and nonmembers who may do business with the cooperative. He 
derived supply functions for products that the member and nonmember 
patrons sell to the cooperative and demand functions for the products 
the member and nonmember patrons purchase from the cooperative. He 
defined the objective of the cooperative as the maximization of the 
member profits. Royer derived the Kuhn-Tucker conditions from his 
model and internreted the economic imnlications of the Kuhn-Tucker 
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conditions. 
Eversull (20) demonstrated how a practical application of Royer's 
model could be used as a planning guide by cooperative decision-makers. 
He did this by specifying a model for a hypothetical cooperative 
association and then derived and discussed the results obtained from 
the model. 
Research dealing with optimization of the capital structure in 
corporate enterprises is typified in the analysis done by Vickers (57). 
Vickers looked at two sources of capital, debt and owners' equity. He 
developed an equity cost function which gives the capitalization rate 
of owners' equity as a function of the coefficient of variation in the firms 
total net operating stream, the total capital employed, and the leverage 
ratio (debt/total liabilities). He then developed a debt cost function 
which gave the average interest rate of debt as a function of the 
coefficient of variation of the earnings stream available to cover tiie 
interest on debt and the leverage ratio. Vickers then selected the 
xinancicLi uiidu c^u L-lic LdCc of jT^ tum On tzhc bcck V^ l—c 
of o'-Tier invest-.ent. Fro^  this he found that the optimum degree of 
financial leverage was that at which the marginal rate of return on equity 
is equal to the iriarginal rate of interest on debt. For the mors general 
case, he said that the optimum allocation of the fiiin's demand for 
capital over alternative capital sources would be such as to equate the 
cost of each capital source at the margin. 
Other sources of research on capital structure have dealt more 
spacificolly ••.•ith cooperatives. T'jbbs {48} measured the effects on 
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member profits, liquidity, and asset accumulation under differing 
financing plans employed by the cooperative. His computer simulation 
model showed that sizeable capital requirements of members by the 
cooperative can reduce substantially the profits and assers accumulated 
by the members over time. In selecting an optimal financing plan, 
Tubbs minimized the financial sacrifices of the investing member as 
a basis for determining the optimum. 
Other cooperative studies have developed models for optimizing 
the capital structure and then compared actual practice with the results 
obtained in the model. Snider and Koller (46) conducted a study on 
Minnesota dairy marketing cooperatives. They found that the average 
cost of capital could be lowered simply by increasing the amount of 
debt relative to other forms of financing in the cooperative. This 
study found that the cost of debt was considerably less than the cost 
of deferred patronage dividends, which was defined as equivalent to 
the member's opportunity cost of capital. 
ç-im-iipr- cT-nmi-in nrhtpr- srares have resulted xn âiiïiilâï con­
clusions, i.e., too much in deferred patronage dividends was being 
used and not enough debt was used as capital. Nervik and Gunderson 
(37) found in their study of South Dakota cooperatives that too heavy 
a reliance on deferred patronage dividends can cause an inadequate 
permanent capital base. Deferred patronage dividends are only a semi­
permanent source of capital since they must be paid out in cash at a 
later date. This creates problems in obtaining borrowed capital which, 
in turn, creates the problem of not enough capital provided by debt. 
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Findings similar to these were obtained by Korzan and Gray (32) 
in an Oregon study. They studied data of capital structures in Oregon 
cooperatives and compared these to alternative financial plans. They 
rates than do the individual member producers. They concluded a net 
gain would result if cooperatives borrowed operating capital and 
returned more equity capital back to the producers. 
Wilson (59) came up with another conclusion from his financial 
study on cooperatives. He recommended that equity capital be serviced 
first, and then patronage dividends be declared. He argued that a 
return on member capital should be equal to a moderate, fixed rate, 
serviced like interest is on debt. Current law allows such an allocation 
procedure,^  however, Wilson asserts that many would argue that this is 
not a real cost and would violate the cooperative principle of 
operation at cost. 
There have been a number of descriptive and applied studies com­
pleted, but relatively few have dealt with the theoretical framework 
in the financing of cooperatives. Fenwick (21) did, however, develop 
a theoretical framework for minimizing the cost of capital in 
a cooperative. He developed equations for determining the current value 
of a member's investment, and then constructed a function identifying 
the value of the cooperative to the members and an average cost of 
capital function. Froz this he fecund that as the amoimt of borrowed 
funds increases, the average cost of capital decreases. Also, as the 
revolving period decreases in length, the member's opportunity cost 
1 
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decreases. Dahl (15) conducted a study on Wisconsin cooperatives which 
also utilized the concept of minimizing the cost of capital. His study 
yielded the standard conclusion that not enough debt was being used as 
a financing tool. 
Coffman (14; developed a linear programming model for analyzing 
the annual financial condition of a local multi-enterprise cooperative. 
The model was used for long range financial planning within the 
cooperative and used to analyze the effects of different financing 
policies on different classes of member patrons. Beierlein and Schrader 
(8) developed a deterministic simulator of cooperative and patron 
cash flows and used it to evaluate the impact of changes in cooperative 
capital structure on the level of patron benefits. They reach in­
conclusive results because of the interaction of particular capital 
plans with patron characteristics. 
Summary of Prior Research 
•rno c-rnrips -reviewed concerninu coooeratives have concentrated cn 
the problem of either developing the theory for cooperative pricing and 
production policy in cooperatives or determining the optimal capital 
structure within the cooperative. No decision model could be found 
which might coordinate these two problems within the cooperative. 
In the cooperative pricing and production problem, much was 
identified which dealt with the theory but the empirical testing of 
the models developed was relatively little or nonexistent. Royer seems 
to have drawn together the ideas from earlier authors to develop his 
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general linear programming model for cooperative production and pricing 
policy. 
The study of cooperative financing has been much more empirical 
than chat of cooperative pricing and production. Several autl'iOrs 
(IS, 31, 36, 45, 48, 58) were able to draw conclusions about present 
cooperative financing practices, the most common conclusion being 
that not enough debt and too much deferred patronage dividends was 
used in financing the cooperative. 
The theory concerning the optimal capital structure in cooperatives 
has not had the extensive research that cooperative pricing and pro­
duction has. The most common approach to evaluating cooperative 
financing has been the development of linear programming models and 
simulation models. The most basic theoretical approach was developed 
by Fenwick in minimizing the cost of capital used for financing the 
cooperative. The other source of theory reviewed concerned the financing 
of corporate enterprises developed by Vickers. His approach to optimal 
O L.JL UW UUi. WCLO L.W L-liC a JLC ULLj.ll v 
of owners'investment for increases in financial leverage. No adaptation 
of this theory to cooperatives was found. 
Objectives 
The review of literature points to several problems associated with 
analyzing cooperatives. First, there has been no study which has 
effectively described the cooperative decision nexus. Many studies have 
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dealt with either the production and pricing problem or the financing 
problem, but never both. Sach author has assumed the decisions to be 
independent enough in nature to analyze separately. 
Second, the literature concerning the production arid pricing 
policies within cooperatives has been primarily theoretical- No 
empirical testing of the models described has taken place. Royer 
developed a general linear programming model for cooperatives and 
interpreted the Kuhn-Tucker conditions he derives from it. Eversull 
applied the model to a hypothetical cooperative to show how the model 
might be used as a planning guide for cooperative decision-makers. 
Beyond this study no practical application of the model has been done. 
Third, even though much literature has dealt with the financing 
problems within cooperatives, few models have been developed for a 
theoretical analysis. Many linear programming models and simulation 
models were developed which were based cn the cash flows to member 
patrons, but minimizing the cost of capital has been the most basic 
rhooT-er-i cal approach used. A coopérative association has been defined 
as an organization of firms operated jointly to improve each member 
firm's operation. It has not been adequately shown that minimizing the 
cost of capital is a rule followed by cooperatives nor has it been 
shown that this is the objective most consistent with cooperative 
principles. 
In light of the problems pointed out, an attempt will be iXiade here 
to define a more complete and accurate description of the cooperative 
decision nexus. The relationship of the production and pricing decision 
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and financing decision will be shown. 
Once the decision nexus has been defined more accurately, theo­
retical models will be developed which this study will use as a 
basis for evaluation of actual cooperative practices. Data collecced 
from local farmer cooperatives in Iowa will be used for empirical 
estimation of the production and pricing model. The treatment of the 
finance model will only evaluate the economic implications of the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the model. No empirical estimation of 
the finance model will be done. 
Following Chapters 
In Chapter II, the decision nexus of the cooperative is presented. 
The relationship of the production and pricing decision and financing 
decision is shown. 
Chapter III takes a close look at the theoretical model concerning 
the production and pricing decision. Chapter IV specifies the empirical 
pi-oroôiTr(=>s ijsed in estimatino the production ai'id oriciriQ inodel and 
Chapter V discusses the results obtained from the empirical analysis. 
Chapter VI presents the theoretical model concerning the finance 
decision. Chapter VII discusses the economic implications of the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions derived from the general finance model and models 
with common-stock price and capital-employed restrictions. Chapter VIII 
consists of a Summary, Conclusions, and Suggestions for Further Research. 
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CHAPTER II. THE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION 
DECISION NEXUS 
The objective of the cooperative decision-maker in the short-run 
production and pricing model developed by Royer and discussed in the 
introduction was the maximization of the total collective profits of 
the member patrons in the cooperative association. The logic for the 
derivation of this objective was that, if the cooperative is viewed 
as an extension of the member patrons or if it is understood that the 
purpose of the cooperative is to benefit the member patrons, maximiza­
tion of the total profits of the members patrons is consistent with 
the assumption that member patrons maximize profits.^  There exists no 
generally accepted objective for the financial decision facing the 
cooperative decision-maker. Fenwick (21) suggested that minimizing 
the cost of capital could be one method of obtaining a defined capital 
structure. Other authors have developed simulation models which maxi­
mize the present value of cash flows to the member patrons of the 
2 
cooperative association. Vickers suggested that the financial function 
of the corporate firm cannot be 'inderstood or discharged in isolation 
from a larger nexus of forces. These forces, when taken together, 
determine an optimum economic position of the corporate firm. 
"^ J. S. Royer (42, pp. 59-50). 
D^. Vickers (57, p. 37). 
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The decisions facing the cooperative decision-maker are in fact 
dependent upon a larger nexus of forces involving all phases of the 
cooperative economic structure. These decisions must be analyzed for 
their interdependence to determine the forces which jointly determine 
the optimum economic structure of the cooperative association. 
In this chapter the operating and planning decision problems 
of the cooperative association which lead to the optimum economic 
structure will be looked at relative to the "sequential decision­
making points" at which the enterprise is examined for optimum economic 
structure. The following chapters will deal more specifically with the 
independent decisions of the cooperative decision-maker. 
The Cooperative 
Association 
A cooperative association is an organization of firms joined 
together for the purpose of processing and marketing their products 
or supplying the inputs they use in production. The activities may or 
lïîdy not ut: jLxinj.ttici iiieiiujeiS ^ xxi facL, ïûâiiV cooperatà-ves do business 
with patrons who are not members. 
Figure 2.1 shows the relationships between the various groups of 
the cooperative association. The cooperative purchases unprocessed 
products (set X) from member and nonmember patrons and supplies them 
with variable inputs (set Y) which they use in production. The 
cooperative determines the price it will pay for purchased unprocessed 
products and the price it charges for the sale of variable inputs. 
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Member Patrons 
\/ 
/\ 
Dividends 
stock 
Sellers outside the 
cooperative association 
j Cooperative 
ISellers outside the 
'cooperative association 
Buyers outside the 
cooperative association 
Buyers outside the 
cooperative association 
Sellers outside the 
cooperative 
association 
Nonmember Patrons 
iBuyers outsxae tne 
X 
KEY: 
! 
aooQS 
cash or credit 
oatronage dividends 
Figure 2.1. Model of the cooperative association (adapted from 
Royer, Fig. 2.1. p. 29) 
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Some inputs are not sold (set G) because they are public goods which can­
not be excluded from nonpayers. Instead, the cooperative provides them free 
of charge. The cooperative also purchases variable inputs (set V) from 
sellers ouLslde the cooperative association and sells finished products 
(set Z) to buyers outside the cooperative association. In this model, the 
member patrons receive patronage dividends from the cooperative on the basis 
of patronage with the cooperative. This is one method of distributing a por­
tion of the net savings. Despite the principle of operation at cost^  
cooperatives do often realize a net savings in the operation. Net 
savings occur in the operation of the cooperative for two basic 
reasons. First, cooperatives cannot accurately forecast what the true 
cost of operation will be. The cooperative may charge a price to its 
members for a service which exceeds the true cost of the service, 
therefore generating a net savings in the operation. Secondly, the 
cooperative may choose to have net savings in its operation to pay for 
upkeep and expansion of its facilities. The cooperative will generate 
the net savings and retain a portion of them via deferred patronage 
dividends or retained savings to accommodate this need. 
An alternative method of allocating net savings is with dividends 
on stock, primarily to pay a limited return on investment in the firm. 
Dividends cannot be paid on any type of investment other than common 
stock investment,- otherwise the cooperative loses %he zax benefits 
derived from the Internal Revenue Service which allows savings 
allocated by specific rules to be nontaxable. 
2 Ma yf" 1 M 5 i rvva V-i ^ C A \ 
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Also observable from the model is that members and nonmembers are 
not required to do business exclusively with the cooperative associa­
tion. Both groups may do business outside the cooperative association 
for tiic variable inputs (set Y) and unprocessed products (sex X) . 
The Cooperative Financial 
Statements 
The process of determining the optimum economic structure of the 
cooperative requires an understanding of the financial statements. These 
financial statements include the balance sheet, which describes in money 
value terms the position of the firm as of a specified date, and the 
income statement, which summarizes the flows of revenues and costs 
during a preceding period of time. The most common period of time in­
volves a calendar year, but may involve different lengths of time. 
The balance sheet and income statement for the cooperative is 
quite similar to that fo'ond in the corporate enterprise. Figure 2.2 
indicates the form of the financial statements for the cooperative. 
Consider the balance sheet first. Double-entry DooKKeeping 
ensures that total assets must be the same as total liabilities. The 
assets side of the balance sheet for tlie cooperative is similar to that 
for a corporate enterprise. The total assets indicate the total invest­
ment that has been made in the cooperative. The asset accounts describe 
the various ways in which the money capital has been invested in the 
cooperative, in essence, the structure of the investment in the coopera­
tive. The money capital may he invesrsd in different activities. The 
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BALANCE SHEET 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
INCOME STATEMENT 
Total sales xxx 
Less; Variable factor costs xxx 
Fixed factor costs xxx 
TOTAL operating costs xxx 
Mat operating income xxx 
Less; Interest on debt capital xxx 
NET savings xxx 
Figure 2.2. Cooperative financial statements 
Assets : 
Current assets 
Cash xxx 
Accounts reveivable xxx 
Inventory xxx 
Fixed assets xxx 
TOTAL ASSETS xxx 
Liabilities : 
Current liabilities 
Accounts payable 
Short-term debt 
Long-term capital sources 
Preferred stock 
Owner equity 
Common stock 
Earned surplus 
Deferred patronage 
refunds 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 
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Less: Preferred stock dividends xxx 
Common stock dividends xxx 
Patronage refunds xxx 
TOTAL allocations xxx 
Retained earnings before tax xxx 
Income tax liability xxx 
Retained earnings xxx 
Figure 2.2 (Continued) 
assets shew the combinations of assets which have been selected and 
employed by the firm. 
The liabilities side of the balance sheet indicates the total 
money capital employed in the firm. The liabilities side of the 
balance sheet for the cooperative is similar to that of a corporate 
antGzpricc .;ith the exception of orrn-iry. The owner eauity 
is the total capital which has been supplied by the owners or, in the 
cooperative,, member patrons. In a cooperative, member patrons supply 
capital via cor=on stock and earned-surplus.. both commonly used by 
corporate enterprises. Cooperatives, however, also obtain capital from 
member patrons with deferred patronage dividends. Patronage dividends 
are exclusive to cooperatives as a method of allocating net savings. 
The deferred portion of these patronage dividends gives the corporation 
an additional instrument for obtaining capital. 
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The principal point to note in the balance sheet is that the 
liabilities side describes the various sources from which money 
capital has been obtained, and the assets describe the uses to which 
the money capital has been employed. Thus, tne balance sheer shows 
the financial structure of the firm, the structure of its investments 
and the structure of its financing methods. 
The income statement indicates the revenues and costs realized 
during the preceding financial period. Net operating income equals 
income minus all costs except the interest paid on debt capital, 
and net savings equals net operating income minus interest on debt. 
The major difference in the cooperative from the corporate firm is 
in the total allocations and handling of the income tax liability. 
In the corporate fir;a income taxes are determined as a function of 
the net saving while in a qualified 521 cooperative, income taxes are 
based primarily on the amount of retained earnings. The allocations 
of net savings also differ because patronage dividends are allocated 
ir. nor in coToorazions. 
The Management 
Functions 
The task of cooperative management encompasses all of the aspects 
v.'hich affect the cooperative financial . A cooperative 
association differs from a corporate enterprise in that the former is 
organized and operated for the benefit of its member patrons. The 
operation for the benefit of the member patrons entails a different 
2 3  
set of objectives by which the cooperative must be operated. As was 
pointed out earlier, the objective of maximizing the profits of the 
firm is not the objective assumed in most cooperative studies. This 
study will assume tnat the objective of rhe cooperative is that of 
maximizing the total collective profits of the member patrons. 
In fulfilling the objective of maximizing the total collective 
profits of the member patrons, the cooperative decision-maker is 
faced with a set of enterprise management decisions. These management 
decisions can be categorized by the levels of economic significance 
associated with each task. The first task which faces the cooperative 
decision-maker is the task of determining the asset and capital structure 
of the firm. Second, there is the task of the short-run functioning 
and management of the cooperative in accordance with the structure 
determined in the first decision. 
The task of determining the structure of the cooperative organiza­
tion involves decisions which determine the size and structure of 
arrivtries which best serves the objective or the meinbtir oatxOiiS. 
In determining the structure, the cooperative decision-maker is con­
cerned with the combination of activities which best serve the member 
patrons, which may involve the decision of adding new activities to 
the enterprise, or changing or deleting existing activities. The 
determination of structure can be divided into cwo separate and distinct 
decisions. First, the cooperative decision-maker must: determine -che 
level of capital investment to have in the cooperative and the combination 
of liabilities necessary for this capital. Second, the cooperative 
24 
decision-maker must determine the investment portfolio by which to use 
this capital. This involves the decision of choosing the amount and 
combination of investments in assets necessary to maintain the 
Finally,- the cooperative decision-maker must be concerned with 
the short-run functioning of the firm. In the cooperative, this in­
volves the determination of the level of production and the price 
paid or received for products handled by the cooperative association. 
The management of the cooperative in the short-run is reflected in the 
income statement. Determination of the production and pricing policies 
affects the revenues and costs of operation, the central points of the 
income statement. 
The Decision Nexus 
The analysis of the cooperative management decision process can 
be analyzed in light of the different decision tasks and their 
nrrsvi mn T* V in rno cnrT'OQctT Tro •no-r-'i-i nlanninrr Marac Tno ttc» 
which shall be adapted for the analysis of the cooperative decision 
process is that the structure decision of the cooperative is logically, 
as well as temporally, made prior to the short-run operating decisions 
of the cooperative decision-maker. The financial structure will be 
determined in conjunction with the asset; structure. To determine the 
WM W -A-A * WA «.f f  ^ O A Ci^  ^  C4 O Vi. W C*0 K V C O * ' • " • ' W 
a A /Q 4-Vso -v-w o 
«- O*  ^W  ^V A » >_& v * * s>^  * w —f W W-a A * C»*, VW & 
with certainty. Given this set of investment opportunities, we can 
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specify the function which describes returns to capital investment. 
This function will be used in determining the financial structure of 
the cooperative. The financial structure determined in this way 
specifies the total capital to be employed, by the coopérâtand 
the asset portfolio. The interdependence of the asset and financial 
structure decisions cause the two decisions to be made simultaneously. 
In conceiving the cooperative decision problem, we can divide 
the decision problem into three interdependent components: one, the 
production and pricing problem; two, the investment problem; and 
three, the financing problem. The solution to the production and 
pricmg problem zs the short -ruri decisioiî problem and wj.ll be reflected 
in the revenue flow in the income statement and in the structure of the 
operating costs. The solution to the investment problem will be 
reflected in the structure of the assets side of the balance sheet. 
The solution to the financing problem will be reflected primarily in 
the liabilities side of the balance sheet. The order of the decisions 
made can be reflected in the planning dates under which they are solved. 
The financial and asset structure problems are long-run decision prob­
lems and must be made prior to the production and pricing decision. 
Once the level of capital employed has been chosen in the long-run 
financing problem, the cooperative decision-maker has simultaneously 
determined the combination ot assets or activities to employ. The 
determination of the production and pricing problem is a short-run 
decision which is made with the established structure determined in the 
financing and investment problems. 
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In the remainder of this text, we shall be looking more closely 
at the short-run production and pricing problem and the long-run 
financing problem in the cooperative. We shall look at the 
investment problem only from the standpoint of the prospective member 
patron in determining the value of membership in the cooperative. 
The determination of the decision problem outlined previously 
would suggest that the financing problem should be analyzed first since 
it is made prior to the production and pricing problem. The text 
here, however, will first look at the short-run production and pricing 
problem. This is done because of the previous work relative to this 
decision problem. A discussion of the theory involved in this problem 
is presented and an empirical analysis of the results is presented. 
The financing problem of the cooperative is then analyzed. The 
financing problem is presented last since it involves the development 
of new theory for the analysis. 
CHAPTER III. COOPERATIVE PRICING AND 
PRODUCTION SUB-MODEL 
Various studies have dealt with the development of optimizing 
models for cooperatives in connection with production, pricing, or 
both. Various objective functions have been specified, each giving 
different results. The most recent and complete was the model developed 
by Royer. His general nonlinear model specified the objective function 
as being the maximization of member profits. He derived the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions and interpreted their economic implications. 
The sub-model developed in this chapter will use many of the ideas 
developed by Royer. The same objective function will be utilized and 
minor modifications will be made in the structure. 
The Cooperative Association in 
the Short-Run 
When dealing with the short-run pricing and production model, we 
the cooperative association. Figure 2.1 shows the relationship which 
exists between these various groups. The short-run pricing and pro­
duction decision involves the dstermination of the optiri'jm level of 
production and the optiimjin price for products handled by the cooperative 
association. By definition of the model depicted in Figure 2.1, the 
cooperative association purchases unprocessed products (sex X), sells 
variable inputs (set Y), and supplies public goods (set G) to the member 
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and nonmember patrons. The member patrons receive patronage dividends 
from the net savings generated by the cooperative and dividends on 
common stock. A final important characteristic of the model is that 
members and nonmembers are not bound into doing business with the 
cooperative association. Both groups may do business outside the 
cooperative association. 
In the pricing and production model we can assume the dividend on 
common stock is a constant, since the dividends are based on common 
stock investment and not patronage. Membership is assumed fixed in 
the short-run which fixes the amount of common stock investment and, 
therefore, dividends on common stock. Although, nonmembers can invest 
in cooperatives and legally receive patronage dividends, I will assume 
this not to be the case in the model developed here. Any investment 
in stock by nonmembers can be treated similar to debt, since it normally 
has a fixed rate of return not dependent upon net savings. 
Patron Models 
The objective of a typical r-.s:r±;er patron and nonmember patron is 
v-m a 1 1 ^ r =» ccmmo/H r\a ma v "i m "i «7 a+* T /"vn -F r>-i c: A C in 
the model of the cooperative association, we will assume the patrons 
market the products they produce in set X, some v.'ithin the cooperative 
association, X^ , and some outside the cooperative association, X_. 
Similarly, Y is the set of variable inputs purchased by the patrons, 
some from the coooerative association. Y . and some from outside the 
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The typical member patron will want to maximize his total profits, 
which can be expressed as ; 
IT,, = Z p..q^  - Z p^ q^  + ds + pvpd - Fc (3.1) 
i£X " " iCY " ' 
where p^  and q^  are respectively, the price paid or received and the 
total quantity of the i-th product or factor, where ds is the dividends 
on trie cooperative stock held by the member patron, pvpd is the 
present value of the patronage dividends which the member patron expects 
to receive, and Fc is the fixed cost of the member firm. The present 
value of the patronage dividends (pvpd) may be restated as; 
pvpd = [s + ] Z r.*q. (3.2) 
(1+d) iec  ^  ^
where s is the proportion of patronage dividends paid in cash and (1-s) 
is the proportion deferred to a revolving fund of length T. Here, c 
represents the products sold to (set X) or factors purchased from 
(set Y) the cooperative by the member, r^ * represents the expected per 
unit patronage refund on the i-th product or factor, and d represents 
the discount rate, i.e., it may be the opportunity cost or interest 
rate paid by the member patron for long term debt. r. * would vary for 
each member patron and could be dependent on past dividend rates. A 
function is not specified for r^  * here. 
Given this objective function, a continuous production function 
with continuous first-order and second-order derivatives, and the 
quantity of each of the fixed factors,- we can solve for the optiirial 
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production of goods supplied in sex X and the optimal amount of inputs 
demanded in set Y. This can be done by specifying the Lagrangian of 
the member patron; 
L = 2 p.q, - I p.q. + ds + pvpd - Fc + [(}) (q^ ,q^ ,q^ ,q^ ) ] 
 ^ i&X " ^  iCY " -
l£F 
where is the implicit production function with continuous 
X Y r "Xr 
first-order and second-order derivatives, q^  is the vector of 
quantities of unprocessed products produced by the member, q^  is the 
vector of quantities of variable inputs used in production by the 
member, q^  is the vector of quantities of public goods used in production 
by the member, q^  is the vector of quantities of fixed factors used 
in production by the member, and q^  ^(iSF) is the total amount of fixed 
factors available for production. If the marginal value products of 
the fixed factors (set F) do not reach zero, the fixed factor will be 
totally unrealistic and will be made here. Imposing this assumption 
allows the economic implications and results of the model ::o be more 
easily derived and understood. The variable is the Lagrange multiplier 
associated with the production function constraint and is the Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the i-th fixed factor (i£F). 
Given these assumptions, the first-order conditions for the model 
in 3.3 become ; 
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for all iex 
c 
= p. + r.Ms + . 0 (3.4) 
for all iex 
G 
35^  = ï'i  ^\ H:'° '3-51 
X 
for all icy 
c 
.. ii-s) , ^  -
for all icy 
o 
35" "Pi "" 35" = ° 
1 
for all icF 
= : 1 = o 
3q, "1 3q, "2i 
for X 
—fr yv X"*  ^  ^
 ^A Y ^ ' "iv ' "-1? '  ^W A_ X .*. V3 
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for all i£F 
= q.^  - q. =0. (3.10) 
3X21 i^o 
Given these first-order conditions, the member patron will produce the 
unprocessed product (set X) and sell to the cooperative association at 
the point where the effective price (price received plus the per unit 
discounted present value of patronage dividends) received is equal to 
the marginal cost of producing it,^  i.e.; 
for all iex 
c 
i^ {l+d)T^ i^* " ~^ i "âf" • (3.11) 
The member patron will produce the unprocessed product (set X) and 
sell outside the cooperative association at the point where the price 
2 
received is equal to the marginal cost of producing it, i.e.; 
V» T T ^ 
o 
i^ '^ 1 3a. * 
X 
A similar conclusion may be reached about the demand for inputs (sex Y). 
The member oatron will demand incuts from the cooperative to the ooint 
• i\\-/j' \'rt ^  f / -1 / 
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where the effective price is equal to the marginal value product of 
using the input in production, i.e.; 
for all ieY 
c 
f1—3 ^ . 36 
Pi - [s + - -A, ^ . u.iJj t = -i* '
The member will purchase inputs outside the cooperative to the point 
where the price of the input is equal to the marginal value product 
of using the input in production,"^  i.e.; 
for all i£Y 
o 
Pi =-X, . (3.1« 
1 
Given the first-order conditions we can solve for the optimal 
values of the choice variables as functions of the parameters if the 
bordered Hessian matrix of the model is nonvanishing and negative 
definite. This results in output supply functions for products in 
set X and 3Ct X and input denar.cl f'jir.ct"'tne inouts in set ï CO c 
and set Y^ . The general functions can be represented as such; 
for icX^ , Y^ , X^ , Y^  
Si = Si(Px'PY'*C'GG) 
where is the vector of prices the member receives for his unprocessed 
products from the cooperative, is the vector of prices the member 
S. Royer (42, pp. 41-42). 
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pays for the inputs he purchases from the cooperative, R* is the vector 
of expected patronage dividend rates on the unprocessed products and 
inputs the member expects to receive for trading with the cooperative, 
and Qg is the vector of quantities of public goods produced by the 
cooperative. Similar functions could be developed for those products 
purchased or sold outside the cooperative association by the member. 
The total quantity demanded of each of the inputs and the total 
quantity supplied of each of the unprocessed products by all members 
will be the horizontal summation across all members for each 
product, i.e.; 
for all i£X, Y 
TM 
where is the total quantity supplied of the unprocessed products 
(sex X) by the members or total quantity demanded of the in­
puts (set Y) by the members, is the vector of expected 
oatronaae dividend rates of the membeirs. P.P. and O are as 
- - A Y ~G 
defined before. 
A similar model may be developed for the nonmember patron, 
except that the nonmember patron will not participate in the patronage 
dividends or dividends on stock, i.e., the profit function of the 
typical nonmember patron is; 
Zi^ i - - "c-
loX 
The nonmember will face the sairie cons craints as the irceiri>cr, i.e., his 
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Lagrangian becomes ; 
l£X i£Y 
+ Z [q. -q.]. (3.18) 
iEF 21 " 
From this Lagrangian, we obtain the following first-order conditions; 
for all iex , X 
c o 
3L NM 
9q. = Pi 
(3.19) 
for all i£Y , Y 
c o 
3L 
3qi 
NM , 3(1) 
i^"^  '^ l 3a. 
= 0 (3.20) 
for all i£F 
3L NM 
= X, 3({) 
- ^ 04 = 0' (3.21) 
for 
3L, 
NM 
3A, 
/ «"v y-» /"V x~r \ 
NM . 
ax:: = Sio - Si = °' 
(3.22) 
(3.23) 
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Similar economic implications may be drawn about the nonmember patrons 
as were drawn about the member patrons. We may also derive output supply 
functions for products in set X and set X and input demand functions 
c o 
for the inputs in set and set Y^ . Again, these may be derived from 
the first-order conditions if the bordered Hessian matrix of the model 
is nonvanishing and negative definite. 
Assuming the bordered Hessian to be nonvanishing and negative 
definite,- we will find the input demand and output supply functions of 
the typical nonmember patron to be a function of the parameters in 
the model, i.e.; 
for all ieX , Y 
c c 
Si = SiCPx'Py.QG) (3.24) 
where all variables are as defined before. The total quantity sup­
plied by all nonmembers to the cooperative association of the products 
in set X^  and the total quantity demanded by all nonmembers from the 
coou^ eiaLivc association of all inputs in set Y v.'ill bs the hcrizontei 
c 
suzir^ tion across all nonmenibers for each product,- i.e.: 
for all iCX , Y 
c c 
sl* = SifPx.Py.Oc) (3.25) 
TN 
where q. is the total quantity supplied (or demanded) of the product 
from all nonmembers. 
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The Cooperative Model 
Assuming the relationships in the cooperative association to be as 
outlined in Figure 2.1, and assuming the objective of the cooperative 
decision-maker to be that of maximizing the total collective profits 
of the member patrons, we can specify our objective function as; 
TM TM 
IÎ = Z p.q. - Z p.q. - FCM + DS + PVPD (3.26) 
iex ^ ^ isY ^ ^ 
where H is the total collective profits of the member patrons, qt'^  
is the total amount of product i purchased or sold by the 
member patrons (determined in the patron model) , p_. is the price 
of product i, FCM is the total collective fixed costs of the member 
patrons, DS is the total dividend on members stock, and PVPD is the 
total present value of patronage dividends. 
The total dividend on members stock, DS, can be assumed to be 
a fixed parameter in the short-run, since this would be a method of 
distributing the net savings of the cooperative and would affect the 
financial structure decision facing the cooperative. 
PVPD may be redefined as ; 
n —-q ^ TM 
PVPD= [s + _^ ] r Z r.a ] (3.27) 
(1+d)' iex,Y  ^ic 
where q|^  is the total amount of product i traded with the cooperative by 
the member patrons. Since cooperative associations have the principle of 
operation at cost, I will assume the net savings less the dividend on mem­
bers stock is paid out as patronage dividends, i.e.; 
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TM NS - DS = Z r.q (3.28) 
i£X,Y  ^^  
and define NS as ; 
T T NS = Z p.q. 4- Z p.q. - Z p.q. - Z p q. (3.29) 
i£Z i£Y i£X i£V  ^j£Y,Z,G  ^
T 
where q^  represents the total amount of product i supplied or demanded 
from the cooperative by both member and nonmember patrons, q^ (i£Z) 
is the set of finished products sold outside the cooperative association, 
and q^ _. is the total amount of input i used to produce product j. 
Given these definitions, we can redefine our objective function to be; 
n= Z p.q™ - Z p.q™ + [s + ] [NS-DS] + DS - FCM (3.30) 
i£X  ^^  i£Y  ^^  (1+d) 
where all variables are as defined before (including NS in Equation 
3.29). 
The objective function of the cooperative association (3.30) will 
be subject to several constraints. A production function must be 
wiixCii Wixi l'iâVê: COriuxIiuOuS xJLiTS u—OjL»aêi ôlîu. 5€:COn^"-Oiicr 
derivatives. We can show the production function in implicit form as; 
where is the vector of quantities of processed products in set 2, 
Q is the vector of quantities of variable factors in set Y, is the 
vector of quantities of public goods in set G, is the vector of 
quantities of unprocessed products in set X used to produce products 
in set Y, set Z, and set G, is the vector of quantities of variable 
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inputs in set V used to produce products in set Y, set Z, and set G, 
and is the vector of quantities of fixed factors of production 
used to produce products in set Y, set Z, and set G. 
A second constraint which is specified maintains that all of the 
unprocessed product (sex X) purchased from the member and nonmember 
patrons is transformed into final product, i.e.; 
for all ieX 
~ Ï. q. . = 0. (3.32) 
1 iEY,z,G 
We may also make the same assujnption concerning the fixed factors of 
production whi^ h we made for the patron models, that the fixed factors 
of production are exhausted in the production process, i.e., we get the 
following constraint; 
for all ieFC 
q. - Z q.. = 0 (3.33) 
jCY,Z,G 
where q^ (^iEFC) is the total amount of fixed factor i available for 
production. 
The final constraint for the analysis will be that a specified 
amount of capital from the net savings is deferred for a period of X 
years. This constraint is derived from the long-run financial 
structure decision made by the cooperative association, i.e., 
K= (l-s)(NS-DS) (3.34) 
'.-.'here K is the total amount cf net savings to be deferred (determined in 
the long-run financial decision model) and all other variables are 
as defined before. This constraint and Equation 3.29 assure a 
consistency between the cooperative short-run and long-r^ an decisions, 
i.e., the level of net savings which is determined by the solution 
of the variables in the long-run decision model is a constraint 
which must be met in the short-run decision model. The constraint 
in Equation 3.34 can be rewritten as; 
(l-s)NS = K + (l-s)DS. (3.35) 
Equation 3.35 is a constraint for the short-run model developed 
in this chapter which Royer did not use in the production and pricing 
decision model he developed. This constraint is the only major dif­
ference in the two models. 
The Lagrangian Function and First-
order Conditions 
From the previously defined objective function, (3.30), and the 
constraints (3.31, 3.32, 3.33, and 3.35), we can define the Lagrangian 
L = S P.q^ '" - Z p.q!'" + [s + [NS-DS] + DS - FCM 
i£X  ^^  i£Y  ^^  (1+d) 
+ fi[ô(Q,,GL,GU,GL,0.,,Q=^ )] +  ^ - Z q.J 
"  ^ i£X " ' jeY,z,G 
iCFC j£Y,Z,G 
+ + (l-s)DS - (l-s)NS] (3.36) 
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TM 
where NS is defined by Equation 3.29; the (ieX,Y) are as defined in 
the member patron model (Equation 3.16); '^^ (^iex), Y^ d^eFC), eind 
are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to each of the constraints; 
and all other variables are as defined before. The instrument vari­
ables available to the cooperative association decision-oaker are 
the prices it sets for products in set X and set Y, the quantities of 
products produced in set Z and set G, and the quantities of inputs in 
set X; set V; and set FC used in the production of each product in 
set Y, set Z, and set G. The first-order conditions are; 
"Frsv all 4 CY 
- 4 -
T  ^ T 
aq, T 
a  V,l r  / t  _  \  f  V - ,  _  V  ^  = L \  t — r\ 1,1.- VJ.-0; \  ^  ^ f: / i — ^ I 
iCY " i£X " "-"j 
for all j£Y 
= z p.. ^  - q™ - z P.. ^  + [s + -^ T] [q! + Z P; 
iex " ''"i  ^ i£Y ^  (1+d) '  ^ i£Y -
._T _^T 
Arfh -"i-i cu. 
iex ^  i£X,Y " Sqt iex 
T 
+ Y.r-(l-s) (q. + Z - Z p. ^ )3 = O. (3.38) 
iEY - iex -
42 
for all jez 
3p. ~. 3p. 
% ' S' ' "3  ^ "a 4' "4'-':-' 'Pj^i 3ij' -
(3.39) 
. TM . TM 
aq'i 
* 'zi à^ - + V4[-(l-s)(.Z^ Pi âE: - âE?)] = °' '^40) 
for all ieX j£Y,Z,G 
ou 
' 1. # f.. = 0, (3.41) 
'%: 1 âq^ j 2i 
for all lev j£Y,Z,G 
3L r_ . (1-s) ,, _ T , V 34 
= ! s + 
3%j ' (1+d)^   ^°^ 'i3 
3p 
+ Y. [-(l-s)(-p.-q. . 3-^ )3 = 0 , (3.42) 
4 1 13 OC;^  
for all isFC j£Y,-Z-,-G 
= 7, 1^  = C, (3.42) 
3q. . '1 3q. . *3i 
1] iD 
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for 
 ^= f(22.8y.S<..ex-Sv.8j.c' = »•"> 
for all jex 
%—= - % q. ^ = 0, (3.45) 
2j  ^ ieY,Z,G  ^
for all ieFC 
||—= q - S = 0, (3.46) 
3j -J i£Y,Z,G 
for 4 
= K + (l-s)DS - (l-s)NS = 0. (3.47) 
An interpretation of results comparable to these yas given by Royer^  
in his analysis of his general nonlinear programming model of a 
"j. S. Royer (42, pp. 85-104) 
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for all jex 
 ^  ^ J !2i! J p 
3Pj "îj g^ TW 3p. % 3p. i 3p. 
' ii'i 
T 
- " '  ^ ' ie/^ 4 
3,^  
' jx  ^
> p. 3q^  3q^  
—3.) ] 
-J- 2 p  ^
3q^  3Pj 1 iri 
9p. 3q" 9qT 
+ ?,{a-s)[(Pj+qt --|) ,p] + p. 
i^ i 
3qî 
- Z p. T-^ ]} = 0. (3.48) 
ieY  ^ j^ 
TM TM 
The term + q^  (Spj/Sq^  ) may be interpreted as the variation in 
total private revenues from the j-th product arising from output 
shifts which are induced by a variation in the j-th price (dp_.). 
TM  ^TM « _ 
Royer represents this effect as (STPK/'Sq^  ) (oq^  /op^ ). "ihe term 
2 p. (9a™/3p,) may be interpreted as the variation in total private 
i£X 1 ] 
2.^ 2 
revenues from all other products in set X arising from output shifts 
_ _ TM. TM induced by dp. and iS represented i:y Royer as i iz^ rx/zq. ; ;c;q. /sp.;. 
 ^ iCX 1 1 ] 
TM Similarly, the term Z p. Oq. /9p.) can be interpreted as the variation 
i£Y  ^  ^  ^
in total private costs arising from shifts in factor use induced by ^ P^  
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Til TM 
and is represented by Royer as Z OTPC/9q. ) Oq. /3p.). 
i£Y 1 1 D 
The terms in the second line of Equation 3.48 may be interpreted 
with similar economic notation. The difference in these terms lie 
T T 
in: 1) the addition of s + (1-s)/(l+d)'; 2) the substitution of q^  
for each qt", and; 3) the fact that what was a revenue in the first 
line of the equation is now a cost and what was a cost is now a 
revenue. The cost and revenue terms are turned around (costs for 
revenues, revenues for costs) because of the affect of the products 
on net savings in the cooperative. The products in set X represent 
a cost to the cooperation in determining the net savings and the 
products in set Y represent a revenue. The term q^  is substituted for 
TM q^  since the total collective product traded by member cind nonmembers 
determines the profits of the cooperative. Finally, the s+(1-s)/(1+d)^  
term is added to represent the present value affect of net savings 
to the members. The net savings are allocated to the members and 
represent an addition to the total collective profits of the members. 
T T . » T 
Given thasa differsnccs, the tcrr. 
J J J J 
T (2Çj/5Pj) is interpreted as the variation in total collective costs from 
the j-th product arising from changes in the quantity supplied which 
T T is induced by dp_. . Royer represents this es OTCC/3q^  ) Oq^ /9p^  ). 
J J J J 
The tem for all other products in set X may be interpreted similarly 
T T 
and is represented by Royer as Z OTCC/3q^  ) (3q^ /8p^  ). The term for 
products in set Y represents the variation in total collective revenues 
arising from changes in quantities demanded which aire induced by dp_.. 
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Royer represents these as Z OTCR/oq"^ ) (9q'^ /8p . ) . 
iEY 1 1 D 
Royer interprets the term which is located in the third line of 
Equation 3.48 as the variation in the profits of the members from 
aie production or the products in set X and set Y arising from changes 
in the quantities demanded or supplied which are induced by dp^ . He 
represents the term as Z (3TMP/9q^)(9q^/3p.) - Z (3TMP/3q^) Oq'^/3p. ) . 
iex  ^  ^  ^ iSY 113 
The term in the fourth line of Equation 3.48 represents the 
variation in the profits of the members from the transformation of 
products in set X to final product arising from a change in the 
quantities supplied which are induced by dp^  and may be represented by 
T T 
- Z OTMP/3q.)(3q./3p.). This term is not found in Royer's model 
i £ X  1 1 3  
because he doesn't include the constraints corresponding to it. This 
to the ts 
equation. Inclusion of this constraint would permit the possibility 
of the film utilizing a product in set X in the production process 
when there may be negative value to the profits of the member patrons. 
The final terms, located in rhe fifth line of iiquation <.45, 
—-A» OVA V dA. o  ^a_ v_^ iu 
output shifts which are induced bv do.. The affect of the outout 
-
shifts on capital employed is through the net savings of the cooperative. 
The terms inside the { } of the fifth line represent the change in 
the amount of deferred patronage dividends induced by dp^  and may be 
represented by Z (9D?/3q^ ) >'3q^ /3p^  ). 
iex,Y 
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The Lagrange multiplier may be interpreted as the variation 
in the total collective profits of the members induced by a change 
in the amount of deferred patronage required, and may be represented 
by (3TMP/3DP). Specifying the terms in the { } cind the in this 
manner allows the term in the fifth line to be interpreted as 
(3TMP/3DP) [Z(DP/SQ"^ ) OQ\/3P.) 1. 
1 13 
Specifying the terms in Equation 3.48 in this manner allows us 
to rewrite the equation as ; 
for all j£X 
- TM  ^TM 
9L  ^ _ 3TPR '^ i^ _ _ 3TPC ^ i^ 
i£X 3q™ iey 5q™ 
. T . T 
3TCR i^ 3TCC % 
jy ' i:x 3.'' 
1 -1 
. T , T 
. y oTMP y oTM? 
iL Sp. - 3p.' 
This is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the sum of the 
variation in total private profits arising from input and output 
shifts induced by dp^ ; the variation in total collective profits 
arising from changes in quantities supplied and demanded induced by 
dpj; the variation in the profits of the members arising from changes 
in the cooperative's production induced by dp^ ; the variation in the 
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profits of the members from the transformation of products in set X to 
final product arising from a change in the quantities supplied induced 
by dpj; and the variation in the profits of the members from the 
change in capital employed via deferred patronage dividends arising 
from output shifts induced by dp^  must equal zero. 
A condition similar to Equation 3.49 may be derived from Equation 
3.38. Equation 3.38 may be rewritten as; 
for all j£Y 
3L , , 
. TM 
TM 9^ j ,BSj 
3P. 
] i/j  ^ :
(1-s) T 
+ z w M_!!l 
iex,Y  ^3q^  
+ Z w,, 
3qt 
u/ -T r y 
'4 .;/i 3p. "i 
ap. 3qu 3oJ 
. T p ——1 1- = n f 7. 
i^ Y i aPi -
- ] i?^ j 
Using the interpretations of the terms derived for Equation 3.49, 
49 
for all jey 
„ TM TM 
3L ,  ^ 3TPR , %  ^ 9TPC 
= ( z —— - z 
'Pj isx 3q™ Pj lev 3qf 
„ 3TCR „ 3TCC 
iL '£>3 " iL 
T T 
. Y 8TMP Y 3TMP 
iL SqT 'iCV3q^  'P. 
T 
- 'i Sf &• 
Equation 3.51 yields an interpretation similar to that for Equation 
3.50. 
OU . 
- 4 
In Equation 3.39, the term p^  + q^  is the marginal revenue 
gç 
of zhe j-th product in set Z. The tenri Y %— was interpreted by 
1 dq_. 
Royer as the variation in the profits of the members arising from a 
change in the quantity of the output produced by the cooperative (da. 
3p. ^ 
Tne term Y + q. %—;] can be as tne variation 
4 ] ] o<3j 
in the profits of the members arising from a change in the amount of 
deferred patronage dividends which is induced by a change in the 
quantity of output produced. Thus, the interpretation for Equation 
50 
3.39 is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the marginal 
% 
revenue to the cooperative, multiplied by s + (l-s)/(l+d) , must be 
equal to the variation in the profits of the members arising from a 
change in quantity of output produced and a change in the amount of 
deferred patronage dividends which is induced by dq^ . 
Equation 3,40 may be interpreted in the same manner as were Equations 
3.37 and 3.38, except that shifts are caused by dq^ CjeG), Equation 3.40 
may be rewritten as ; 
for all j£G 
 ^TM . TM 
3L , ^  3TPR "%  ^ aTPC '^ i , 
= ( Z —— - I —— ) 
iex 
» T 5 T 
, , ^  3TCR "^ i^ 3TCC '^ '^ i , 
3q. - j, 
 ^T „ T 
, _ 3TMP „ 3TMP i^ . 
+ ( ^  ^ 2. 
i£X Sq"^  iSY 1 
0»^. 
- 'i sr 
X J 
This yields an interpretation similar to those given in Equations 3.49 
and 3.51. 
For Equation 3.41 the term (30/oq..) is the variation in the 
profits of the members from a change in the quantity of the i-th factor 
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of set X used to produce output j in the cooperative (dq^ j ) . nay be 
interpreted as the variation in the profits of the member patrons from 
a change in the amount of unprocessed product j used in the coopera­
tive. Thus, Equation 3.41 implies -char che variation in the profits 
of the members from dq.. must be equal for all j. 
-X3 
In Equation 3.42, Royer interprets the term -p^ -q^ j(9p^ /9q^ j) 
as the marginal factor cost to the cooperative of using the i-th 
variable input. Again, the term (90/9q;^ ) is interpreted as the 
J. ij 
variation in the profits of the members from a change in the quantity 
of input i used to produce output j by the cooperative (dq^ )^. The 
term -(l-s)[-p^ -q^ j(9p^ /9q^ j)] can be interpreted as the variation 
in the profits of the members from a change in the amount of required 
deferred patronage dividends which is induced by dq.Thus, Equation 
3.42 may be interpreted as stating that, for a maximum, the variation 
in the profits of the members from dq^  must be equal to the marginal 
% 
factor cost of the input multiplied by s + (l-s)/(l+d) . This 
condition iinpjies that the variation in the profits or the members 
from dq_ must be equal for all j. 
In the analysis of the condition stated in Equation 3.43, Royer 
aaain interprets Y,'3$/9c..) as the variation in the orofits of the i • • -IT' 
members from a change in the quantity of input i used to produce output 
j by the cooperative (dq^ _.). was interpreted by Royer as the 
imputed value or shadow price of the i-th fixed factor. Thus, Equation 
3.41 is interpreted as equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the 
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variation in member profits from must equal the imputed value to 
the cooperative of the factor. Again, this result implies that the 
variation in the profits of the members from dq^  ^must be equal for all 
j-
•The first-order conditions stated in Equations 3.44 through 3.47 
are just restatements of the constraints of the model. The values 
of the Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints indicate 
the imputed values of the constraints on the cooperative. 
The interpretation of the first-order conditions indicate the 
normative purpose of Rover's study. In his study, he proposed a set 
of assumptions by which a cooperative association should operate. 
The model derived from these assumptions allowed Royer to interpret 
the conditions which maximized the total collective profits of the 
member patrons. The interpretations derived for the first-order 
conditions stated in Equations 3.37 through 3.47 are those given by 
Royer with a few minor changes. 
Tr 5s not the purpose of this study to analyze the interpretations 
derived by Royer. This section of the study will focus or. tiie posi­
tive purpose of describing the way cooperative associations operate 
in reality. The model described by Royer was used as a basis for 
the model derived in this chapter. The model described in this 
chapter is considered by the author to be a useful tool for the positive 
purpose of an empirical analysis of how cooperatives actually operate. 
The only major difference between the model developed in this 
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chapter and the one presented by Royer is the addition of the 
constraint stated in Equation 3.35. This constraint was added to 
assure a consistency between the short-run and long-run decisions made 
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CHAPTER IV. COOPERATIVE PRICING AND PRODUCTION SUB-MODEL 
ANALYSIS - EMPIRICAL PROCEDURES 
The first-order conditions (Equations 3.37-3.47) represent a set 
of structural equations which may be solved to yield a set of general 
reduced form functions for the instrument variables of the model. The 
instrument variables of most interest in this model include the prices 
the cooperative pays for the unprocessed products (set X) and the 
prices it charges for the variable inputs (set Y)• The general reduced 
form functions for these instrument variables may be expressed as; 
for all jex 
Pj = P (s,T,d,R^ ,DS,Qp^ ,Py,Pg,K), (4.1) 
for all j£Y 
Pj = Pj (s,T,d,R^ ,DS,Q^ ,Py,Pg,K). (4.2) 
Differential equations may be derived for the structural equa­
tions of the model.^  The differential equations can often be used to 
solve for instrument variables and to hypothesize the effect of a 
change in one of the exogenous variables on an instrument variable. 
The generality and size of the model presented here makes it impossible 
to hypothesize signs a priori. The analysis does allow us to recognize 
variables to use in the empirical procedure. The general reduced form 
equations for the prices of unprocessed products in set X (4.1) and the 
T^he differential equations were derived by the author and may be 
obtained upon request from John Van Sickle. Food and Resource Economics 
Department, McCarty Hall, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, 
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variable inputs in set Y (4.2) specify the exogenous variables which 
are to be tested in the empirical analysis. 
Data 
This phase of the study deals with the enxpirical estimation of 
the reduced form functions given in Equations 4.1 and 4.2. The 
typical cooperative association which is involved in this study 
purchases grain (set X) from member and nonmember patrons and sells 
inputs such as feed, fertilizer, and petroleum (set Y) to the member 
and nonmember patrons. 
Information was collected from sixty-eight Iowa cooperatives in 
the summer of 1979. The sampling procedure for selection of coopera­
tives was the event of being independently selected from the membership 
of the Iowa Grain and Feed Dealers Association, conditional on the 
basis that the firm was a cooperative association. 
The sample information for each firm^  consisted of time series 
price ddta for com and soybeans (set X) , a crocs-sectional price for 
feed and fertilizer (set Y), financial data (income statement and 
balance sheet information), and information about the physical facili­
ties of the cooperative. The time series price data for corn and soy­
beans included the cooperative association cash bid price for each 
product on each Thursday from January 6, 1977, through May 31, 1979. 
•""The questionnaire used in the sample is presented by J. Van Sickle 
(56) . 
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In order to eliminate the industry supply and demeind forces from the 
analysis, the Chicago Board of Trade closing bid price for the nearby 
option for each Thursday was subtracted from the cash bid of the 
cooperative association. This makes rhe variable for the analysis 
procedure the cooperative "basis" level on each Thursday. 
The cross-sectional price data for feed consisted of the charge 
for a one ton bulk load, FOB, of; 40% protein hog concentrate meal 
ration, 35% all natural protein cattle concentrate pellets ration, and 
50% protein (containing nonprotein nitrogen) cattle concentrate pellets 
ration. The cross-sectional price for fertilizer consisted of the 
charge for anhydrous ammonia in May, 1979. The high, low, and average 
for each of these cross-sectional variables is given in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary of feed and fertilizer prices 
Variable High IJOW Average 
40% hog ration $322.00 $233.40 
35% cattle ration 304,00 201.00 
50% cattle ration 278.32 133.31 
Anhydrous ammonia 188.10 150.00 
$272.78 
255.57 
233.12 
169.90 
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Empirical Models for 
Estimation 
Given the time series information across cross-sectional units, 
we will De concerned wirh estima-cing rhe effects of -che exogenous 
variables in Equation 4.1 on the basis levels. We can denote the 
bean-basis model for estimation as: 
®"it = \ + J, Vikt " 
k=l 36=1 k=l &=! 
+ i - 1,...,68 t = t,...,t^  k = 1,...,K (4.3) 
and the corn-basis model as; 
®=it = " J, Vikt + "Ai + J, X «P'kî 
k=l 2=1 k=l 2=1 
i — l,..-,58 L. — l,...,t^  (4.4) 
k 1J _ . . 
where is the soybean basis level for the i-th fxrra in period t, 
A is rn<= -i rrrp-rcpnr for tlhe povbean n^sis level. A., is tilt; k-CJi ciuiê 
O - - IKt 
series exogenous variable for the i-th firm in period t, A,_ is the 
coefficient for in the soybean basis model, Z^ . ^ is the 5,-th 
cross-sectional exogenous variable for the i-th firm. is the 
coefficient for Z. ^ in the soybean basis model, and (Ay),,,, is the 
interaction coefficient for the terms X., ^  and Z.„ in the soybean basis ikt i£ 
model. p^ , and (Bp)^  ^are the corresponding coefficients in 
the com basis model, is the error term for the i-th firm in period 
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t for the soybean basis model and is the corresponding error term 
for the com basis model. The basic assumptions which can be added 
are; 
Each of the explanatory variables is nonstochastic, 
i.e., X.. ^ and Z.„ are known and measured without error. (4.5) 
IKt ix. 
The number of observations exceeds the number of 
coefficients to be estimated. (4.6) 
No exact linear relation exists among any of the 
explanatory variables. (4.7) 
The behavior of the error terms will not be specified, except to 
say that they have cross-sectional and cross-product independence, 
i.e. ; 
E(£^ )^ = E(n^ )^ = 0 (4.8) 
R f p  F  J  =  K  (  n  n  )  =  K  i  • ù  -  r ' l .  ;  =  u  •  
* 1 4- If' 1 f nf IT' ' 1 T, 
The data in the feed and fertilizer price analysis are cross-
secticnal, i.e., the model may he stated as; 
L 
?P. = c + Z C„Z.„ + e. i = 1,...,68 (4.11) 
1 2^ 1  ^ " 
where FP^  is the 40% hog ration price, c is the intercept for the 
model, Z_.^  is the 2,-th exogenous variable for the i-th firm, 
firm. Similar models may be specified for the 35% cattle ration 
price, 50% cattle ration price, and anhydrous ammonia fertilizer 
price. In this model we can assume that; 
The Z_. ^  are fixed and measured without error (4.12) 
E(e^ ) = 0 (4.13) 
E(e^ ej) = (i=j) 
= 0 (ifg). (4.14) 
Empirical Procedure 
Feed and fertilizer price models 
Given the data available for the feed and fertilizer price models, 
ordinary least squares would be an appropriate method of estimation. 
The procedure followed in the estimation process was to choose those 
exogenous variables (Z^ )^ for the regression analysis which best 
rsprcwcntcd the catcgcriss cf genera.! va-ri ables in the 
general reduced form Equation 4.2. 
The exogenous variables were chosen from the facility and 
fir.ar.cial data information collected from each firm, and also from 
farm production data compiled in the county where the firm's home 
office was located. These farm production data were taken from the Iowa 
Agricultural Statistics 1979 compiled and issued by the Iowa Crop 
and Livestock Reporting Service. 
Some of the exogenous variables were represented by the actual 
variable as measured in the survey. Other exogenous variables were 
represented by proxy variables. Because many of the variables 
measured for the analysis were proxy variables, they represented one 
or more of the specific variables in Equation 4.2. 
The variable s is the portion of patronage dividends which is 
paid in cash. Information on this variable was collected from each 
firm. In most firms, the practice has been to determine a value of 
s and use it for several years. In the estimation of the pricing 
models the firm's most recent value of s was the value used in the 
analysis. 
The variable T is the number of years the retained portion of the 
patronage dividend is deferred. The value, of this variable was 
determined by observing the most recent payment of deferred patronage 
dividends and noting the year in which these dividends had been 
declared. The number of years away from the current fiscal year in 
May, 1979, was determined to be the value for T. Some firms paid 
is d o n e i t  is comm o n  p r a c t i c e  t o  pay c a s h  f o r  the  pre f e r r e d  s t o c k  
on a revolving basis as is done for deferred patronage dividends, but 
not necessarily by paying the oldest first. When the oldest was 
paid first, the variable T was calculated in the same manner as for 
deferred patronage dividends. When the oldest wasn't paid first, a 
value of zero was given to the variable t and a value of one was 
given to a dummy variable, TD. The value of TD was set to zero in the 
observations where T was oositive. Bv constructing these variables, T 
and TD, we were aible to measure the affect of T and the general affect 
of paying for preferred stock in any other manner than the oldest 
first. In the analysis, we could estimate coefficients for T and TD. 
The variable d is the discount rate given to the deferred portion 
of patronage dividends by the cooperative. It was assumed that the 
discount rate was equal for all firms and therefore d was not used in 
the analysis. 
is the vector of expected per unit patronage dividend rates 
of the member patrons in the cooperative. Since this vector was im­
possible to measure, it was assumed that the vector was a function of 
past rates. It is possible that the cooperative decision-makers can 
influence with additional information given to the member patrons, 
but since this information was impossible to measure, the variable 
was constructed only as a function of past patronage refund rates. 
The expected rate was computed as a simple average of the three most 
recent actual rates paid out by the i-th cooperative association for the 
The variable DS is the total amount of net savings allocated as 
dividends on common stock. This variable was not used in the analysis 
sines r.c cooperative association in the sample had declared a 
dividend on common stock. 
The variable is the vector of fixed factors of production 
available to the cooperative firm. These factors were represented 
by measures of physical elements owned by the cooperative, e.g., total 
capacities of production for each of the products, total investment in 
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fixed assets in both book value and purchase value, number of locations 
or plants, etc. 
The variable is the vector of prices for the variable inputs 
purchased outside the cooperative association. These variables would 
represent the unit prices of the various inputs the cooperative 
purchases outside its association. Information on these variables 
was not collected in the sample. The cost of operation was the proxy 
variable used to indicate these variables. Although the cost of 
operation also represents other variables, it was chosen as the best 
representation of variable input prices. The total expenses as measured 
in the most recent annual income statement were allocated to the 
products in the analysis. The allocation was based on a factor 
computed by dividing total dollar sales for the product by total 
cooperative sales. This factor was then multiplied by total expenses 
to get a computed cost of operation for the specific product. This 
cost of operation would be price determined since the allocation of 
The variable is the vector of prices for the final outputs 
sold outside the cooperative association. These variables would 
represent the prices that are available for products the cooperative 
produces and sells outside the cooperative association. Grain is 
generally the only product sold outside the cooperative association. 
Since specific measures for these variables could not be observed, 
proxy variables were identified which would indicate these price 
variables- The price available to the cooperative is commonly 
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indicated by the markets available and used by the association for its 
grain. Variables identified as proxies for this include; the per­
centage of grain shipped to the market via unit train shipment; the 
distance in mileage to alternative markets; percentage of grain 
shipped to the alternative markets; etc. 
The final variable, K, is the total amount of capital employed by 
the cooperative association. This variable was measured in the balance 
sheet as total liabilities. 
Many variables were observed in the firm which would be indicative 
of several of the general categories constructed here. One such vari­
able would be unit train shipment. Unit train shipment represents the 
ability to utilize market outlets available to the cooperative, most 
commonly the gulf market. When shipping grain to the Gulf of Mexico 
for export, it is common to ship several grain cars in one train to 
obtain better shipping rates. Being able to use unit train shipping 
often allows the cooperative to consider the gulf market for its grain, 
otherwise it is too expensive to ship the grain that distance. 
Unit train shipment is also an indication of expenses incurred 
in the opération. To be able to ship unit trains of grain requires 
an investment in facilities which will change the average cost of 
operation. This dual role of unit train shipment as an indicator for 
variables in the irodel requires us tc analyze both roles in the analysis 
of the results. 
The exogenous variables used in the analysis could be represented 
by a matrix Z, where ç is the observation for the £-th exogenous 
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variable in firm i. The variables for prices of feed and fertilizer 
can be represented by P , P , P , and P , where P is the vector 
1 2 3 1 1 
of cross-sectional prices for 40% hog ration, P is the vector of 
2 
crcss-sectiona.1 prices for 35% cattle ration. is the vector 
3^ 
of cross-sectional prices for 50% cattle ration, and P, is the 
1 
vector of cross-sectional prices for anliydrous ammonia. The models 
can be represented in matrix form as; 
P. = ZB. -f , (4-15) 
1 11
where i represents the different products (i = F^ , and A^ ) , is 
the vector of coefficients for tlie exogenous variables in the i-th 
model, and is the vector of error components for the i-th model-
Applying ordinary least squares to these models will derive estimates 
of the B^ , i.e.; 
Ê. = Z'P. (4.16) 
1 1 
where 4,16 is the normal equation for the ordinary least squares 
procedure. 
Grain models 
The models hypothesized for the cross-sectional and time series 
information for com and soybeans were presented in Equations 4.3 
and 4.4. Because of the error structure in the models presented, a 
generalized least squares regression procedure must be used in the 
estimation crccess. 
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The dependent variable chosen for analysis in these models was 
the weekly Thursday closing basis level determined for each firm from 
January 6, 1977, through May 31, 1979. The hypothesized model states 
that the values of chese observations are dependent on exogenous time 
series elements and exogenous cross-sectional elements \Z. ^) . 
The exogenous cross-sectional variables in the analysis are the 
same variables which were proposed in the feed and fertilizer models. 
Variables were constructed which would represent the different general 
classes of exogenous variables in the general reduced form Equation 
4.1. 
The exogenous time series variables used in the analysis included 
a utilization-of-facilities variable and time series factors such as 
trend and seasonal elements. The utilization variable was determined 
from the grain storage records of the cooperative associations. Total 
grain in storage at the end of each month was measured. Each 
stored grain level was divided by total storage available to determine 
T'ne» pf-rrTpnraçe of storage utilization at the end of each ûiOIîth. Each 
utilization level was matched with the basis levels for the same month. 
The other time series factors used in the analysis were trend-
seasonal dummy variables, and trigonometric functions to account for 
seasonal effects. These time series factors along with the utilization-
of-facilities time series represented the exogenous time series variables, 
in the analysis. 
The models for soybean and com basis levels can be rewritten as; 
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«\t ' Vit' ^  ^
"iKt + ^ it M.17, 
and; 
==it - + ,V\ + 
£=1 k=l &=1 
Xikt + ^ it- M.18, 
Consolidating the terms in brackets, we can redefine the equations for 
each firm as ; 
K 
®\t = °io " ®it 
k=l 
and 
K 
BC. = G. + ZG..X.. + n._. (4.20) 
xt lo , , IJC ixr It k=l 
Realizing these models are time series models, a time series analysis 
can be done for each firm. The error structure for each firm was 
assumed to have cross-sectional independence (condition 4.10). It is 
assumed that the error structure of all firms will be of the same 
a 1-Nt  ^V*  ^ o *ic T-\/^  C c "î VV T ^  
It is important to specify an appropriate error structure so 
that the best linear unbiased estimates of the coefficients of the time 
A. JL. 
in a model tend to be highly correlated. This corrélation is kno^ vn as 
serial correlation or autocorrelation. 
Serial correlation in time series models is often assumed to 
be either an autoregressive process, a moving-average process, or a 
mixed model of the two. The error structure of the models in 
Equations 4.19 and 4.20 will be assumed to be the same across firms. 
Heteroschedasticity may exist, but the basic structure of tne residuals 
will be the same. In time series data, the most common type of error 
structure assumed in most analyses is an autoregressive process. An 
autoregressive process in the error structure can be shown as; 
i^t " ®l^ i,t-l "2^ i,t-2'*"**-'^  \^ i,t-k ^  ^ it (4.21) 
where z. is the observed error of the i-th firm in the t-th time it 
period, 8^  through 8^  are the coefficients of the autoregressive 
process of order k, and u^  ^is the random error of the i-th firm in 
the t-th time period. 
In examj.ning the error structure of the time series models in 
Equations 4.19 and 4.20, a typical firm was chosen for the analysis 
to determine the structure. In the examination process an auto-
icMiessiva process of the rccidu-lc .zz ass'-ur-sd ct t^ .e 
Equation 4.21. The examination dealt with specifying the order of 
the process,- i = e..- the number of time periods, k, which were involved 
in the process. 
The first phase for the error structure analysis was the application 
of ordinary least squares for the models in Equation 4.19 and 4.20 for 
the typical firm. The resulting estimates of the regression coeffi­
cients were unbiased and consistent, and were used in the second phase 
of the error structure analvsis to calculate the ordinary least squares 
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regression residuals From this series of calculated regression 
residuals, we can specify estimates of the coefficients in the error 
models for each firm as specified in Equation 4.21. 
Given an appropriate error structure, an analysis of the models 
in Equations 4.19 and 4.20 can be done for each firm. If, for firm i, 
we specify the covariance matrix as for the soybean basis model 
and for the com basis model, the vector of soybean basis levels 
as BB. , the vector of com basis levels as BC., and the matrix of time 1 i 
series elements as , then using generalized least squares procedure 
will yield the Aitken's estimator^  of. 
D. = (Xîfi'^ X.) ^ (x:fi"^ BB.) (4.22) 1 1 ll 1 1 ll 1 
ana 
G. = (X!0%-BC.). (4.23) 
1 1 2i 1 1 2i 1 
~ ~ 1 
D. and G. would be the best linear unbiased estimators of D. and 11 1 
G . Th(= asvmD-hofcic variance-covariance matrix of D. is. 
1 ' * T 
~ -1 -1 
and G. is 1 
Asympt. Var-Cov (G^ ) = (X^ w^ ^^ ,-Î (4.25} 
S^ee J. Kmenta (30, p. 504). 
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After computing the estimates of and G^ , estimates of the 
coefficients A^ , (keX) , and for the soybean basis 
model and p^(ZeZ), (keX) , and for the com basis model 
can be found. To do this, it must be realized that the estimated 
coefficients in the and vectors are consistent, asymptotically 
efficient, and asymptotically normal, with the asymptotic variance-
covariance matrices given in Equations 4.24 and 4.25. Noting that they 
are asymptotically normal, we can use the estimates from and G^  to 
regress on the cross-sectional characteristics (Z^ )^ to derive the 
estimates for the coefficients in the overall model given in Equations 
4.3 and 4.4. The regression models we would fit would be, 
5lk = (AY'kzZit + «ik '4-2S: 
£=1 
\ «"VAl + "ik '4-27' 
2=1 
where D., is the estimated coefficient for the k-th time series vari-ik 
able for the i-th firm in the soybacxn model, Z. „ is the 2-th exogenous 
cross-sectional variable for the i-th firm, and e^  ^is the error in 
the k-th coefficient for the soybean model in the i-th firm. G^ ,^ and 
w^  ^are the corresponding variables for the com basis model. 
In fitting the models in Equations 4.26 and 4.27, we will be able 
zc define unbiased esrimaras of zhe coefficisnzs in zhe overall models 
defined in Equations 4.3 and 4.4. Given an appropriate specification of 
the error structure we can define the coefficients in Equations 4.3 and 
4.4 from Equations 4.26 and 4.27. 
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Realizing the distribution of the and is not homoscedastic 
across firms indicates that generalized least squares should be used 
to get the "best" estimates of the coefficients in Equations 4.26 
and 4.27. To apply generalized least squares clie variables must be 
transformed to represent a normal distribution across firms. If the 
variance-covariance matrices of the errors are represented by 5 and Q, , 
the Aitken's estimates can be derived, i.e.; 
Ày = (Z'^ f^ D) (4.28) 
B p  = ( Z ' O l ^ Z ) " ^ ( 4 . 2 9 )  
G G 
where Ay and Bp are the vectors of estimated coefficients in Equations 
4.26 and 4.27, z is the matrix of exogenous variables in Equations 
4.26 and 4.27, and D and G are the vectors of estimated coefficients 
from Equations 4.22 and 4.23. The variance-covariance matrix of Ay 
and Bp are; 
~ -1 -1 (A-v) = (x-'O, Z.') (4.30) 
var-cov(Bp) = (Z'Sl "Z) (4.51) 
If ordinary least squares is applied to Equations 4.25 and 4.27 
then the normal Equations for Ay and Bp can be derived, i.e.; 
Ày = (Z'Z)"1(Z'D) (4.32) 
Bp (Z'2)~^ (Z'-G) . (4.33) 
where Ay and Bp are the estimates of the coefficients in Equations 4.26 
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and 4.27 using ordinary least squares procedures. The variance-
covariance matrix for Ay can be derived as ; 
var-cov(AY) = E[(Ay-Ay)(Ây-Ay)'] (4.34) 
where Ay is the vector of actual values of the coefficients. Equation 
4.34 can be rewritten as; 
var-cov (Ây) = E[ (Z'Z)~^ Z'f2^ Z (Z'Z)~^ 3 . (4.35) 
or; 
var-cov (Ây) = (Z'Z) ^ Z'fi^ Z(Z'Z) (4.36) 
The variance-covariance matrix for Bp is ; 
var-cov (Bp) = (Z'Z)"^ Z'JÎ^ Z (Z'Z)"^ . (4.37) 
From Equations 4.30 and 4.31 and Equations 4.35 and 4.37, we can note;^  
var-cov (Ay) >_ var-cov (Ay) (4.38) 
/N ~ 
var-cov (Bp) var-cov (Bp), (4.39) 
équa-ions 4.36 and 4.39 poini: ouT. •die disadvantages of using ordinary 
1 c-!- ZL ? -^np. ZL *77 i  ^ i-Ha fMrr? in:::: y-U' 1 c:t-
variance ox laie orainary xeast squares escima'cor is ûiasea. yne 
ry least squares estzmator zs, however, unbiased and is lilce 
^See J. Johnston (29b, p. 210). 
Fuller. Taken from class notes developed in Econometric 
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the generalized least squares estimator for large n if Z satisfies; 
lim n'^ Z'Z = D |D|^ 0 (4.40) 
n-K» 
and; 
lim n~^ Z"fi'^ Z = H (4.41) 
n-x» 
Ây and Bp were the esrima-cors chosen for estimating trie coeffi­
cients of Equations 4.3 and 4.4. These ordinary least squares esti­
mators were chosen for this phase of the empirical procedure since it 
is the final step in the regression analysis and it does result in 
unbiased estimates. The estimated variance of each coefficient will 
be equal to or larger than the variance with generalized least squares 
procedures. We can, however, use the results here to specify and 
discuss the results of the models in Equations 4.3 and 4.4. Generalized 
least squares would yield better estimates, but time and monetary 
ys ^ 
considerations dictated the use of Ay and Bp. 
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CHAPTER V. COOPERATIVE PRICING AND PRODUCTION 
SUB-MODEL RESULTS 
Feed and Fertilizer Models 
The models for feed and fertilizer were stated in Equation 4.11. 
The results were obtained by applying ordinary least squares to the 
data. The standard ordinary least squares assumptions were given in 
conditions 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14. 
The equation which best fit the anhydrous ammonia fertilizer model 
was ; 
PA = 188.997 - 1.827913 (PCAP). + 3.213252 (ECAP). 
(5.775) (0.965038)  ^ (1.716101)  ^
-3.420716 (SERV) . +18.195844 (LEV). - 3.165396 (CCON) 
(1.215927)  ^ (8.882489)  ^ (1.144392)  ^
-0.767206 (K).. 
(0.183946)  ^
PA^  ^is the estimated price for anhydrous ammonia fertilizer for the 
i-tn firm. I'PCAP)^  is the total in-plajiL sLoraoe capacity in hundreds 
of tons for anhydrous ammonia for the i-th firm. (ECAP)^  is the total 
storage capacity in hundreds of tons which is available in "nurse" 
tanks in the i-th firm. "Nurse" tanks are used with an applicator 
to apply anhydrous ammonia fertilizer in the fields. Anhydrous ammonia 
fertilizer can be stored in these "nurse" tanks, i.e., the "nurse" 
tanks become another type of storage for rhe cooperative. (SERV)^  is 
the total charge (in $10/ton units) for delivery and application of 
anhydrous ammonia. (LEV) is the leverage ratio (debt/total liabilities) 
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of the i-th firm. (CCON)^  is the percentage of total grain production 
which is corn in the county of the home office of the i-th firm, 
divided by 10.0. (K)^  is the total amount of capital (millions of 
dollars) which is employed by the i-th cooperative and was measured 
as total liabilities. These variables were chosen from a set of 
exogenous variables specified in the general reduced form Equation 4.2. 
The estimated coefficients for the variables are stated with the esti­
mated standard deviations of the coefficients in parentheses below. The 
estimated coefficients for the intercept, SERV, CCON and K were found to 
be statistically significant at a level of 99 percent. The estimated 
coefficient for LE^ .' v.'as statistically significant at a level of 95 
percent and the estimated coefficients for PCA? and ECAP were 
statistically significant at the level of 90 percent. The mean square 
2 
error was 32.4048 and the R was 53.30. The F-statistic was . 
10.46, which was significant at a level of 99 percent signifi­
cance . 
The significant exogenous variables are listed in Table 2 with 
their high, low, and average values. Other exogenous variables 
were fit in the analysis but were either not statistically signifi­
cant or collinear with the variables discussed before, which yielded 
several insignificant variables (the new variable and one or more of 
zhe variables in Table 2; . ThuSs variables which were fit 
and considered insignificant included: a) total storage capacity of 
anhydrous ammonia (PCA? + ECAP); b) average farzi size in acres in the 
county of the firm's home office; c) working capital in dollars (total 
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Table 2. Exogenous variables for the anhydrous ammonia model 
Variable High Low Average 
PCAP 6.1500 0.0000 1.5344 
ECAP 3.1200 0.0000 0.9087 
SERV 2.8000 0.0000 1.1096 
LEV 0.5368 0.0493 0.2090 
CCON 5.5556 2.0755 4.4334 
K 25.5223 0.9523 6.0093 
current assets less total current liabilities on May 31, 1979); d) the 
percentage of patronage dividends paid in cash, s ; e) the number of 
years deferred patronage dividends are deferred, T, and the dummy 
variable TD for indicating those firms who pay out the deferred portion 
of patronage dividends in any method other than oldest first; f) total 
corn production in the county of the firm's home office; g) the total dollars 
cf cpcrcLting expense '.-.'hich car. be allocated to a'jronc^ y^ arcmrning ro 
dollar sales; h) the average dollars of operating expense for agronomy 
per dollar of agronomy sales; and i) the simple average dividend rate 
or. anhydrous amip.onia fertilizer for the three most recent fiscal years. 
The variable PCAP represents an exogenous variable from the 
general exogenous variable of since it represents one of the fixed 
assets owned by the cooperative, it also may be correlated with the 
general exogenous variable P,^ . This correlation is because the type of 
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facilities may dictate the types of variable inputs which have to be 
purchased to produce the anhydrous ammonia. The sign on the 
coefficient for in-plant storage is negative, meaning wirh all other 
the cooperative the lower is the price charged to the patrons. This 
variable may indicate that economies of scale exist in the plant 
capacity for anhydrous ammonia. 
The exogenous variable ECAP, total equipment storage capacity in 
tons, represents the general exogenous variables of and P^ . 
ECAP is representative of the general variable since equipment 
r C 
storage indicates one of the fixed factors of production available to the 
cooperative. It is indicative of the general variable P^  since it may 
also dictate the type of variable inputs the cooperative has to purchase 
to produce anhydrous ammonia. The sign of the coefficient for equipment 
storage is positive which may be interpreted as meaning with all other 
things equal, the larger the level of equipment storage capacity, the 
The major reason in the difference in signs between PCAP and ECAP 
is the type of variable inputs needed to produce anhydrous ammonia with 
the defined variable. By adding in-plant storage, the firm is likely 
to gain some economies of size in the facility. In order to add 
equipment storage, the firm must increase the number of units which 
are able to store the anhydrous ammonia. Equipment storage comes in the 
4 r-i r» vo a ca c +• r* Ck armz-Miv» 4- <-s f 1 p r>/-> v ~yorr^  i 4 -y-o A +- r\ r>p>-»/^ To O 
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maintain the equipment. With everything else equal, this causes the 
average cost of producing and selling anhydrous ammonia to increase 
leading to the positive coefficient for ECAP. 
The exogenous variable 3ERV is tlie total service charge for 
delivery cJ3d application of anhydrous ammonia. The sign on the 
coefficient for SERV is negative which may be interpreted as meaning 
with all other things being equal, the higher is the service charge 
for delivery and application of anhydrous ammonia the lower is the 
price of anhydrous ammonia. Service charges are reimbursements from 
the patrons to the cooperative for the cost of performing the services. 
If service charges represented only the cost of performing the seirvice 
then SERV would be representative of the general variable P^ . There 
also exists the possibility of a specification error by including 
this variable in the analysis. It may be argued that delivery and 
application of anhydrous ammonia is a product produced by the coopera­
tive and that SERV represents the price of this product. If delivery 
of the coefficient for this variable. The two products, service and 
anhydrous ammonia, complement each other. The lower the price charged 
for service, the higher is the price for anhydrous ainmonia to compen­
sate for the lower service charge. 
The exogenous variable LEV, leverage ratio, is indicative of 
che general variable The leverage ratio is one of the determinants 
of the marginal interest cost for debt in the cooperative. The higher 
is the leverage ratio, the higher is the amount of risk assumed by the 
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lenders. In order to assume more risk, most lending institutions 
charge a higher rate of interest to compensate for the higher level of 
risk. Interest is a cost of obtaining debt, therefore, interest 
represents a cost of a variable input (debt) required to produce 
anhydrous ammonia. The positive correlation between the leverage 
ratio and interest cost indicates a positive correlation between the 
leverage ratio and the price of one variable input of production. 
The sign of the coefficient for leverage ratio is positive which may 
be interpreted as meaning with all other things equal, the higher is the 
leverage ratio the higher is the price of anhydrous ammonia. 
The exogenous variable CCON, concentration of com production in 
the county of the firm's home office, is indicative of the general 
variable P^ . The higher concentration of corn production could be 
associated with a lower cost of marketing the anhydrous ammonia. The 
lower cost of marketing could come with savings in advertising and 
delivery costs. Any firm which delivers the anhydrous would have a 
chcrtcr zvzrzgc hauling distar.cs for deliver^ ' ? -Fiven Amount of 
anhydrous ammonia in a county with a high concentration of corn pro­
duction. The market for anhydrous ammonia is represented by the pro­
duction of corn since anhydrous ammonia is used primarily as a 
fertilizer for corn in Iowa. Advertising costs could be lowered, 
with other things being the same, since the general level of demand 
for anhydrous would be higher and less advertising would be needed 
to gain a given level of sales in comparison with a county with less 
com concentration. The sign of the coefficient for com concentration 
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is negative which may be interpreted as meaning with all other things 
equal, the higher is the concentration of com production in the 
county the lower is the price for anhydrous ammonia. 
The exogenous variable K, the total capital employed, is the 
general variable K. The sign of the coefficient for total capital 
employed is negative which may be interpreted as meaning with all 
other things being equal, the higher is the amount of total capital 
employed the lower is the price for anhydrous ammonia. Capital cannot 
be interpreted as being the only variable which causes the affect 
indicated by its coefficient. Capital will be correlated with several 
factors in the firm which may have more direct influence on the price of 
anhydrous ammonia than does capital. The coefficient for capital 
indicates the net influence of these variables on the price. Another 
general variable which would be correlated with capital would be Q.p^ f 
i.e., the amount of capital could be correlated with the general level 
of all the fixed factors of production. 
•r'ri(=> on wni.c'n best f it  the feed model for tiie 40 oëïCêiiL. hoc 
ration was ; 
= 270.171 + 23.428045 (LEV). + 0.019290 (HENS), 
i (5.705) (16.009235)  ^ (0.008738)  ^
-0.753558 (K).. 
(0;336771)  ^
P„-, is the estimated orice for the 40 percent hoc ration for the i-th 
Fi. ' ' 1 
firm. (LEV)^  is the leverage ratio which was defined in the anhydrous 
ammonia model (debt/total liabilities) for the i-th firm. (KENS). is 
80 
the variable measured as the thousands of laying hens in the county of 
the i-th firm's home office. (K)^  is the total capital employed (millions 
of dollars) in the i-th firm and is the same variable as in the an­
hydrous ammonia model. The estimated coefficients of the variables 
are stated with the estimated standard deviations of the coefficients in 
parentheses below. The coefficients for the exogenous variables HENS and 
K were found to be statistically significant at a level of 95 percent 
significance and the coefficient for LEV was found to be statistically 
significant at a level of 80 percent. The mean square error was 
2 160.0529 and the R was 16.84 percent. The F-ratio for the model 
was 4.12 which was significant at a level of 95 percent signifi­
cance. The exogenous variables are listed in Table 3 with the high, 
low, and average values. 
The exogenous variable LEV, the leverage ratio, is again indi­
cative of the general variable P^ . As shown in the model for anhydrous 
ammonia, the higher leverage ratio generally indicates a higher margi-
na 1 inror-<=»c;r . M*ho c^-irrn r^n -f i or>t- fnv- 1 i <5 
positive which may be interpreted as meaning with all other things 
equal, the larger the leverage ratio the higher is the price for the 
hog ration. 
The exogenous variable KENS, the number of the laying hens in 
the county of the firm's home office, is also indicative of the general 
variable P^ . Many inputs used for producing chicken feed are also 
used in producing 40 percent hog ration. The larger the number of 
laying hens the higher is the general demand for the inputs of production 
Table 3. Exogenous variables for the 40 percent hog ration model 
Variable High Low Average 
LEV 0.5368 0.0493 0.2090 
HENS 840.0000 1.0000 113.0147 
K 25.5223 0.9523 6.0093 
for hog ration. This generally indicates a higher price level for the 
variable inputs with all other things being equal. The sign of the 
coefficient for laying hens is positive which may be interpreted as 
Cleaning with all otlier things being equal, rhe larger the number of 
laying hens the higher is the price for the hog ration. 
The exogenous variable K, total capital employed, is the 
general variable K. The sign of the coefficient for the total amount 
of capital employed is negative which may be interpreted as meaning 
with all other things being equal, the higher is the amount of total 
capital employed the lower is the price for the hog ration. The amount 
of capital will again be correlated with several factors in this model 
also. It is indicative of the scale of the operation and also of the 
general level of all fixed factors of production ) • The effect 
indicated by the coefficient should not be interpreted as being solely 
dependent, on tne amount of capital, but on the amount of capital and 
the other factors correlated with capital. 
Other exogenous variables were used in the regression analysis for 
this model, but the variables were either not statistically significant 
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or were collinear with the variables discussed before and listed in 
Table 3. The exogenous variables which were used in the regression 
analysis and considered insignificant included: a) dollars of feed 
Sci-LêS XIFI CI'ic LUONCII Oj- I'lciy / uj nixiiuvcx kj±. iucj-hv-ij-cls-. 
plants; c) number of pigs farrowed fro~ Decaober, 1979, to May, 1980, 
in the county of the firm's home office; d) number of grain fed cattle 
marketed in 1979 from the county of the firm's home office; e) the 
percentage of total grain production which was corn in the county of the 
firm's home office ; f) feed manufacturing capacity in tons for the firm; 
g) delivery capacity of feed in tons for the firm; h) the simple 
average dividend rate on feed for the three most recent fiscal years ; 
i) total storage capacity in bushels for grain; j) total working 
capital (total current assets less total current liabilities on May 
31, 1979); k) average farm size in acres in the county of the firm's 
home office; 1) proportion of patronage dividends paid in cash(s); 
m) the number of years deferred patronage dividends are deferred, T, 
diivi uiic: vox xcu-/u_c xlj x\^x .Lii\-i^\_ci,L.xiiy w»-*.v.. 
deferred portion of patronage dividends in any method other than the 
oldest first; and n) the average dollars of operating expense for feed 
per dollar of feed sales. 
The equations for 35 percent cattle ration and 50 percent cattle 
ration had no coefficients which were found statistically significant. 
It was found that the best estirriace of the prices for these variables 
is the mean of each variable. 
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models to be inadequate. Most local cooperatives purchase their 
feed from a regional cooperative for marketing to their patrons. The 
regional cooperative supplies the cooperatives with a suggested retail 
^ j_ _i_ ^  c: _L. U.O (_ • i'ldi ky j- a. u j. v c; o c&ac u-i ic: o v&y yea v-c v* v- c. w 
of the regional cooperatives as a base price list for their feeds. 
This type of pricing mechanism should cause a small standard deviation 
in the prices the cooperatives charge for feed. The large standard 
deviation in the feed prices reported in the sample suggests that a 
large portion of the standard deviation is caused by measurement error. 
The regional cooperatives send out suggested retail price sheets 
weekly. The price sheet generally lists a price for a feed in a 
certain form (e.g., 1 ton, bagged, meal, undelivered) i.e., discounts 
or additional charges are made to conform to the type of feed the 
sample price was for. For the 40 percent hog ration, the price asked 
for was a one ton bulk load of meal, undelivered, for June 14, 1979. 
To give the correct price the cooperative needed to get the price 
^ f/"x ^  V\ yx T.f/^ ^ T O TO —» ^ ^ f» ^ C* ^ ^ 
additional charges to arrive at the sample price. The large standard 
deviation in the prices of the feeds is assumed to be caused by the 
measurement of the feed prices. The cooperatives had the possibility of 
using the wrong price list or not making the appropriate discounts and 
additional charges. These errors in measurement would cause a large 
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Grain Models 
The estimation of the com and soybean basis models in Equations 
4.3 and 4.4 involved a three step estimation process. The first step 
in the analysis involved the specification of an error structure for 
the time series in each of the firms. The structure of the errors 
in each of the time series was assumed to be the same, but allowed 
for heteroschedasticity to be present across firms. The process 
followed in this step was the examination of the error structure of 
a typical firm selected at random. Once the basic error structure 
was defined for this typical firm, the same structure was used in the 
other firms. 
The second step in the analysis of the grain models was the esti­
mation of a time series equation for each of the individual firms. In 
this step of the analysis the error structure determined for the 
typical firm was assumed for the remaining firms. The exogenous vari­
ables included in this analysis were utilization-or-Iacilities, trend, 
monthly and quarterly seasonal dummy variables, and trigonometric 
functions to account for seasonal affects. 
The third step of the analysis involved the regression of the 
coefficients derived in step two on the cross-sectional independent 
variables of the fiz-mK. From this regression the coefficients of the 
models specified in Equations 4.3 and 4.4 were determined. 
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Error specification 
Specifying the error structure involved the analysis of the time 
series model for a typical firm chosen at random from the sample of 
firms. In the analysis of the error structure, an autoregressive 
process of the residuals was assumed of the form stated in Equation 
4.21. The examination dealt with specifying the order of the 
autoregressive process, i.e., the number of time periods, k, which 
were involved in the process. 
Examining the error structure of the firm chosen at random re­
vealed that an autoregressive error structure of order 2 was the 
appropriate error structure for both the com and soybean basis models, 
i.e., the error structures could be modeled as ; 
i^t ®li^ i,t-l ^  ®2i^ i,t-2 i^t (5.3) 
%it = Wli^ i,t-1 + W2i^ i,t-2 + %it (5-4) 
6., and 0^ . are the coefficients of the error structure for the 
soybean basis model in firm i and co., and are the coefficients 
of the error structure for the corn basis model in firm i. u^  ^and 
3re the random error elements for each of the respective models. 
The models to be estimated in this step of the analysis were 
stated in Equations 4.19 and 4.20. First, the estimated coefficients 
of the error structures in Equations 5.3 and 5.4 were estimated for 
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and 4.23 were applied to the models. 
Only sixty-one firms could supply complete information for the 
utilization-of-facilities variable. Because of the lack of information 
from six firms, cwo models were specified for 'che corn and soybean 
basis models. The first model contained the utilization-of-facilities 
variable, trend, and seasonal components. The second model contained 
only the trend and seasonal components. The number of observations for 
most firms was 126. Some firms had some missing observations, yielding 
fewer than 125 observations, yet enough for estimation of the models. 
The number of firms used for the analysis in the first model was sixty-
one while all sixty-eight were used in the second model. 
The seasonal components for each of the models were chosen in the 
first step of this analysis in conjunction with the estimation of the 
error model coefficients. Monthly seasonal dummy variables, quarterly 
seasonal dummy variables, and various trigonometric functions were 
tested. The seasonal variables chosen for the analysis of the time 
àeiies ïûodelà wére iiionthlv seasonal dummv variables and a trigono­
metric function. The specific trigonometric function used was; 
Trig - t*SIN(^ ) . (5.5) 
t is the time period of the observation (1 through 126) and w is the 
V-' — jrv—WAAC4.W  ^ \ 
through 52). The sine function allows for a trigonometric seasonal 
factor with the production period being one year. Multiplying the 
sine function by the trend element (t) allows for a multiplicative 
seasonal component, meaning that the seasonal factor from the sine 
function is becoming larger in absolute value throughout the time 
period. 
The results of the analysis of the four time series models are 
summarized in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7. The tables list the correlation 
coefficients of the estimated coefficients of the time series models 
and the means of the coefficients of the four time series models which 
were derived in Equations 4.19 and 4.20. 
Some interesting notes may be made about the results derived 
in this step of the analysis. We defined the "basis" as the cash 
price the elevator bids for the grain less the Chicago Board of Trade 
closing bid for the nearby option. This implies that the more positive 
is the basis level the higher is the cash price bid to the patron 
for a given Chicago Board of Trade price. The most positive value of 
the basis level gives the patron the highest price for his grain. 
From the average values of the coefficients in Tables 4, 5, 5, and 7, 
soybean basis model including storage utilization and in August in the 
soybean basis model excluding storage utilization. The highest basis 
0T^7^ f o î T  coz T i  s o o s s i T C G  sti i o i r s c r s  
utilization and in February for the model excluding storage utilization. 
The lowest basis level for soybeans appeared in September for the model 
containing storage utilization and in March for the model excluding 
storage utilization. The lowest basis level for com appears in March 
for the model containina storaae utilization and in Sentember for the 
Table 4. Correlations and means of coefficients for the soybean basis 
model, including storage utilization (the body of the table 
contains the correlations and the means are listed at the 
bottom) 
Vari- Inter-
able cept 
Storage 
utiliza- Trend 
tion 
•Tan. Feb. March Aoril Mav 
Inter­
cept 
Storage 
utiliza­
tion 
Trend 
Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
Sep. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec, 
-0.84895 -0.39696 0.69663 0.48260 0.17325 0.06498 -0.48830 
0,04953 -0.80575 -0.61949 -0.27711 -0.10878 0.55036 
-0.07768 0,18414 0.26968 0-16643 0.07816 
0.78377 0.39585 0.22435 -0.37619 
0.79670 0.63209 0.04120 
0.81356 0.39201 
0.58653 
MEANS -27.9045 -7.2855 -0.0701 4.9348 5.5948 -0.2916 0.6505 2.2133 
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Au gust S ep. C et. cv. D T 
-0. 76106 -0. 81960 -0. 73790 -0. 38990 0. 76819 0. 69487 0. 69084 0. 06118 
0. 81341 0. 89530 0. 84245 0. 44928 -0. 79482 -0. 74711 -0. 63547 0. 06402 
0. 94450 0. 15562 -0. 00954 -0. 22763 -0. 14541 -0. 04298 -0. 21643 -0. 29102 
-0. 75547 -0. 89632 -0. 90822 -0. 48963 0. 63409 0. 56012 0. 59745 -0. 25144 
-0. 42194 -0. 70886 -0. 86640 -0. 77660 0-26362 0. 20926 0. 28836 -0. 65338 
0. 01938 -0. 34699 -0. 56923 -0. 81735 -0. 16083 -0, 20131 -0. 00545 -0. 80154 
0. 24786 -0. 19476 -0. 41251 -0. 73656 -0. 33957 -0. 30198 -0. 24648 -0. 82866 
0. 72930 0. 38666 0. 24055 -0. 28240 -0. 82396 -0. 73255 -0. 48884 -0. 57334 
0. 82022 0. 65512 0. 13893 -0. 88698 -0. 86059 -0. 71772 -0. 23437 
0. ,81980 0. 46947 -0. 71731 -0. 70683 -0. 67628 0. 17397 
0. 70165 -0. 59323 -0. 55519 -0. ,57732 0. ,43998 
-0. ,05211 -0. ,09485 -0, .33208 0. 68225 
Q. 85974 0. 63110 0. 34064 
0, .65924 0. 30602 
0. 17772 
0 .0444 . 5452 -7-7CO 1 . 2568 -0 .0255 -2 -2 . 0250 -9 . 6317 — 5 . 5^ 3\/ * f 
Table 5. Correlations and means of coefficients for the soybean basis 
model, excluding storage utilization (the body of the table 
contains the correlations and the means are listed at the 
bottom) 
Vari­
able 
Inter-
ceot Trend Jan. Feb. March April May June 
Inter­
cept 
Trend 
Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
Aug. 
Sep. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
-0.79653 -0.57080 -0.77974 -0.71376 -0.48184 -0.74118 -0.44190 
0.42977 0.75089 0.73276 0.59817 0.68486 0.31925 
0.68528 0.45178 0.48969 0.38740 0.09335 
0.85151 0.70811 0.76570 0.33495 
0.75620 0.85804 0.42198 
0.70371 0.45816 
0.45576 
MEANS -24.9249 -0.2393 -7.1321 -10.9968 -21.7780 -15.5953 -5.9555 1 .9903 
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July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Trig. 
0. 05017 0. 34458 0. 68502 0. 76620 0. 72369 0. 76800 0.73447 
-0. 34871 -0. 24427 -0. 60933 -0. 72051 -0. 67920 -0. 74052 -0.73941 
-0. 28420 -0. 64893 -0. 49021 -0. 45436 -0. 54306 -0. 38267 -0.56487 
-0. 21903 -0. 62248 -0. 81998 -0. 82573 -0. 82954 -0. 72021 -0.87867 
-0. 13621 -0. 56909 -0. 86924 -0. 90415 -0. 85673 -0. 76058 -0.92040 
-0. 39640 -0. 66802 -0. 73267 -0. 71323 -0. 83947 -0. 70304 -0.86662 
-0. 00976 -0. 49147 -0. 85134 -0. ,84970 -0. 85581 -0. 74582 -0.89739 
-0. 02149 -0. 29813 -0. 52651 -0. .49830 -0. 57417 -0. ,57925 -0.48330 
0. ,27675 0. ,10325 -0. ,06860 0. ,09543 0. .02699 0.26130 
0. ,57963 0. .42813 0. .55353 0. . 34495 0.65968 
0, .82324 0. .81671 0, .61746 0.89616 
0, .88017 0, .81442 0.87938 
n 0/4 ^  1 C n anc;i;/i  
0.75974 
17 .1832 23 .4702 11 .1424 1 .9490 0 .4465 5 .2762 0.0949 
Table 7. Correlations and means of coefficients for the com basis model, 
excluding storage utilization (the body of the table contains 
the correlations and the means are listed at the bottom) 
Vari— Inter— 
. 1 . Trend Jan. Feb. March April May 
able cept 
Inter­
cept -0.71253 -0.66813 -0.75552 -0.77589 -0.62397 -0.60905 
Trend 0.37747 0.64765 0.68207 0.56429 0,51027 
Jan. 0.74527 0.62651 0.57003 0.49272 
Feb. 0.92789 0.88574 0.79868 
March 0.92411 0.87779 
April 0.91425 
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June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Trig. 
-0.79909 -0.78333 -0.81483 -0.38682 0.83485 0.81551 0.86054 0.16328 
0.88064 0.90109 0.92127 0.60566 -0.82675 -0.76913 -0.78432 0.07505 
-0.10328 -0.28225 -0.16691 -0.40622 -0.04037 -0.08725 -0.20337 -0.46455 
-0.77232 -0.84160 -0.90167 -0.73610 0.58457 0.47437 0.60846 -0.40409 
-0.54601 -0.74809 -0.80843 -0.89924 0.28246 0.20819 0.29593 -0.68975 
-0.13086 -0.39798 -0.46113 -0.80447 -0.19361 -0.23693 -0.15416 -0.87064 
0.19941 -0.18858 -0.16711 -0.53390 -0.41204 -0.51974 -0.41900 -0.82437 
0.67606 0.43476 0.43257 -0.11975 -0.83852 -0.89056 -0.82521 -0.66801 
0.80899 0.83239 0.39054 -0.86300 -0.82333 -0.85285 -0.10389 
0.91811 0.63428 -0.73548 -0.65303 -0.70044 0.24224 
0.74108 -0.72878 -0.66282 -0.73651 0.26700 
-0.21683 -0.16515 -0.26317 0.70934 
U-O^OJL/ » 
0.93259 0.47766 
0.33272 
5,1423 20.0132 26.6046 10.9143 -3.2082 -3:8324 2.5791 0.0756 
Table 5. Correlations and means of coefficients for the corn basis model, 
including storage utilization (the body of the table contains 
the correlations and the means are listed in the bottom) 
Vari­
able 
Inter­
cept 
Storage 
utili- Trend 
zation 
Jan. Feb. March April May 
Inter­
cept 
Utiliza­
tion 
Trend 
Feb. 
March 
April 
May 
•J une 
July 
Aug. 
Sep. 
ucr. 
-0.85230-0.17712 0.64967 0.45521 0.0S205 -0.09436 -0.74555 
-0.20918 -0.82093 -0.70066 -0.29579 -0.01444 0.60518 
0.18838 0.45968 0.51574 0.38149 0.25913 
0.83178 0.49799 0.19982 -0.29416 
0.81947 0.51260 0.03067 
0.72485 0.46321 
0.60779 
x'rig. 
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June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Trig. 
0.50340 0.13934 0.24517 0.18525 0.21409 0.07356 -0.07374 0.37556 
-0.30244 -0.00421 -0.32510 -0.42227 -0.32325 -0.19719 -0.11631 -0.42548 
-0.52583 -0.52112 -0.45908 -0.21370 -0.18447 -0.01055 0.24379 -0.39015 
-0.38713 -0.30877 -0.66463 -0.55790 -0.58503 -0.37209 -0.14536 -0.65107 
-0.44333 -0.22255 -0.57360 -0.52184 -0.58244 -0.32753 -0.17434 -0.64985 
-0.33515 -0.16529 -0.61774 -0.51316 -0.70981 -0.41557 -0.26473 -0.58327 
-0.52334 -0.05572 -0.43022 -0.44566 0.50632 -0.22644 -0.12666 -0.55569 
0.09314 -0.29321 -0.32363 -0.35561 -0.60560 -0.52513 -0.00051 
0.39755 0.04411 0.02328 -0.10755 -0.16659 0.18355 
0.74062 0.74790 0.68599 0.41517 0.67887 
0.78957 0.71250 0.24232 0.58395 
0.83209 0.59024 0.65181 
0.55557 0.50551 
0.29756 
3.2811 -1.0958 -0,2176 -8.6773 -6.8742 3.2109 0.1810 -0.0273 
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model excluding storage utilization. 
The average value of the coefficient for storage utilization was 
negative in the soybean basis model, which may be interpreted as 
meaning with all other things being equal, the higher the level of 
storage utilization the lower is the basis bid to the patron for soy­
beans. The average value of the same coefficient in the com basis model 
was positive, yielding the opposite result which is interpreted as 
virtual. 0.^0. lings being equal, the higher the level of 
storage utilization the higher is the basis bid to the patrons for com. 
The differences in the coefficients between the two models for 
each product is caused by the addition of the storage utilization vari­
able. The storage utilization variable tends to follow a seasonal 
pattern. The highest value for this variable tends to be in the late 
months of the year (October, November, and December) following the 
harvest of the two products- The value then diminishes throughout the 
production period as grain is shipped to final destination for use as 
a tznai proauct. Given the seasonal pa-^ ern of crily variable, IL 
accounts for so=2 of the seasonal affects through multicollinearity with 
the seasonal elements. The ccllinearity of the storage utilization 
variable with the seasonal dummy variables is what likely caused the 
change in the value of the coefficients of the seasonal dummy variables 
when the storage utilization variable was added. 
The storage utilization coefficients were significant at a level 
of 75 percent or more in 38 of the soybean basis time series models and 
OjL WiC ~ —' — — ~ - -
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most appropriate would probably be for the model which includes the 
storage utilization variable. If the model which includes storage 
utilization is chosen as the "true" model, then we must assume that 
specification bias exists in the estimated coefficients of the models 
which exclude the storage utilization variable. If a specification 
error of the model exists then the estimated coefficients will be 
biased.^  The addition of the storage utilization variable would 
eliminate the specification bias in these models. Since the results 
do not substantially support either model as being better than the other 
(including the storage utilization variable versus excluding the vari­
able) , the results of both models have been reported. 
The mean values of the coefficients indicate some pattern in the 
coefficients of the seasonal dunmiy variables. Another indication of the 
seasonal pattern can be seen in the correlation coefficients of the 
seasonal dummy variables (Tables 4 through 1). While the means indi­
cate the overall average of the coefficients, the correlation coeffi-
cienca indicate tha correlation bctv.'cor. ths coefficients eacM of 
the cooperatives. The pattern of the correlation coefficients indi­
cates that- on the average, a seasonal pattern exists within the firms. 
This is indicated by the values and signs of the correlation coeffi­
cients, e.g., the correlation coefficients in Table 3 for January dummy 
variable coefficients show; positive correlations with February, March, 
S^ee Z. Griliches (23, pp. 8-20). 
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and April; negative correlations with May, June, July, August, and 
September; and positive correlations with October, November, and December. 
Similar observations can be made on the other coefficients within the 
four models which indicate a definite seasonal pattern in trie cinie 
series. 
Estimation of the final coefficients 
This step of the analysis involves the regression of the estimated 
time series coefficients derived in tlie previous step on the cross-
sectional variables of the firms. The results of these regressions 
derive the coefficients of the models as specified in Equations 4.25 
and 4.27. 
The results of this step of the analysis are contained in Tables 
8 through 11. A regression was fit for each time series coefficient in 
each of the four models. Twenty-two cross-sectional variables were fit 
in each regression. Ordinary least squares was used for the analysis 
which yielded unbiased estimates of the coefficients. 
The twenty-two cross-sectional variables listed down the sides of 
Tables 8 through 11 represent the general exogenous variables of the 
reduced form Equation 4.1. The variable "'turnover" represents 
the number of times the available storage of the cooperative is used 
duriivg the year^  i.e. it equals total sales nf grain in bushels divided 
by total storage available in bushels. This variable would be repre­
sentative of the general exogenous variables and It would 
represent since a higher utilization of storage facilities reduces it's 
99 
cost. It would represent Q.^ Q since lower utilization could represent 
over expansion of the fixed factors of production. 
The variable "storage" represents the general exogenous variable 
ûtoragô xs caj.cuxaced as ciic mxilxons of bushels of grazn storags 
capacity (all types) the cooperative has available. Storage is a fixed 
factor of production in the cooperative. 
The variable "employees" represents the general variable P^ . 
Employees was computed as the total number of employees (in tens) 
the cooperative employs on a full-time basis. This represents a variable 
cost of production in the cooperative, i.e., the more employees for a 
given cooperative size, the higher is the expenditure on laibor per unit 
of output. 
The variable "concrete" represents the general variable Con­
crete was computed to be the proportion of all storage which is 
upright concrete storage, i.e., concrete storage divided by total 
storage. Concrete storage was separated out because it has generally 
been cOiisiùérêu C.O be ifore efficient (in terms of unit cost cf pro­
duction) than other types of storage. Concrete storage is again a 
fixed factor of production just as "storage" was considered to be. 
The variable "FAPV" represents the general variable This 
variable was computed as the millions of dollars of fixed assets in 
purchased value available to the cooperative. This variable represents 
the general level of fixed factors of production. 
The variable "distance" represents the general variable This 
variable was computed by multiplying the proportion of grain shipped to 
100 
each local market by the number of air miles to each of these markets, 
and then summing them. A local market was considered to be any destina­
tion other than the Gulf of Mexico. The sum was then divided by 100 to 
get -che variable "distanceDistance is representative of the general 
variable since the closer the cooperative is located to the final 
markets, the higher will be the net price (price received less transpor­
tation cost), other things being equal. 
The variables "s gulf" and "c gulf" are also representative of the 
general variable P^ . S gulf and c gulf were computed to be the propor­
tion of soybeans (former) and com (latter) shipped directly to the 
Gulf of Mexico as final destination. These variables represent a product 
market which is generally considered to offer higher prices for com 
and soybeans since they are shipped for export from the gulf. 
The variable "pigs" represents the general exogenous variable P^ . 
This variable was computed as the inventory of hogs and pigs on farms 
(in 100,000 units) in the county of the firm's home office on December 
1, 1377. ?ias represent a market for com and soybeans since both are 
used to produce pig feed. The larger the nuirJser of pigs, the larger is 
the demand for pig feed, all other things being equal. 
The variable "concentration" is representative of the general vari­
able P,,. Concentration was computed by dividing the total storage 
capacity of the cooperative by the total storage capacity (commercial 
plus private) in the county of the firm's home office. Concentration 
is representative of P^  since it represents the amount of competition 
for utilizing storage facilities. The lower is the level of concentration 
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the higher will be the cost of obtaining grain to utilize the storage 
capacity of the firm, all other things equal. 
The variable "all cattle" represents the general exogenous 
variable P^ . All cattle was computed as the total number of all cattle 
(in 100,000 units) in the county of the firm's home office on January 
1, 1979. All cattle represents a market for the product since corn and 
soybeans are used to produce cattle feed. The larger the number of 
cattle, the larger is the demand for cattle feed, all other things being 
equal. 
The variable "grain cattle" is representative of the general vari­
able Pg. Grain cattle was computed as the total number of cattle (in 
100,000 units) in the county of the firm's home office which were grain 
fed for marketing in the year 1979. Grain cattle represents in 
the same way as pigs and all cattle. Grain cattle and all cattle were 
both used in the analysis since all cattle represents the general class 
of cattle and grain cattle represents a more specific type of cattle. 
•Thp rvne or marker ôîfferc rwrwppn orain cattle ;='.nâ A11 cartle. 
The variable "hens" is also representative of the general variable 
P^ . This variable was computed as the total number of laying hens (in 
units of 1.000.000) in the county of the firm's home office. This 
variable also represents a market for grain in the same way as pigs, all 
cattle, and grain cattle. 
The variable "F concen" is representative of the general variable 
P^ .^ F concen was computed by dividing the storage capacity of the firm 
by total commercial storage in the county of the firm's home office. 
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F concen represents competition for storage utilization in a manner 
similar to the "concentration" variable. F concen represents the 
direct competition between commercial storage firms for utilizing the 
storage. 
The "bushel expense" variable is also representative of the 
general variable P^ . Bushel expense was computed by dividing the total 
expenses of the cooperative which could be allocated to the marketing 
of grain, by total grain sales in bushels (both for the most recent 
fiscal year). This variable (in units of cents per bushel) would be 
an indication of the general level of variable input prices, P^ . 
The variable "dry 24" was computed as the price in cents per bushel 
the cooperative charges it's patrons for drying 24 percent moisture 
com to storage level moisture, divided by ten. If dry 24 represented 
only the cost of drying the corn, then dry 24 would be representative 
of the general variable P^ .^ There also exists the possibility that a 
specification error is involved by including this variable. It may be 
argued that drying grain is a product produced by the cooperative and 
that dry 24 represents the price of this product. If drying is considered 
a product then complementarity may exist, as was the case in the anhydrous 
ammonia model with SERV. or the variable may have no effect on the 
price of grain. 
The variable "shrink" was confuted as the percent of weight deducted 
from grain for each percent of moisture removed in the drying process. 
This variable can be analyzed with interpretations similar to the dry 
24 variable. If shrink represents the true loss of weight in the dr>-ing 
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process, then shrink is representative of the general variable P^ . If, 
however, we consider drying grain to be a product of the cooperative, 
then complementarity may exist, or the variable may have no effect on 
the price of grain. If drying graiii is a product then a spscification 
error has been incorporated in the i^ odel by including shrink in the 
analysis of grain prices. 
The variables "K", "s", "x", "TD", and "LEV" are the same variables 
as K, s, T, TD, and LEV, which were all described in the feed and 
anhydrous ammonia models. K represents the general variable K; s 
represents the general variable s; x and TD represent the general 
variable X; and LEV represents the general variable P^ . 
The variables "sdiv" and "cdiv" represent the general variable 
. Sdiv and cdiv are calculated as a simple average of the past 
three years dividend rates for soybeans and corn, respectively. These 
variables would be indicative of the expected level of dividends of the 
member patrons since most members would use history as their best judge 
•y"aT"<3Q 
The results in Tables 8 through 11 show the coefficients of the 
cross-sectional variables which have significant t-statistics at a level 
of 80 percent or more. The P-statistics indicate the significance of the 
models which were fit to the time series coefficients. In the re­
gressions where the F-statistic is not significant, the best estimate of 
the coefficient is the mean value of the time series coefficient 
(located in Tables 4 through 7). The level of significance for the 
P-statistics which were chosen as acceptable for constructing the models 
Table 8. Final coefficients for the soybean basis model, including storage utilization 
Variable Storage 
utilization Intercept Trend Jan. Feb. March April May 
Intercept 
Turnover 
Storage -31,8996** 
Employees 
Concrete 
FAPV 45.416*** 
Distance 
S gulf 
Pigs 
Concentration 
All cattle 
Grain cattle 
Hens 
F concon 181.9203* 
Bushel exp. 
Dry 24 
Shrink -13S.S452* 
K -16.5033** 
s 
I 
TD 60.0439* 
Sdiv 
' _TOC -I-Ï-TO» 
-0.4951*** -19.7719* 
5.0926** 3.6145* 
-0.1291- -i0.2625- -11.3353--
-6.8499*** -6.2002** -5.2874* 
-19.9686* 
10.9969* 
6.6538* 7.5907* 7.5584* 
-21.1700* 
-0.5080** -51.7071**** -40.3943*** -34.0505** 
-6.9803* 
48.9360* 
2.8062*** 2.6256*** 1.9876* 
1.4826* 1.7188** 1.7927** 
.0337* 
R2 27.88 
F-statistic 0.65 
31.30 30.07 31.11 31.45 32.21 25.96 29,89 
0.77 0.72 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.59 0.72 
The variables across the top are the time series variables and the variables down the 
side are the cross-sectional variables. 
t-statistic significant at 80 percent, 
t-statistic significant at 90 percent, 
t-statistic significant at 95 percent, 
t-statistic significant at 99 percent. 
'F-statistic significant at 50 percent. 
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Jonc July /Vug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Trig. 
-7.1056*** -5.4819* -8.4252** 
12.4261-
7.4638** 7.3160* 11.7341*** 7.7540* 
6.8608* 
-17.6691* 
0.2390* 
-0.1527'"' 
-0.0848* 
0.2388* 
56.1796*** 36.0051* 63.1635** 48.6044** 
-9.7843* 
-2.7136** -2.4601* -4.3882** -2.8847* 
'29.0294* 
0.6563* 
13.1283* 
-1.8553* -2.0918* 
- 39. 
0.2689* 
-62.8913* 
-0.0184* 
-9.7679* 
-0.0219*** 
33.03 23.32 28.41 25.08 30.90 22.95 
0.83 0.51 0.67 0.56 0-75 0.50 
25.65 36.19 
0.58 0.95^ 
Table 9. Final coefficients for the soybean basis model, excluding storage utilization 
Variable^ Intercept Trend Jan. Feb. March April May 
Intercept 74.1645• 
Turnover -0.2669* 
Storage 
Employees 
Concrete -8.0830* -0.1001* -4.7152** -8.8731*** -7.2843* 
FAPV 
Distance 9.1685** 
S gulf 8.8452* 
Pigs 7.0601* 
Concentration -8.1832** -7.2960* -6.9544*** 
All cattle -29.6538*** -35.2849*»** -25.3183*** 
Grain cattle 19.4414** 24.9248*** 20.62^4*** 
Hens 
F concen -7.9522* -11.2815* -17.3151» 
Bushel Exp. 
Dry 24 -4.777S-
Shrink 
K 
s -3.5411* 
T 
70 
Sdiv -1.1870* 
LEV 
20.28 17.65 25.39 32.3626.6834.0123.04 
F-statistic 0.51 0.43 0.68 0.93^ 0.73 1.03'^ 0.60 
^The variables across the top are time series variables and the variables down the 
side are the cross-sectional variables. 
t-statistic significant at 80 percent, 
t-statistic significamt at 90 percent 
t-statistic significant at 95 percent, 
t-statistic significant at 99 percent. 
'F-statistic significemt at 50 percent. 
'F-stitistlc significant at 75 percent. 
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Juna July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Trig. 
0.2390» 
-7.1056*** -5.4819* -8.4252** 6.8608* 
12.4281* 0.1166* 
7.4638** 7.3160* 11.7341*** 7.7540* 
-17.6691* -0.1527** 
-0.0848* 
0.2388* 
56.1796*** 36.0051* 63.1635** 48.6044** 0.2689* 
-9.7843* 
-89.0294* -62.8913* 
-2.7136** -2.4601* -4.3882** -2.8847* -0.0184* 
0.6563-' 
13.1283* -9.7679* 
-1.8553* -2.0918* -0.0219*** 
-39.4205* 
33.08 23.32 28.41 25.08 30.90 22.95 25.65 36.19 
0.83 0.51 0.67 0.56 0.75 0.50 0.58 0.95^ 
Table 10. Final coefficients for the corn basis model, including storage utilization 
Variable Storage 
utilization Intercept Trend Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. 
-14.5845**** 
_1 _ qçLQA*** 
-17.8075* 
17.9528**** 
Intercept 
Turnover • 
Storage 
Employees 
Concrete 
FAPV 
Distance 
C gulf 
Pigs 
Concentration -13.5862* 
All cattle 
Grain cattle 
Hens 
F concen 
Bushel exp. 
Dry 24 
£hrink 
K 
S 
T 
TD 
Cdiv 
LEV 
-0.5270* 
-0.1140* 
5.5274** 
1.3370*** 
11.3384* 
-5.6134* 
-4.8997** 
-11.7660** 
21.9093»* 
1.7693*** 
—4. 
-2.9850**** -2.7542***-2. 
3027*** 
3525*** 
-3.3234** 
-1.4960* 
-2.7002**** 
-2.8150* 
2.4840* 
0.1218*** -3.9488* 
-0.1953**** 
20.9799*» 
5.9486* 
1.0234*** 
2.0985*** 
-0.2189** -0.2074* -0 
-3.8510** 
0.9865** 0.8114** 
2864*** 
-1.4178* 
-0.1991* 
F-statistic 
47.10 
1.50^ 
38.11 
1.04 
45.46 
1.40 
tr 
40.14 
1.13 
34.61 
0.89 
41 
1 
,49 
.19 
51.04 
1.75 
.ttti 
^The variables across the top are time series variables and the variables down the 
side are cross-sectional variables. 
*t-statistic significant at 80 percent. 
**t-statistic significant at 90 percent. 
***t-statistic significant at 95 percent. 
****t-statistic significant at 99 percent. 
"p-statistic significant at 50 percent. 
^"^F-statistic significant at 75 percent. 
-statistic significant at 90 percent. 
'^^^F-statistic significant at 95 percent. 
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May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Trig. 
-2.0753*** -3.2863*** -2.9162** -1.9925* 
-0.2207* -0.4354****-0.5365*** -0.3603* 
-2.8bvi* -3.5726* 
2.5214*** 4.4196**** 5.1802*** 
-1.3658* 
2.2409* 2.2302** 
0.5232*** 0.5089*** 0.3341** 
5.4972** 4.6682* 0.0656*** 
3.9384*** -2.3470* -2.3240* 0.0194* 
2.1579** 0.0197** 
2.0740* 
-2.1382* 
7.9122** 
-6.4967* 
-8.9601* 
14.5113*** 
-4.7584** 
6.6053* 
-4.2419*** 
20.2792* 
-1.4492* 
6.8490** 
-0.8565** -1.2174** -1.5674*** -1.2301* -0.0073* 
-3.5726****-3.8508*** -3.4213** 3.7510*** 2.9100** 4.3141**** 0.0158* 
0.4993*** 0.4259** 0.5690*** -0.4297*** 0.0023* 
4.7233*** 8.1119*** 5.4890* -4.8613* -6.4245*** 
45.16 
1.39 tt 
52.68 51.20 39.65 44.09 47.91 38.13 
1.87'+^ -^  1.76+^ '^  I.IO"" 1.33 tt ttt t 1.55 1.04 
45.12 
t 
1.38 
45.98 
tt 
1.43 
Table 11. Final coefficients for the corn basis model, excluding storage utilization 
Variables Intercept Trend Jan. Feb. March April May June 
Intercept -0.4085* 
Turnover -12.5652* 
Storage 
Employees 
Concrete 
FAPV 
Distance 
C gulf 
Pigs 
Concentration 0.0452** 
All cattle 0.1000*** 
Grain cattle 8.3237* -0.1699**** 
Hens 
F concen 
Bushel exp. 4.7066* -0.0538* 
Dry 24 -6.0972** 
h^rink 
K 
7.1391*** 9.8180* 
2.0469** 
-28.5361* 
8,7913* 
1.9011** 
1.8731* 
-1.1213* -1.6311* -2.1741* -2.7720** -2.4898** 
-1.3899* -2.9169*** -1.7401* 
-5.2090** -4.3951-* 
2.4158* 3.1642* 3.9242*** 2.3600* 
6.0115* 
-) C.-I qn»* 
-14.4232* 
0.4510* 0.6920* 0.8410* 0.9254* 0.7542* 
T 
TD 
Cdiv 1 
LEV 
23.88 
F-statistic 0.63 
31.72 35.53 
0.93 1.10 t 
17.86 
0.43 
17.26 
0.42 
29.52 
0.84 
25.70 
0.69 
13.93 
0.32 
^The variables across the top are time series variables and the variables down 
the side are cross-sectional variables. 
t-statistic significant at 80 percent. 
**t-statistic significant at 90 percent. 
'**t-statistic significant at 95 percent. 
****t-statistic significant at 99 percent. 
F-statistic significemt at 50 percent. 
F-statistic significant at 75 percent. 
' ' ' '^F-atatistic significant at 95 porcor.t. 
July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Trig. 
-C.1153* 
1.4009* 
-1.43S9-
-1.7976** 
1.8393** 2.6001** 2.9393*** 1.8766* 
2.9253*** 3.4704**** 1.8224** 
3.9521* 
-3.7136** -2.7525* 
6.3858**** 4.4506** 
-5.2245**** 
-3.7484** 
-5.6410* -5.4179* 
4.0597* 
-0.0253* 
0.0408** 
0.0356** 
-0.0418* 
3.3992* 
-0.7894*** -1.1541** -1.1169** -0.8277** 
-1.1896*** 2.7577*** 2.4470** 
0.1307** 0.3698*** -0.2923** 
1.6166* -4.6192*** 
-0.7782*** 
.11 OOO -]* 
58.64 32.43 37.70 38.99 
2.84-^ '-+^  0.96' 1.21 ft 1.28 tt 
24.90 
0 .66  
23.54 
0.62 
-0.0155** 
0.0251* 
2 8 . 2 2  
0.79 
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was 50 percent. Given this level of significance, we can specify the 
estimated equations for the corn and soybean basis models. To construct 
the models as specified in Equations 4.3 and 4.4, each column in the table 
must be analyzed. The intercept of the general model, A^ , and the cross-
sectional coefficients are determined from the intercept column of the 
time series variables which is derived from the regression of Equation 
4.25, i.e.; 
°io = ''o ^  'S.6) 
&=1 
c 
where D. is the estimated time series intercept for the i-th firm, A is lo o 
the estimated intercept of the model, is the estimated coefficient for 
the cross-sectional variable Z.„, and ê. is the residual error for the 
IX. lO 
i-th firm. The are estimates of the in the model specified in 
Equation 4.3 and A^  is the estimate of in Equation 4.3. 
The A^  and vAy)^ ^^  are estimated by the coefficients derived frosi 
regressing the cross-sectional variables on the k-th time series coeffi­
cients derived in the time series analyses. The regression of the k-th 
time series coefficient can be shown as ; 
 ^ (5.7) 
£=1 
where D.. is the estimate of the k-th time series coefficient for the i-th 
IK 
firm, and (Ay) . are estimates of and (Ay) . in Equation 4.3, 
< V « & /V iC iv 
and eis the residual error for the i-th firm in the k-th regression. 
xk 
If the F-statistic is not significant for regression Equation 5.7, then 
a, eauals the inean value of D.. fTables 4 and 51 derived from the time 
K XX 
series regressions, and the (Ay)^  equal zero. 
For the soybean basis model which includes the storage utilization 
variable (Table 8) the only time series coefficient which yielded a signifi­
cant F-statistic in the regression on the cross-sectional elements was the 
trig coefficient. Interpreting the results as indicated in Equations 
5.6 and 5.7 would yield the mean values of the time series coefficients 
(located in Table 4) as the estimated coefficients for the and A^ , 
except that the coefficient for the trig term would be dependent on the 
cross-sectional elements as shown in Table 8. Estimating Equation 4.3 
in ti'iis manner yields the following equation; 
3B._ = -27.9045 - 8-2855*SU. - 0.0701*t + 4.9348*S,. 
It It lit 
+ 5.5948*S_._ - 0.2916*S^ . + 0.6505*5^ ._ + 2.2133*S^ . 2it 3it 4it 5it 
+ 0.0444*5 . - 2,5492*5.,. - 2.0250*S„_ - 9.6917*3.. 6it 7it 8it 9it 
- + 4'7758*Sii.t + 1.8568*512.^  
+ L0.23yu* (Turnover > ^  -i- U. ilbb* (Concrete; - 0.1527-(6 gulr;^  
- 0.0848* (Pigs) + 0.2388* (All cattle) ^ + 0.2589* (F concen)^  
- 0.0184'(K)^ - 0.0219*(Sdiv)*(Trig)(5.3) 
where would be the estimated soybean hasis level for a cooperative 
with cross-sectional variables equal to the i-th firm's cross-sectional 
variables, SU^  ^ is the level of storage utilization for the i-th firm in 
the t-th time period. 5^ ^^  ^(k=l,... ,12) is k-th montlily seasonal dummy 
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for the i-th firm in time period t. equals 1.0 if the t-th time 
period is in month k and zero otherwise. The variables inside the 
brackets of the equation are the values of the cross-sectional vari­
ables as defined earlier for the i-th firm. (Trig)^  ^is the value for the 
trig time series variable for the i-th firm in the t-th time period. 
The soybean basis model which excludes the storage utilization 
variable (Table 9) can be constructed in a manner similar to the soy­
bean basis model including storage utilization. In the soybean basis 
model, excluding storage utilization, the regression models for the 
time series coefficients February, April, and August were found to have sig­
nificant F-statistics at the 50 percent level of significance. Using 
these regressions for determining the coefficients corresponding to these 
variables, we can construct a model from Tables 5 and 9 which would con­
tain the average coefficients for the intercept, trend, January, March, 
May, June, September, October, November, December, and trig terms (found 
in Table 5); and the regressions found in Table 9 for time series vari­
ables rcbruary, April, July, zzzd J-.ugust. Ar. written 
for this model as ; 
= -24.9249 - 0.2393*t - 7.1321*5,.^  + [-8.8731*(Concrete). it lit 1 
- 11.2815*(F concen) - 4.7778*(Dry 24)^ ]*S2^  ^- 21.7780*5^ ^^  
- [74.1645 + 8.8452* (S gulf) /I- 7.0601* (Pigs). 
- 7.2950*(Concentration). 
- 35.2849*(All cattle). +24.9248*(Grain cattle). 
- 3.5411*(s)j*S,.^  - 5.9555*5=.^  + 1.9903*S,.^  1 4it 5it bit 
+ [53.5778 - 4.9231*(Pigs)^  - 5.0545*(Bushel expense)^  
- 29.5655*(Shrink) + 1.8953*(s)J*S^ ^^  
+ [-0.3803*(Employees)^  + 21.3142*(All cattle)^  
- 18.5713*(Grain cattle)^  + 4.6033*(Dry 24)^  
- 0.9023*(K) .]*S„.^  + 11.1424*5^ .^  + 1.9490*S_.^  1 8it 9it lOit 
+ 0.4465*5^ ^^  ^+ 5.2762*S 0.0949* (Trig) (5,9) 
The time series variables in this equation can be interpreted simi­
larly to those in Equation 5.8. The cross-sectional variables located 
inside each of the brackets in Equation 5.9 are defined for each firzr. 
(i) as equal to the definitions given before. 
An equation for the corn basis model including the storage utiliza-
to both soybean basis models. In the com basis model which includes 
storage utilization the only time series coefficient which did not yield 
significant F-statistic was the February coefficient. To construct this 
com basis model we would use the average value for the February time 
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series coefficient (from Table 6) and the regressions as defined for 
the other time series variables in Table 10, i.e.; 
= 5.5274* (Storage)^  + 1.3370*(Employees) + 11.3384*(Concrete)^  
-5.6134(FAPV)^  
+5.9486*(s)^  + [-14.5845*(Storage)^  
-1.9596* (Employees)^  - 17.8075*(Concrete)^  + 17.9528*(FAPV)^  
-13.5862*(Concentration)^  - 4.8997*(K)^  - 11.7661*(s)^  
+21.9093* (TD).]*SU.. + [-0.5270 + 0.1141*(Turnover) . 1 nc 1 
+0.1218*(All cattle). - 0.1953*(Grain cattle)^ ]*t 
+ [1.7693*(Storage)^  - 2.9850» (FAPV)^  - 3.9480* (All cattle)^  
+1.0234*(K). + 2.0985*(s). - 0.2189*(T). - 3.8510*(TD).]*S, _ 
-11.4915*82^  ^+ [-4.3027*(Concrete)^  - 2.3525(FAPV)^  
-1.3005* (Distance)^  + 0.8114(K)^  - 0.2864 (T)*5.^  ^
+ L—3.3235Concrete. - 1,4960 {FAPV) ^ — 2./GG2 (Dj-suaiiCc:) ^ 
-2.8150(C Qulf). + 2.4840(Pigs). - 3.3781(Dry24), i l  - * •  
+20.9709 (Shrink). - 1.4178(S). - 0.1991(T).]*S..^  i 1 J. 411. 
+ [-0.2207* (Eniplcyees) ^ - 2.8594 (Concrete) ^ + 2.0740* (Pigs) ^ 
-4.2419* (Drv 24). + 20.2792 (Shrink) . - 1.4492 (s:),] *S  ^i X X J-». L. 
+ L-2. 0753* (Storage) ^ - 0.4554^ '(rinployees) - 3.5726-(Concrets) ^ 
O 1 "5 O O * / va +• 4  ^
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+14.5113*(F concen)^  - 0.8565*(K) - 3.5726*(s)^  + 4.7234*(TD)*5^ ^^  
+[-3.2863*(Storage)^  - 0.5365*(Employees)^  + 4.4196*(FAPV)^  
+7.9122*(Ail cattle)^  - 6.4967*(Grain cattle)^  - 1.2174*(K)^  
-3.8508*(s). + 0.4993*(T)^  + 8.1119(TD)*S^ ^^  
+[-2.9162*(Storage)^  - 0.3503*(Employees)^  + 5.1802*(FAPV)^  
-8.9601*(Hens)^  - 1.5674(K), - 3.4213* (S), + 0.4259* (T). 
+5.4890* (TD).]*S„.^  + [-1.9925*(Storage). + 3.9384*(FAPV) . i Ole X 1 
+6.8450* (Dry 24)^  - 1.2301*(K)^  + 0.5690* (T)*5^ ^^  
+[2.2409*(Storage)^  + 0.5232*(Employees)^  + 5.4972*(Concrete)^  
-2.3470*(FAPV) - 4.7584*(Pigs)^  + 3.7510*(s)*8^ ^^  ^
+ [2.2302*(Storage)^  + 0.5089*(Employees)^  + 4.6682*(Concrete)^  
+2.9108*(S) - 4.8613*(TD)^ ]*S^ ,^  ^+ [0.3341*(Employees)^  
-2. 3240* (FAPY} . + 2. x5/y*'.uisrance) . f 6.6055-(Hens) . 1 11
+4.3141*(s) - 0.4297*(r)^  - 6.4245-(TD)-S^ 2it 
+ [0.0656*(Concrete). + 0.0194*(FAPV). + 0.0197*(Distance), 1 i  ^
-0.0074*(K), + n.msft* (s) _ + 0.0023* (T) . 1 * (Trig) (5.10) 
In Equation 5.10 is the estimated corn basis level for a cooperative 
with cross-sectional variables equal to the i-th firm's cross-sectional 
variables, and the other variables are as defined before. 
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The final model which was estimated was the com basis model ex­
cluding storage utilization. The F-statistics in Table 11 indicate 
that the time series coefficient regressions for trend, January, July, 
August, September, and October were significant. The average 
value of the time series coefficients (Table 7) would be used for 
the intercept, February, March, April, May, June, November, December, 
and Trig. The corn basis equation may be written as; 
BC.. = —30.3467 + [-G.40S5 + 0.0452*(Concentration). it: X 
+ C.1001*(All cattle)^  - 0.1699*(Grain cattle)^  
-0.0538(Bushel expense)"'t 
+ [7.1391*(Turnover)^  + ?.8731*(Concrete)^  -1.1213*(FAPV)^  
+ 2.6160* (Dry 24)^ + 0.4511* (K) 4.4816*32^  ^
- 1.0691*5^ ._ + 0.4983*3^ .^  + 2.5230*S_.^  + 3.2811*3... 3it 4it 5It 5it 
+ [-0.1154* (Employees) + 1.4010* (Concrete) ^ 
- 1.4399*(C gulf)^  + 6.3858*(All cattle). 
- 5.2245*(Grain cattle). - 3.7484*(F concen). - 1.1897*(s). 1 1 j-
+ 0.1307*(T)i+ 1.6166*(TD)^ ]*3^ ^^  
f [1.8393*(FAPY). + 4.4506(All cattle). - 0.7894(K).]*S 1 1 i olu 
+ [2.6001*(FAPV)^  + 2.9255*(Distance)^  - 3.7136*(Concentration)^  
- 1.1541*(K)^  + 2.7577*(s)^  + 0.3698 (T) . 1*3^ ^^  
. r 1 \ O !z?r.-aX7\ I ^ «L «• 1^1 YJ \ jL / ' AM • ^  ^ ^ ^ \ ^ • w — \ — — — — — — — T _ 
+3.9520* (C gulf)_. - 2 .7525* (Concentration) ^ 
- 5.6410* (Kens) + 4.0597* (Bushel expenses)^  
- 1.1169* CO . + 2.4480*(s) .] "S + 3.2109*8- . 2. 1 lOlu illL 
- 0.0273(Trig).^ . (5.11) 
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The variables in Equation 5.11 may be interpreted in the same way as 
in Equations 5.8, 5.9, and 5,10. 
No definite conclusions can be drawn from these results about 
the effect of any of the cross-sectional variables on the basis level of 
corn or soybeans. The signs of the coefficients on no cross-sectional 
variable was consistent in all four models. Table 12 shows the 
summary of the coefficient's signs of the cross-sectional variables. 
Table 12. The summary of the coefficients signs of the cross-
sectional variables in all basis models 
Variable 
Soybean 
basis 
Equation 
5.8 
Soybean 
basis 
Equation 
5.9 
Com 
basis 
Equation 
5.10 
Com 
basis 
Equation 
5.11 
Turnover 
Storage 
Employees 
Concrete 
FAPV 
1(+) 
1(+) 
Distance 
Gulf" 
Pigs 
Concentration 
All cattle 1(+) 
Grain cattle 
•L 
1 
i(-) 
1 (-} 
11+; XI-; 
l(-) 
4(+) 5(-) 
4(+) 5(-) 
4(+} 5(-) 
6(+ )  6  ( - )  
3(-j 
1 (-) 
2(+) i(-) 
2 ( - )  
1(+) l(-) 2( + ) l(-) 
1(+) 
l(-) 
l(-) 
2(+)  
3(+) 1{-) 
2 ( + )  
1 (-r) l(-) 
3(+) 
2(-} 
2(-) 
9  r _ i  
Gulf is S gulf in Equations 5.8 and 5.9 and C gulf in Equations 
5.10 and 5.11. 
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Table 12 (Continued) 
Variable 
Soybean 
basis 
Equation 
5.8 
Soybean 
basis 
Equation 
5.9 
Corn 
basis 
Equation 
5.10 
Corn 
basis 
Equation 
5.11 
Hens i(+) 1 (-) l(-) 
F concen 1(+) i(-) i(+) l(-) 
Bushel expense i(-) 1(+) l(-) 
Dry 24 i(+) i(-) i(+) 2(-) 1{+) 
Shrink 1 (-) 2 (+) 
K l(-) i(-) 2(+) 6 (-) 1(+) 3(-) 
s i(+) i(-) 5(+) 5 (-) 2(+) l(-) 
T 4(+) 4(-) 2(+) 
TD 4(+) 3(-) 1(+) 
Div 
LEV 
l(-) 
Div is Sdiv in Equations 5.8 and 5.9 and Cdiv in Equation 5.10 and 
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CHAPTER VI. COOPERATIVE FINANCING 
SUB-MODEL 
The sub-model developed for the pricing and production decision in 
Chapter III utilized the objective of maximizing the total collective 
profits of the member patrons. The approach used in most of the 
literature concerning the cooperative financing decision has been to 
minimize the cost of capital. Much of the corporate literature has 
used the objective of maximizing the rate of return on owners' invest­
ment in the firm. 
The sub-model used in this chapter to analyze cooperative financing 
will utilize the objective of maximizing the total collective profits 
of all present members. We can distinguish the financing sub-model from 
the pricing and production sub-model in the process of decision-making 
the cooperative decision-maker operates by. The production and pricing 
sub-model is considered to be a short-run sub-model of the firm for 
functioning within uiê limiLs aixd in accordoncc •.:ith ths 
the established structure. The established structure of the cooperative 
association will be that which is determined in the long-run decision­
making process. The enterprise structure analysis will contain two basic 
decisions. First, the cooperative association must determine the 
financial structure within which the cooperative must operate. Second, 
the cooperative association must determine the types and amounts of asset 
investments to make. The model developed in this chapter will be con­
cerned v.-ith the financial structure of the cooperative association. 
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Determining the types and amounts of asset investments to make will be a 
separate decision process not considered. 
The temporal relationship of the finance sub-model with the 
production and pricing sub-model assumes that the finance decision is 
made prior to the production and pricing decision. In the finance 
sub-model I am assuming that the cooperative association is in a long-run 
decision process. The long-run is distinguished from the short-run by 
the variables which the cooperative association can var^ '. With the 
production and pricing sub-model developed in Chapter III, we were able 
to obtain the structural equations of 4.1 and 4.2 as results which 
gave the price of unprocessed products (set X) and the price of variable 
inputs (set Y) as dependent upon structural variables within the firm. 
In the long-run finance decision we will allow these structural vari­
ables to be decision variables. 
The model of the cooperative association developed in Chapter II 
(Figure 2.1) is applicable for development of the financing sub-model. 
The cooperative association is composed ot tzrms joined together lui. Llie 
purpose of processing and marketing their products or supplying the 
inputs they use in production. The activities may or may net be limited 
to members. The various relationships of products with, member and non-
member patrons will still exist. 
In this chapter, we will need to reassess the member and nonmember 
patron's decision process in the long-run. The decision which the patrons 
will need to make is whether to belong to the cooperative association. 
To belong ro the cooperative association, cl^ a r.U3t pay fcr % share 
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of common stock and allow the cooperative association the right to re­
tain allocated earnings of the member patron as an additional method of 
vestment in the cooperative. In the long-run membership will not be 
fixed for the cooperative decision-maker, but dependent upon the 
operating decisions of the cooperative. 
Model of a Typical Patron for 
Determining Membership 
The patron of a cooperative association must determine whether to 
join the cooperative association. In Chapter III, we described the 
typical patron as a maximizer of profits. A typical decision of a 
profit maximizer is determining which asset investments, or disinvest­
ments, to make. Authors have used different criteria for determining 
optimal asset investment, e.g., net present value, rate of return, and 
profitability index. Most asset investment criteria involve the cash 
flows to and from the firm. The decision of joining the cooperative 
asccciation can be assumed to be a rate of return analysis. 
The total cash inflow to a cooperative association member patron 
for the present year may be described as the total sales revenues re­
ceived or paid for products traded with and outside the cooperative 
association plus the net present value of patronage dividends allocated 
to the member patrons plus the dividends on stock, i.e.; 
„  M  „ O M  -  M _  0  M 
° iL - is. 
+ rs + r r, r*a^ 1 + ds (6.1) 
iC%,Y 1-1= 
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M 
where and are the price and quantity of the i-th product traded 
O M 
with the cooperative association by the member, p^  and q^  ^are the price 
and quantity of the i-th product traded outside the cooperative association 
by the member, s is the proportion of patronage dividends paid in cash, 
(1-s) is the proportion of patronage dividends held for deferred payment 
in T years, d^  is the discount rate of the member, rf is the expected per 
unit patronage dividend of the i-th product, and ds is the dividends on 
stock. 
The cash inflow of the typical nonmember patron for the present 
year may be described as the total sales revenues received or paid 
for products traded with and outside the cooperative association, i.e.; 
N 
where p^  and q^  ^are the price and quantity of the i-th product traded 
o N 
with the cooperative association by the nonmeniber and p^  and q^  ^are 
the price and quantity of the i-th product traded outside cha cooperative 
association by the nonmember. 'We may assume the price of 
product (p^  and p'^ ) to be the same in boî±x models. The quantity supplied 
N 
or demanded by rhe typical nonmember patron (q. ) will differ from that 
M 
of the member patron (q^ )^ because of the expectation of patronage 
dividends by members, and the quantity is assumed to be larger for the 
member patron. 
The net cash inflow that results from becoming a member for the 
present year is the difference between the cash inflows of the t^ 'pical 
member and nonmember patrons, i.e.; 
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(6.3) 
or; 
+ [s + [ Z r*q^  ] + ds. (6.4) 
(1+d y iex,y  ^
in 
The total member investment required to become a fully invested 
member in the cooperative association is the sum of the cost of a 
share of common stock and the total amount of patronage dividends 
retained. Assuming the member expects a constant amount of patronage 
dividends each yearwe can write this total cash outflow as ; 
MI = P + T (1-s) I P*q^  (6.5) 
iEX,Y 1 1= 
where P is the price of a share of common stock and all other vari-
m  ^
ables are as described before. 
Given Equations 6.4 and 6.5 we can describe the rate of return for 
membership in the cooperative as ; 
7T 
= (6.6) 
MI 
. [Pi +Pi ^^ i ' 
+ [S + H S r*q" ] - ds. 
(1+d ) i£X,Y  ^
op^  — 2 
+ T(l-s) Z r*q" (6.7) 
iGX,Y 
If the patron were to use the rate of return method for determining 
membership, he would compare RR.. with d... If RR, were greater thar 
PI n i-j "î-l ' 
chen che patron would become a cooperative laerriber. 
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The other methods of determining membership (net present value and 
profitability index) would utilize the same variables developed above. 
In considering only the one investment option, all methods should give 
the same result. If we were considering a group of investments, the 
ranking of investments could differ, depending on the method of 
analysis. The only investment option I will consider will be member­
ship in the cooperative association. Given this assumption, each 
patron could determine his decision for membership with Equation 5.7 and 
his discount rate (d^ ). Total membership would be the aggregate of the 
decisions made by all patrons. All patrons will not make the same 
decision since each faces a different set of exogenous variables, 
o M N 
The p^ , d^ , and rf could and probably would differ for 
each patron, and therefore dictate different decisions. Membership in 
the cooperative will therefore depend upon the value of these variables 
for the patrons it serves, i.e., total membership may be expressed by; 
-M = ,?^) (5.8) 
where ? is tlie vector of prices paid by the cooperative 
the products in set X, is the vector of prices paid by firms outside 
the cooperative association for products in set X, is the vector 
of prices received by the cooperative association for products in set Y, 
is the vector of prices received by firms outside the cooperative 
association for products in set Y, is the vector of quantities of public 
goods produced by the cooperative association, is the vector of 
expected per unit patronage dividend rates of tlie patrons, and 
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M N 
and ds are as described before. The q. and q. were eliminated from ic ic 
the equation because of their dependence on c^' 
Model of the Cooperative 
Association 
In the production and pricing sub-model of the cooperative associa­
tion, we assumed that the cooperative decision-maker had the objective 
of maximizing the collective profits of the member patrons, i.e., the 
objective function was; 
TM TM 11= Z p.q. - E p.a. - FCM + DS + PVPD. (3.25) 
iCX iCY 1 1 
The long-run objective of the cooperative decision-maker will also be 
to maximize the total collective profits of the member patrons. In the 
long-run we will have different variables which are decision variables 
to the cooperative decision-maker. The long-run decision will involve 
the establishment of the optimal structure for operating the coopera­
tive. Optimal structural analysis includes asset investment analysis 
and financial structure. The structural decision which is analyzed 
in this chapter concerns the financial structure decision. 
In determining the optimal financial structure of the cooperative, 
the cooperative decision-maker must determine the total amount of 
debt, total amount of owners' equity, and the sye'-'iric airiounts cf alter­
native types of owners• equity to employ. Owners' equity in cooperative 
associations includes common stock and deferred patronage dividends. 
Membership allows the patron two important rights. First, it allows the 
members to vote at annual meetings and have the right to be elected to 
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the board of directors. This allows patrons the right to be involved 
in the control of the cooperative enterprise. Second, it is required 
for the patron to receive a patronage dividend at the end of the fiscal 
year by most cooperatives. 
The net savings of the cooperative association are allocated to 
the members either as dividends on stock or as patronage dividends -
i.e. ; 
NS = PD + DS (6.9) 
where PD is the total amount of net savings allocated as patronage 
dividends, and DS is the total amount of net savings allocated as 
dividends on stock. Patronage dividends can be allocated in cash, de­
ferred patronage dividends, or preferred stock. The cash portion of 
the allocation is determined by the board of directors of the coopera­
tive provided certain provisions have been met. Under the Iowa Code 
beginning January 1, 1980, the cooperative must have at least 20 per-
cenL cash allocation of presonr patronage dividends. The cccpcrc.tivc 
allocate a portion greater than 20 percent, provided there are no 
deferred patronage dividends of deceased members in the cooperative.^  
The portion of the allocation not paid in cash would go to either 
deferred patronage dividends or preferred stock- Allocating preferred 
stock allows the cooperative the choice of cash allocations greater than 
20 percent without restrictions in the manner the noncash portion is 
•'"The cooperative must pay a 20 percent cash allocation if there are 
deferred patronage dividends of deceased members in the cooperative. 
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paid. Deferred patronage dividends must be paid to the members with 
the oldest deferred patronage dividend being held by the cooperative 
paid first. The major difference between deferred patronage dividends 
and preferred stock is the increased freedom allowed in retiring 
the preferred stock. I will assume that preferred stock will he handled 
the same as deferred patronage dividends and I will also assume that 
no deferred patronage dividends of deceased members is held by the 
cooperative. 
Paying dividends on stock is a method of paying a dividend on 
member investment in the firm. One of the principles of cooperation 
states that the cooperative should pay only a limited return on in­
vestment, i.e., limited to a fixed rate. The dividend could be defined 
as a fixed dividend rate on total member investment from common stock, 
i.e. ; 
DS = i[CS] (6.10) 
where i is the fixed dividend rats and CS zs tne rorai member investment 
in coûûûon stock. 
The total amount of member investment in common stock is dependent 
upon the nuiïiïer of members (Mj and the price of common stock . 
Each member is allowed one share of common stock under the rules of the 
Internal Revenue Service governing cooperatives, i.e., the number of 
shares equals the number of members. The number of members was found to 
be determined by Equation 5.S in the model of the typical patron. The 
price of common stock is fixed in cl'ic articles and be changed by 
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amending the articles of incorporation. Amending the articles of in­
corporation requires a two-thirdc affirmative vote from all members 
present at the annual meeting or any meeting held for that purpose.^  
The average price of stock can be changed by issuing a different class 
of preferred stock. Many cooperatives have provisions in the articles 
of incorporation that allow the board of directors to issue a second 
class of stock to cause a change in the average price of the stock. 
This method also gives the advantage of offering a low initial 
common stock price so that members could pay it outright and receive 
the benefits of full membership while earning a second class of stock 
from their patronage dividends received from the cooperative. Given 
these definitions, we can define the member investment by common stock 
as; 
CS = P • M (6.11) 
m 
and redefine the dividend on total common stock investment as, 
DS = i[P «]. (5.12; 
m 
The other method of obtaining member investment in the cooperative 
is by deferred patronage dividends. Given a cash allocation of s, the 
deferred portion of the patronage dividend is; 
DP = (1-s)ÎNS-DSj. (6.13) 
Ones the optimum capital structure is defined, membership will be fixed 
until a change in one of the exogenous variables occurs. Given the 
l^owa Code (13, Section 41). 
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level of membership, and no expected change in the exogenous variables, 
we may define the members' investment via the deferred portion of 
patronage dividends to be; 
TDP = T(1-s) (NS-DS) , (6.14) 
and total member investment as; 
TMI = T(1-s)(NS-DS) + P M. (6.15) 
m 
The total capital employed (K) by the firm is the sum of the total 
member investment and debt (D), i.e.; 
K = T(l-s)(NS-DS) + p M + D. (6.16) 
m 
The net savings of the cooperative can alternatively be broken 
down into operating income and interest expense. Operating income 
(0) is the excess of revenues over costs (not including the total 
interest cost of debt). I will assume that the operating income is 
dependent cr. tcte.1 zc^berchip (M) and tot?."' capital employed (K) . 
i.e., net savings may be expressed as; 
NS = 0(M,K) - rD (6.17) 
where r is the average interest rate on all debt and D is the total 
amount of debt employed. The average interest rate will be dependent 
upon the leverage ratio of the firm (D/K). I will assume the average 
interest rate is positively related to the leverage ratio. Vickers"^  
1 
D.'Vickers (57, pp. 67-69). 
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shows how this might be proven by showing how the higher leverage ratio 
implies a higher amount of risk assumed by the lending institution and, 
therefore, a higher interest rate. 
By using Equations 6.12 and 6.17 we can express the patronage 
dividends (PD) from Equation 6.9 as; 
PD = 0(M,K) - rD - ip m (6.18) 
m 
and the present value of patronage dividends (PVPD) as ; 
PVPD = [s + ]^[0(M,K) - rD - iP \M]. (6.19) 
(1+d )t * 
lU 
The terms s + (l-s)/(l+d )*" define the present value of the patronage 
m 
dividend allocated with portion s paid in cash and (1-s) paid T years 
later, d is the average annual discount rate of the membership. 
m 
Denoting net savings as expressed in Equation 6.9 and noting that 
dividend on common stock is paid in cash, then the present value of net 
savings (PVNS) is the sum of the present value of patronage dividends 
(Equation 6,1?,' and on cnTTrmori Stock (Eouation 6.12), i.e.; 
J [C(n,K) - rD - iP %] ^  i? M. (6.20) in in 
The objective of the cooperative is to maximize the total collective 
profits of its members. Equation 3.26 shows the objective function of 
the cooperative association for the short-run prcduciiicn and priciiig 5ui>-
mcdsl. In. the long-run we allow the structural parameters of the 
cooperative to become decision variables. The total sales revenues to 
the member patrons received or paid for products in set X and set Y will 
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vary with the level of membership and total capital employed, i.e.; 
Z p.q™ - Z p.q™ = T{M,K) (6.21) 
iex 11= iEY 11= 
Given Equation 5.21 for total sales revenues to the member patrons, we 
can redefine the objective function to be; 
nF = , (1-S) T(M,K) + [s + ] [NS-DS] + DS - FCM 
where NS is defined in Equation 6.17 and DS is defined in Equation 
6.12. 
Since membership is allowed to vary, it is possible that increasing 
membership in the cooperative association indefinitely would increase 
the total collective profits as long as T(M,K) is positively related 
to membership (M) and not offset by decreases in net savings (NS). 
Furubotn^  took this factor into account in his long-run analysis of 
the labor-managed firm. He assumed the objective of the cooperative 
was to maximize the total profits of the present members only. Since those 
meinbtirs wxTinin 'cixt: «jooperciCive dre proric , j.L xS a. ZaXX 6.5-
"v~ /"w.Tv* +• c a T-, T.T-i "H n "i" c wn mi fiTi — 
come members. Noting the total number of members to be M now and 
o 
M after the optimal capital structure is established, we can specify 
the long-run objective function to be; 
£ = if . (6.23) 
M n M 
o 
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or; 
M 
nf, = r;2{T(H,K) + [s + l^lMS-DSl + DS}. (6.24) 
The long-run objective function of the cooperative association will 
be subject to five constraints. We can define the total capital em­
ployed by the cooperative association (Equation 6.16) to be a defini­
tional constraint. The second constraint specifies that the present 
membership will remain as members, i.e., 
M > M . (5.25) 
— O 
fTTU 4  ^J-  ^«m, 4- 4  ^ a +* 1 TTO T Q T V AT" 
is concerned with maximizing the total collective profits of the 
present members. Total membership will be the most appropriate 
measure to graarancee that present membership has this objective 
satisfied. This constraint can also be justified by assuming that 
the present members have already analyzed cooperative association 
membership as profitable and will retain membership within the firm 
because they are in essence the policy-makers for the cooperative. 
Given this assumption, membership with optimum financing will contain al 
old members and new members who find the cooperative association member­
ship profitable. 
patronage dividends paid in cash will be greater than or equal to 20 
percent but less than or eoual to 100 percent, i.e.; 
1.0 > s. (6.27) 
These constraints are derived from the laws governing cooperatives.^  
We will allow s to be greater than 20 percent since I have assumed 
the cooperative association holds no deferred patronage dividends 
of deceased members. 
The final constraint will limit the dividend rate allowed on 
2 
common stock investment. Currently, Iowa law limits the annual dividend 
rate to no more than eight percent on common stock, i.e.; 
.08 ^  i. (5.28) 
From the objective function (6.24) and the constraints (6.15, 6.25, 
6.26, 6.27, and 6.28), we can define the Lagrangian for this sub-model 
to be; 
M 
A= -^ T(M,K) + [s + [NS-DS] + DS} 
+ 4). [K-P M-T (i-s) (NS-DS)-D] 
1 Tn 
+ + $^[1.0-s] 4- ^^[.08-i] (5.29) 
where 4), is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the total capital 
employed, ({) is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the member­
ship constraint, and <{) are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to s 
is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to i, NS is defined cy iiquaric 
S.17, DS is defined by Equation6.12, M is defined in Equation 6.8.- and all 
"Iowa Code (13, Section 30). 
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other variables are as defined before. The decision variables available 
to the cooperative decision-maker include the total capital employed, 
the price of a share of common stock, the proportion of patronage 
dividends paid in cash, the length of the revolving fund, total debt 
employed, and the dividend rate on total member investment- The Kuhn-
Tucker conditions, whose economic interpretations will be presented 
in the next chapter, are; 
dA o^ r3T(N,K) , , (1-s) TfSo , 
2 
+ $^ {1 - T(l-s) [|| ^ 1|3} = 0 (6.30) 
3A 
3s M (1+d ) 
xn 
+ -  — X  i  -  i l  -  i p „  § }  
oH 
'l''^ m 3s - ^- TLNS-DS] + T(l-s)["" 3M 3S " 
• * ^ 3 - '4 - -
(6.31a) 
3A 
33 
s > o 
!s = 0 (6.31b) 
(6.31c) 
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[NS-DS] 
M (l+d ) 
m 
(1+d ) 
m 
- 6.{P + (1-s) [NS-DS] + T(l-s)  ^- i? 1 m (3t ow o l m o l 
4,[# 10 
•^  - T - 0 (6.32b) 
dX 
T > 0 (6.32c) 
lïï = ^ - -|^,T - 1 |l> - t- - 11! ^ ^ ° 
* K K (6.33a) 
- 0 = 0  ( 6 . 3 3 b )  
D > 0 (6.33c) 
3A 3M _F , O^r3T(M,K) 3M , , , (1-s) ,,3o 3M 
- iM - iP 1^ ] + iM + iP 
r,, 
m 3? ' "m 3P 
m m 
- O^ iM + H- - T(l-s) '1^  Ifr - i- - If-' 
m mm
P>M 
+ $2^ #::^ -° (6.34a) 
m 
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- P = 0 (6.34b) 
JP m 
m 
p > O (5.34c) 
m — 
M . _ îk . "or3T(M,K) M . r.  (I'S) i M 
3i 2 Si "M • M ' 3M 3i ' 3M 3i M (1+d ) 
m 
3M, . 3M, 
- V + V 3T' 
, r 3M _ . r3o 3M 3M 
-  ^^ (1-S, âï -P^ M - IP^  g-J ) 
+ - 4g. ^  0 (6.35a) 
• i = 0 (5.35b) 
oi 
i > 0 (5.35c) 
n A 4T— = K - P M - T(l-S)(NS-DS) - D = 0 (5.36) (39 m 
aA 
0^ 2 
dA 
30^  ' 9? = ° (6.37b) 
2 -
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3(|), = s - .2 > 0 
3((). 
(j)_ = 0 
*3 1 0 
9 A 
3*. 
= 1-s > 0 
SA 
3 4 
*4 2 0 
. 4^  = 0 
Ml. 
34) c 
= .08 - i > 0 
3A 
3*: *5 = 0 
95 > 0-
(6.38a) 
(6.38b) 
(5.38c) 
(6.39a) 
(6.39b) 
(5.39c) 
(5.40a) 
(5.40b) 
(5.40c) 
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CHAPTER VII. COOPERATIVE FINANCING 
SUB-MODEL ANALYSIS 
Interpreting the Lagrange 
Before analyzing the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the meaning of the 
Lagrange multipliers must be determined. In general terms, the value 
of the Lagrange multiplier of a solution indicates how the value of the 
objective function will change given a one unit change in the constraint 
constant. c|)^  will indicate how the value of the objective function will 
change given a one unit change in the amount of capital employed, i.e.; 
(f)„ indicates how the collective profits of the present membership will 
change if we allow minimum membership to decrease one unit, i.e.; 
o 
4), and indicate how the objective function will change given a 
one unit change in the minimum or maximum value of s, i.e.; 
an! 
""h 
max 
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One of these, or both, must be equal to zero. If both ({) and 
4)^  are equal to zero, then the solution for s is within the 
range of s . to s . 6^  indicates how the value of the objective 
 ^ mxn max 5^ 
function will change given a one unit increase in the maximum allowed 
value of i, i.e.; 
4)g = g^ >0. (7.5) 
iiicaX 
The General Financing 
Sub-Model 
Whenever there is a set of (a), (b), and (c) Kuhn-Tucker conditions, 
the (c) condition requires that the instrument variable to which the 
conditions correspond must be nonnegative. In many cases, it is useful 
to assume the instrument variable has a positive value, in which case 
condition (b) guarantees that the (a) condition is satisfied as an 
equality-
Since capital is defined in the first constraint with an equality. 
Equation 6.30 is satisfied as an equality and may be rewritten as ; 
 ^_ O^r3T(M,K) , . , (1-s) _ , .30(M,K) , 9r , 
3 k  m  3 k  L S  -r  ^ J  L  3 k  ^ 2  o D / K -
m K 
. . _ 2 
_i rA r \ I > -^r- . 
= (7.6) 
K 
The term 9t(M,K)/3k is the variation in total sales revenues induced 
by dX. This is the derivative of the right hand side of Equation 
O » 6 .L W ^  L'A 1 j. C  ^ wC* ^  \  ^* AW wO ^ 
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2 2 3O(M,K)/3K + [D /K ][9r/3(D/K)] can be interpreted as the variation in 
net savings (defined in Equation 6.17) induced by dK and can be 
redefined as Marginal net savings due to dK, MNS^ ,. The term 
s + (l-s)/(l+d ) *• is the present value factor for patronage dividends. 
m 
This present value factor with the in the first line of Equation 
7.5 can be interpreted as the variation in the present value of net 
savings to the present membership induced by dK. This is equivalent to 
the derivative of P\^ S in Equation 6.20 with respect to capital (K). 
The term T(l-s) is the factor for the amount of capital supplied 
by deferred patronage dividends. This can be shown by (1-s) being the 
portion of patronage dividends deferred each year and T being the total 
years in which the deferred portion of patronage dividends is held. This 
factor along with represents the variation in the amount of capital 
supplied by deferred patronage dividends which is induced by dK. 
From our interpretation of the Lagrange multipliers we found; 
K 
4, = (7.7) 
-L UXV 
p 
or, taking the derivative of 11^  with respect to K; 
"o 
V \ fl— 
Substituting for the terms in the first line of Equation 7.5, we 
can find that; 
-^  = + 4u{l-T(l-s)XNS_} = 0 (7.9) 
OK i J. 
or; 
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= (j)^ {2-T (l-s)MNSj,} = 0. (7.10) 
From Equation 7.10 we can determine that if  ^0, at the optimum; 
This condition is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the 
marginal net savings from total capital employed should be equal to 
exactly twice the inverse of the factor for the amount of capital supplied 
by deferred patronage dividends. The reason for the marginal net savings 
from capital employed being twice the inverse of the factor is not exactly 
clear. This effect may be caused by the presence of direct and indirect 
effects of capital employment on the total collective profits of the 
member patrons. The direct effect is the effect of capital on net 
savings. The indirect effect comes through the effect on deferred 
patronage dividends. As net savings change so will the total amount of 
capital supplied from deferred patronage dividends, which in turn 
efzycty tlit: lt;vt:l ux LoLal collecLxve oirofj_uS. Expression 7.11 also 
implies some important characteristics for the variation in net savings 
induced by dK, i.e., as long as T does not equal zero and s does 
not equal one,^  then MNS.. must always be positive. This implies that 
the cooperative decision-maker should not maximize net savings derived 
by capital employment since MNS^  never equals zero. This reaffirms an 
important distinguishing characteristic of this model of cooperative 
associations, that is, the objective of this model is not to maximize tlie 
net savings in the operation, but to determine a capital structure which 
I^f T=0, then s equals 1.0 since deferred patronage dividends are not, 
in facr, deferred. 
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will maximize the total collective profits of the membership. 
We know from Equation 6.38a, that s must be greater than or equal to 
.2,i.e.. Equation 6.31a must be satisfied by an equality and may be 
rewritten as; 
i = #'4 ^  - r 
M (L+D ) 
m 
- 4u{P_ + T(L-S) - iP_] 4- ({> ] 
J. iU Ol'X lU 6 
M 
+ ^  { [1 —] [NS-DS]} 
- (NS-DS) ] 
+ = 0. (7.12) 
The terms inside the brackets on the first two lines of Equation 7.12 
represent the variation in the total collective profits of the present 
memJoer?nip f-rom changing membership, which in Equation 7.12 is induced 
by ds. This expression contains the derivative of the total collective 
profits (Equation 6.22) with respect ro membership and could be called 
(9TCP/9M)(9M/3S). The effects of chcmging membership comes from: 
1) the variation of the distribution of profits over a changing 
M  ^
membership ; - —— IT , which contains the derivative of the 
M " 
right hand term of Equation 6.23 with respect to M; 
2) the variation of the total private sales revenues. 
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M M K.^  
— , which contains the derivative of the right hand 
M dM 
side of Equation 6.21 with respect to M; 
3) the variation in the present value of patronage dividends, 
—^ [s + — ip ] which contains the derivative of 
M (1+d )? 
m 
Equation 5.19 with respect to M; 
M 
4) the variation in the dividends on common stock, 77- iP , which 
m ITi 
contains the derivative of Equation 6.12 with respect to M; 
5) the variation in total collective profits of the present 
membership from a change in total capital employed, 
- Cfi-{p - T ( 1 - s )  [ — —  i P  ] } ,  w h i c h  c o n t a i n s  t h e  1 m dM m 
derivative of Equation 6.16 with respect to H; and 
5) the effect of the membership constraint should membership 
be constrained to M , d)_. 
o 2 
The term in the third line of Equation 7.12 can be interpreted as 
che variation in the present value of the net savings to the present 
membership which is induced by ds. This contains the derivative of the 
present value of net savings (Equation 6.20) with respect co 5 (M held 
constant). [1 - — ] is the variation in the present value factor 
induced by ds and causes the effect here. This term couid be caij-ed 
 ^SPVNS 
M 3 s 
The term in the fourth line of Equation 7.12 is the variation in 
the tccal collective profits of t]ie present membership arising from a 
change in total capital provided by the present membership, which is 
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3tcp 9k induced by ds. This term could be represented by ^. The 
portion of this term inside the brackets [ ] is the derivative of total 
capital provided by deferred patronage dividends^  (Equation 6.14) with 
respect to s. (j)^  is the variation in total collective profits of 
present membership induced by a change in total capital employed. 
The terms in the last line of Equation 7.12 are the Lagrange 
multipliers corresponding to s. These Lagrange multipliers would have 
an effect on the total collective profits of the present membership 
if the solution for s was on the boundary of s . (.2) or s (1.0). 
min max 
A. and 6. represent the shadow price of s . and s . These terms 3 4 mm max 
can be represented by SP^  would be nonnegative. 
Given the interpretations of the terms in Equation 7.12, we can 
rewrite the equation as; 
SA 3TC? 3M , "o 3PVNS 3TCP SK . 
3i"^ 3Î + S 37- * -âg- 3; » 
This equation is equivalent to srating that, for a maximum, the 
u^iu ol: a.) Llic va^ iacion in th£ total ccllcctivs profits of the 
present ^ "^bership from changing membership which is induced by ds; b) 
the variation in the present value of the net saving to the present 
membership vhich is induced by ds; c) the variation in the total collec­
tive profits of the present membership arising from a change in capital 
provided by the present membership which is induced by ds; and d) the 
shadow price of the solution for s must equal zero. 
Equations 6.32a, 6.33a, 6.34a, and 6.35a cannot be assumed to be 
T 
This term is also the derivation of rocal capital employed (Zqua-
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equalities. Assuming these as equalities assumes that deferred patronage 
dividends, capital stock, and debt are used as financial instruments 
and that a dividend on common stock is used as a method of allocating 
net savings. Rather than make these assumptions, I will state these 
conditions as inequalities. 
Equation 5.32a has an interpretation similar to that of Equation 
5.31a. We may rewrite 6.32a as; 
9A 3M, \ „F , o^ r3T(N,K) , , . (1-s) , 
w - -  i r  "  —  T '  
m 
+ ^2' 
M 
+ In (1+d ) [NS-DS]] 
M (1+d m 
m 
- Of(1-s)(NS-DS)] >0 (7.14) 
The term in the first two lines is again interpreted as the variation 
in zhe total collective profits of the present membership from 
changing total membership which, in Equation 7.14, is induced by dx. 
The affects of a changing membership on the -coral collective profits of the 
present membership are analogous to the affects in the term of the first two 
lines of Equation 7.12. This term can be represented by (STCP/SM) (SM/ST). 
The term in the third line of Equation 7.14 can be interpreted as 
the variation in the present value of net savings to the present member­
ship v.'hich is induced by dT 
present value of net savings (Equation 6.20) wirh respecr toT (M held 
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(X~s )  
constant). [- ln(l+d )] is the variation in the present value 
(1+d * 
m 
factor induced by dx and causes the effect here. This term could be 
.. . ^o BPVNS 
caxxea ^ • 
The term in the fourth line of Equation 7.14 can be interpreted as 
the variation in the total collective profits of the present member­
ship arising from a change in total capital provided by the present 
membership, which is induced by dT. The portion of the term inside the 
brackets [ ] is the derivative of total capital provided by deferred 
patronage dividends (Equation 6.14) with respect to T.^  The term 
^ I /"i i-v/r» /-« r» I « o/H • -I I 
Given the interpretations of the terms in Equation 7.14, we can 
rewrite the equation as ; 
9A 3TCP 3M . "o SPVNS , 9TCP 3K ^ 
3^  = ^ 3? * ^  3? - (7.15) 
This equation is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the sum of: 
ci ;  die VciX" jLdCxOli xii Liic Lvjucij. COxxtrC i-x vë 'OxOxj-uS Ox. u-iic wo. 
ship from changing membership which is induced by dt; b) the variation 
in the present value of the net savings to the present membership which 
is induced by dT; and c) the variation in the total collective profits 
of the present membership arising from a change in capital provided by 
the present membership which is induced by dt must be greater than or 
eaual ro zero. 
•""This can also be interpreted as the variation in total capital 
provided by the present membership which is induced by dT. This would 
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Equation 5.33a can be rewritten as; 
m 
- (j)^ [T(l-s) (-r - lll^ ) + 1] > 0. (7.16) 
The sum -r- ^  is the marginal interest cost of debt (MIC) which is 
induced by dD. The term in the first line of Equation 7.15 can be 
interpreted as the variation in the present value of net savings to the 
present membership which is induced by dD. The portion of this term in 
the brackets { } is the derivative of the present value of net savings 
(Equation 5.20) with respect to D. This term can also be interpreted 
as the present value of marginal interest cost to the present membership. 
^ ^ ^o 3pvns 
We can represent this term as — . i"! au 
The term in the second line of Equation 7.16 can be interpreted 
as the variation in the total collective profits of the present member­
ship arising from a change in total capital provided by the present 
ip, wn-li-Vi 4 <= innm-pn "nv nf). T ("i —s i M'lr: t s the effect debt hctS Oii 
the amount of capital employed by deferred patronage dividends. Debt af­
fects patronage dividends through the amount of net savings available 
for distribution. Debt also affects capital by the direct addition of 
it to the capital employed, hence the -+1 in the brackets. The term in 
the second line could also be interpreted as the marginal profit of 
debt to the present membership. We can represent this term as 
9TC? 9K 
3K 3D ' 
Given zhe interpretations of the terms in Equation 7.16, we can 
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rewrite the equation as ; 
3A _ > 0 (7 17) 
3D ~ M 3D 3K 3D - W-i/) 
This equation is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the 
sum of: a) the present value of marginal interest cost of debt to 
the present membership; and b) the marginal profit of debt to the 
present membership which is induced by dD must be greater than or 
equal to zero. we can also interpret these results to mean that the 
cooperative decision-maker should employ debt to the point where the 
marginal profit of the debt to the present membership equals, or 
just exceeds, the present value of the marginal interest cost to 
the present membership. 
Equation 5.54a can be rewritten as; 
m m M m 
-t- iP } - 9 {P T (1-?) — iP ]} + é_] 
~ 1 rr. m • y 
M 
+ ^ {[s 4- ] [-iM] + Im} 
 ^ (I4d_)' 
- {M + T(l-s) [-iM] } > 0. (7.18) 
The term in the first two lines of Equation 7.IS can again be interprets 
as the variation in the total collective profits of the present member­
ship from changing membership which, in Equation 7.18, is induced by 
d? . rtoain- the effects of chanainc; membership are analogous to those 
m -
effects described in Equation 7.12. This terui caii be rcpreser.tsd by 
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3TCP 9M 
3M 3P • 
m 
The term in the third line of Equation 7.18 can be interpreted as 
the variation in the present value of net savings to the present member­
ship which is induced by dP_. The portion of the term inside the 
brackets { } is the derivative of the present value of net savings with 
respect to P (M held constant). This term could be represented by 
M „ O 3PVNS 
M 3P 
m 
The term in the fourth line of Equation 7.18 can be interpreted as 
the variation in the total collective profits of the present membership 
arising from a change in the amoijnt of capital provided by the present 
membership, which is induced by dP . The portion of the term inside in 
the brackets { } is the derivation of total capital provided by the 
present membership (Equation 5.15) with respect to P^  with membership held 
3TC^  3x 
constant. We can represent this term as 3K 3? 
m 
Given the interpretations of Equation 7.18, we can rewrite the 
3A 3TCP 3V 3PVNS . 3TCP SK 
3P - 3M 3P M  ^ 3K 3P -
m m ra m 
This equation is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the sum 
of: a) the variation in the total collective profits of the present 
membership from changing membership which is induced by dP^ ;^ b) the 
variation in the present value of net savings to the present membership 
which is induced by dP ; and c) tl":e variation in the total collective 
m 
profits of the present membership arising from a change in the amo^ ant 
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of capital provided by the present membership which is induced by dP^  
must be greater than or equal to zero. 
Equation 6.35a has a meaning similar to that of Equation 7.19. 
Equation 6.35a can be rewritten as; 
3A = 2^ n? + (1-s) ,30(M,K) _ -p . 
3i 9i^  2^ 3M  ^ 9M m/ 
+ iP } - 4 {P + T(l-s)[3°(M,K) _ ip ]} + (j, 1 
m 1 m dM m Z, 
M , 
+ -^ {s + s) ] [_p M] + p m) 
(Hd ™ 
m 
J. /— / •* _ \ r  ^**t"L 
- Y_ Ll VX-=>/ \.-ir L-ii J 1 m 
- > 0. (7.20) b — 
The first two lines of Equation 7.20 can again be interpreted as the 
variation in the total collective profits of the present membership 
froiû changing membership which, in Equation 7.20, is induced by di. This 
3TCP 8M 
term could be represented by —;r— . The term in the third line of dM di 
Equation 7.20 can be interpreted as tne variaT:ion in d:ie presenL value 
of net savings to the present membership which is induced by di- and 
. , , O^ 3PVNS 
can oe represencea oy 
M 3i ' 
interpreted as the variation in the total collective profits of the 
presenr membership arising from a change in the amount of capital 
employed by the present membership, which is induced by di, and can be 
9TCP 3K 
represented as . The final term, is the Lagrange multi-
RR^ 1 no of the objective function will chance 
given a one unit change in z-axiz-.uz-. allovad value cf i (Equation 7.5} 
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This would be the shadow price of i^ ^^  ^(.08) and can be represented by 
SP. . 1 
Given the interpretations of Equation 7.20, the equation can be 
rewritten as; 
This equation is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the sum 
of: a) the variation in the total collective profits of the present 
membership from changing membership which is induced by di; b) the 
variation in the present value of net savings to the present 
membership which is induced by di; c) the variation in the total 
collective profits of the present membership arising from a change in 
the amount of capital provided by the present membership which is 
induced by di; and d) the shadow price of i^  ^must be greater than or 
equal to zero. 
Equations 5.36a through 5.40a are just restatements of the 
constraints imposed on the Lagrange function. These constraints were 
dj-scussed j.n Equations 6».15, 5.25, 5.25, 5.2*7, and 5.23. 
The Fixed Membership and 
Caoital Model 
capital when analyzing cooperative financial structure. The two most 
c f 4 f 3 "i cf VI -y-o 'n a -rro r\ o an rmr^Trm^Tmrr -r n ^ 
cost of capital emoloved in the cooperative association and maximizing 
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the returns to the member patrons in a simulation analysis. Both of these 
methods assume a fixed membership and often assume fixed capital employ­
ment levels. 
Similar assumptions can be made with the model in the previous section. 
In the model to be presented now, the cooperative decision-maker will 
be concerned with maximizing the total collective profits of the member 
patrons assuming the capital employment and membership level are fixed. 
This model will allow us to compare other methods of analyzing coopera­
tive financial structure with the model developed in the previous section. 
Arguments may be presented where the time frame (long-run vs. inter­
mediate-run vs. short-run) for determining the optimum membership 
level and capital employment level differs with the time frame for the 
decision on the financial structure. The sequence of the decision 
would be that membership and capital is determined first, and that the 
composition of the capital is determined second. This, however, would 
violate the results perceived in the patron model in Chapter VI 
(Equation 5.8) where membership was determined by the decision vari­
ables in the finance model. This model would require more restrictive 
membership requirements than the model presented in Chapter VI. 
A second argument which may be used is that membership is fixed by 
the organisation of member patrons into a cooperative association and 
membership would not be allowed to change after the initial decision to 
join. It could then be argued that the first decision facing the 
cooperative decision-maker is determining the level of capital to employ, 
anc? th^ r:, secondly,- determining the composition of that capital. Tne 
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assumptions for this model will put the cooperative decision-maker in 
this second phase of the capital structure decision. 
In this model, the total revenues to the member patrons received 
for products in set X and set Y will be fixed because membership and 
capital are fixed, i.e.; 
T(M,K) = T. (7.22) 
In addition, net savings may be expressed as; 
NS = 0 - rD (7.23) 
where 0 is the fixed level of operating inccms (fixed because member­
ship and capital are fixed) and r and D are as defined before. DS 
will also be as defined in Equation 6.12. Given these definitions, we 
can express the objective function of the cooperative decision-maker 
as; 
= T + [s + [NS-DS] + DS. (7.24) 
^ (l+d ) ' 
TH 
p 
The n— term is the total collective profits of the present membership 
with fixed capital employment and membership. The bar over the F 
represents fixed capital employment and the bar over the M represents 
fixed membership. 
The operation of the cooperative will be subject tc four '-••-••••istra: 
The first constraint will fix total caoital at the oredetermined levé! 
K - P M - T(l-s) (NS-DS) - D = 0. (7.25 
m 
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The second, third, and fourth constraints are the same as Equations 
6.25, 6.27, and 5.28. We can state the Lagrangian expression as; 
,F - . . (1-s) 
J UNO—L-iOl -r 1VÙ TT c,. I X^ —J 
m 
± -r 1.5 -r — t ua -r Ç ^ L -ir__ri 
(l+d . 
m 
- T (1-s)(NS-DS)-D] + ^ i^s-.2] + CgEl-s] + Ç^ [.08-i]. (7.26) 
The decision variables available to the cooperative decision-maker 
include the same variables as in the previous model except for K: the 
price of a share of common stock (P^ ); the proportion of patronage 
dividends paid in cash (s) ; the length of the revolving fund (T); 
total debt employed (D); and the dividend rate on total common stock 
investment (i). The Kuhn-Tucker conditions follow. The first five 
can be obtained from 5.31 through 5.35 by setting all derivations of 
M equal to zero. 
3A- _ _ _ _ 
 ^= [s + J + iM 4- g [-M + T(l-S) (iM)] > 0 (7.27a) 
m (l+d ) lu 
3A-
m 
? > 0 (7.27c) 
m — 
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^4 1 ô = [1 j [NS-DS] + Ç, [T(NS-DS;]+ S >_ 0 (7.28a) 
(1+d 
m 
- 3 = 0  ( 7 . 2 8 b )  
ds 
S > 0 (7.28c) 
F 
3A|-
 ^= [- In(1+d )][NS-DS] - q,[(1-s)(NS-DS)] > 0 (7.29a) 
0 1 ,1,. \T ~i j. \ j 
m 
ag ^
 • T = 0 (7.29b) 
dX 
T > 0 (7.29c) 
"'s . Is + iilî^  H-r - § -^ ] 
SD ,T* K 3D/K 
- E^ [T(l-s) (-r - — +11^ 0 (7.30a) 
R 
 ^. D = 0 (7.30b) 
D > 0 (7.30c) 
r )  \  —  
M — — — 
IT:— = LS -r j L-y inj -r t" •• ç,_ L t K-L-S) i'i; j - C. > u w . oxa; H1 I m ml m u — [1-rC. / lU 
4 ^
- i = 0 (7.31b) 
i > 0 (7.31c) 
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_ 
= K -- P M - T(l-s) (NS-DS) - D = 0 (7.32) dc, m 
1 
*^  = s - .2 > 0 (7.33a) 
3^2 
3A^  
g# - 2^ = 0 (7.33b) 
> 0 (7.33c) 
z — 
= 1.0 - s > 0 (7.34a) 
SS] 
3A| 
• Ç = 0 (7.34b) 
aSg 3 
> 0 (7.34c) 
%4 
= .08 - i > C (7.35a) 
3A^  
 ^ = 0 (7.35b) 
OÇ, ^ 4 
4^ - ^ 
The condition a of Equations 7.27 through 7.31 may be rearranged as; 
5A-
"""M _ r n_c\ 
" - _ V -t c -L in .z' T _ f J. f V > n /7 ?7p'i ao ^ J-• -5-, - _ 
IT. (1+d )' 
m 
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1 
-K— = [NS-DS][1 + Ç T] + C, - C. 1 0 (7.28a') 
(1+dn,)' 
r = [NS-DS] [- _ ln(l+d ) - Ç-(l-s)] > 0 (7.29a') 
(l+d_y  ^
F 
3^  =  ^ - SlT(l-s)] - > 0 (7.30a') 
(1+d ) 
— m 
- n-s^ 
— = -P^ M[s + '- ' ^  - 1 - ^ Td-s)] - ^ >^0. (7.31a') 
The Lagrange multipliers, through could be interpreted in the 
same way as the Lagrange multipliers in the general model with the 
corresponding constraints. 
Equation 7.33a guarantees that s is greater than zero, i.e.. 
Equation 7.28a' must be satisfied as an equality. Beyond this, 
assumptions of the relationships would result in assumptions about 
the results of these equations. No definite conclusions can be drawn 
about the resLilLs wiLiiuuL making additional assumptions. ±f we do assume 
deferred patronage dividends are used as a method of financing the 
cooperative association, then the length of the revolving fund ( T )  
-1 v,- jsitiva and the cash portion of "che patronage dividends (s) 
will be less than one?" ciuuj-iiioii, 
the solution for s is not on the boundary (i.e., Ç, and Ç. equal zero) . 
"For the cooperative to use deferred patronage dividends, it must 
defer a portion of the dividends (1-s, i.e., s<1.0) for a positive num­
ber of years (T>0) . 
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and 1+d^  is greater than one.^  Given these assTurçtions, we can determine 
from Equation 7.29a' that; 
ln(l^ d ) 
C, 1 - (7.36) 
From Equation 7.2Sa we can determine that; 
+ = 0. (7.37) 
(1+d )'^   ^
m 
Substituting the right hand side of Equation 7.35 into Equation 7.37 for 
we find 
T.ln(l+d ) 
1 - —  ^= 0. (7.38) 
(1+d ) (1+d ) 
m m 
The only solution for T in Equation 7.38 is zero. This implies that 
deferred patronage dividends are not used as a capital source, which 
violates the assumption made in order to solve the equation. If the 
expression on the left hand side of Equation 7.38 was positive, then a 
positive solution to t con]à be determined. This result could be ob­
tained if the solution for s was -2 and the shadow price of s . (Ç_) 
min 2 
was negative. There is, however, no reason given in Equations 7.27a' 
through 7.31a' to expect the result of s equal to .2 and to be 
positive. 
Given the result of T equal to zero, the solution tor s is irrele­
vant, sines the deferred portion of patronage dividends is paid in cash. 
We could, therefore, express the solution for s as equal to 1.0 since. 
d_ is the average discount rare of the membership. We would 
expect d >0 since the opportunity cost of money should be positive. 
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when T equals zero we are actually paying out deferred patronage 
dividends at the same time we pay the cash portion (s) of patronage dividends. 
Multiplying Equation 7.37 by -(1-s), we find; 
s + - 1 - Ç T(l-s) = 0. (7.39) 
Given this equation, we can determine from Equations 7.30a' and 
7.39 that; 
r D 3r T  ^ r 
(7.40) 
The term [-r - ^  -1 is the marginal interest cost of debt (MIC). 
K dD/K 
If we assume a positive solution for debt, then from Equations 7.36 and 
7.40 we find that; 
ln(l+d ) 
MIC  ^, (7.41) 
(1+d )' 
m 
and, since T=0; 
MIC = -ln(l+d_). (7.42) 
The solution of Equation 7.42 implies Luat trie cooperative decision­
maker should employ debt to the point where the marginal interest 
cost is less than the negative of the average discount rate for the 
membership. This result is determined since the first derivative of 
the right hand side of Equation 7.42 is negative (- with respect 
to d and che second derivative is positive, (—— :r). MIC equals 
ii+da)-
d when d zs zero anc MIC zs less zn absolute value than zs d v.'hsn d 
m m mm
is positive. 
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K - P M - D * = 0  ( 7 . 4 3 )  
m 
or; 
P = ^ =21 (7.44) 
M 
where D* is the solution for D determined in Equation 7.42. T vjas 
set equal to zero to yield Equation 7.43. 
The solution for i is irrelevant because T equal to zero means that 
paying dividends on common stock is equivalent to paying cash patronage 
dividends. Since Equation 7.39 was expressed as an identity we can 
rewrite 7.31a' as; 
-C. > 0. (7.45) 
From Equation 7.45 and Equation 7.35c we find that; 
= 0. (7.45) 
We can interpret this as meaning that the shadow price of the maximum 
value of i is equal to zero, which indicates only that the solution for 
i is between 0 and .08. No further results can be obtained from the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions about i. 
The system of Equations 7.27a' through 7.31a' dictate specific 
solutions for T, D, and Given fixed membership and capital indi­
cates T:hat the burden of financing thta cuupszaLlve association should 
rest on debt and common stock investment. The result of this model 
does indicate a result different from most other models constructed 
for analyzing financial structure. Equation 7.42 indicates that the 
marginal interest cost of debt should be less in absolute value than 
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t±ie average discount rate for the membership. The normal solution indi­
cates that MIC and should be equal. The results from empirical 
m 
studies using this latter criterion showed that cooperatives often rely 
too heavily on member financing and not enough on debt to finance the 
cooperative. The result of the simplified model constructed in this 
chapter appears to come closer to fitting reality in the determination 
of the amount of debt to use. The other major difference in this model 
from other models constructed to study financial structure lies in the 
fact that only common stock investment and debt are used in financing 
the cooperative. Many other authors who have analyzed cooperative 
financial structure with fixed membership have also assumed a fixed 
common stock price (?^ ). This assumption leads to the result that de­
ferred patronage dividends should be used to satisfy the capital 
obligation left after determining the level of debt to employ, i.e.; 
DPD = K - ? M - D* (7.43) 
m 
where DPD is the ajnouiic of Jefcrreu Datronaae dividends required, 
is the fixed common stock price and D* is the level of debt em­
ployed (where MIC = —) . In this model constructed with variable 
common stock price, T was determined to eqv.al zero, i.e., DPD would also 
equal zero and all member financing was obtained via common stock 
investment. The determining factor of whether deferred patronage dividends 
are used is the price of common stock. If common stock price is fixed, 
then member investment does come from deferred patronage dividends. If 
common stock price is not fixed then no deferred patronage dividends are 
l ed  
used with fixed merri>ership and capital employment. 
The Fixed Membership With Variable 
Capital Model 
Variable capital allows the cooperative decision-maker to choose 
the total amount of capital to employ that will give the member patrons 
the maximum total collective prufius. In this model, we would change the 
objective function since total revenues for products in sets X and Y 
are dependent on capital and the operating income portion of net 
savings is dependent on capital, i.e. , we derive the following 
Lagrangian function;^  
= T{K) + [ S  +  \INS-DS] + DS + a,[K-P M 
 ^ (1+d  ^ " 
m 
- T(l-s)(NS-DS) - D] + a [s - .2] + a^ Cl-s] 
+ a^ [.08-i], (7.44) 
where NS is "die net savinas defined as; 
NS = 0(K) - rD. (7.45) 
The decision-maker faces the same decision variables as in the fixed 
membership and capital model with the addition of capital (X) as a 
variable. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this model will be the 
same as for the fixed membership and capital model where the Lagrange 
multipliers are the same, capital is not fixed, and in this model we 
have an additional condition for capital, i.e.: 
1 
~The Lagrangian function is called A— since we have variable capital 
(no bar over che ?) and fixed membership (bar over the M). 
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3T(K) , , , (1-s) ,,80(K) , Sr , 
m 
An fvi 9v 
+ a^ [l-T(l-s)(^  + -^ )j =0. U.40, 
2 K 
oO O oiT The term,  ^.^ , is the marginal net savings induced by dK 
oK dD/K 
(MNS^ ) and 7.46 may be rewritten as; 
3A-
- = + [s + _ a^ T(l-s)]MNS + = 0 (7.47) 
p - T •• 
(1+d )' 
m 
If we assume all Lagrange multipliers with the exception of a^  equal zero, 
then we derive the sane results as in the fixed membership ajid capital 
model, with the additional result; 
+ MNS, = ln(l+d ) (7.48) dK k m 
Equation 7.48 is derived from Equations 7.36 (a^  equivalent to ^ )^, 
7.39, and 7.47. The equation is equivalent to stating that capital 
should be employed to the point where the variation in profit to the 
3T ( K) 
membership, —— + MNS^ , is exactly equal to the natural logarithm of 
(1+d ) which would also eaual the negative of MIC. in 
Assuming a variable capital level allows an optimal solution for 
capital employment which guarantees that capital is employed at the 
poznt where it's variation in profiz nc -che membership tjqudls Ll'ie natural 
logarithm of (1+d ). This adds the additional solution of determining the 
• m 
amount of capital to employ in the cooperative association. From this, 
the level of debt to employ and the price of common stock may be found 
from Eauations 7.42 and 7.44. 
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The Variable Membership and 
Capital Model 
Eliminating the final assumption of fixed meuibership makes the 
model identical to the general model developed earlier. In this 
model we derive the Lagrangian expression defined in Equation 5.29. 
Membership was shown to vary with the decision variables in the 
financial model as shown in Chapter VI (Equation 5.8). The Kuhn-
Tijcker conditions were expressed in Equations 6.30 through 6.40 and 
discussed earlier in this chapter. The major difference in the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for the general model and those for the fixed member­
ship model is the expression for the effects of changing membership 
where j is one of the decision variables) and the normalizing constant 
 ^ o^ for present membership (—) . 
The results of the models with fixed membership, or fixed member­
ship and capital, determined values for the decision variables K, D, P^ , 
and T. s and i were determined to be irrelvant in the solution. In 
the general model the effect of a variable membership will be to dictate 
specific solutions for all of the decision variables, since each 
decision variable s, T, P , and i will have an effecr on rhe level of 
m 
membership. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions 6.30 through 6.40 are very complex. 
A great aiûount of information is needed to evaluate them. The 
cooperative decision-maker must know the specific form of the irerrber-
ship function, the response f'jnction of total sales revenues for 
products in sets X and Y to capital and membership, tne response function 
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function of operating income to capital and membership, and the form 
of the interest rate function. In addition, the cooperative decision­
maker must know the average cost of capital for the membership (d^ ). 
The optimality conditions presented here do provide some value 
to the cooperative who is attempting to maximize the total collective 
profits of the present membership. The conditions also point out the 
difficult task cooperative decision-makers have in fulfilling this 
task. They also point to the need for research to provide an 
understanding of these relationships. 
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CHAPTER VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary and Conclusions 
Some of the problems associated with cooperative associations were 
discussed, and the relevant literature was reviewed to see how well these 
problems have been studied and solutions provided. The purpose of this 
study was to discuss the overall decision nexus of the cooperative decision­
maker and analyze the separate problems involved in this decision nexus. 
The decision nexus of the cooperative was separated into three 
interdependent problems. The first problem discussed was the short-run 
determination of pricing and production practices. The second problem 
was the long-run problem of determining an investment portfolio for the 
cooperative. This problem was not discussed at length. The third 
problem was the long-run problem of determining the financial structure 
of the cooperative association. The study of the decision nexus was 
important in that it did specify the link between the short-run produc-
— ——J —- ^  ^ ——' — - ^  ^ ^ 1 y-v /-f __ -v—I "t V » T5 c  cT d ^  fiTnsvx"*"? a I 
t I ml. A A  ^  ^  ^ 1^ • m  ^  ^ #*# w ww — —. — . - •• « ^  __ — 
structure decision problems. The long-run decision problems prescribe 
the structure the cooperative decision-maker must operate within the 
short-run. The long-r'zn decision problem encompasses a larger n'omber 
of variables which can be controlled by the cooperative decision-maker. 
The individual problems of determining the production and pricing 
practices within cooperatives and determining the financial structure 
of cooperatives were discussed at length. The study of the production 
and pricing practices within cooperatives was a positive-descriptive study 
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of how cooperatives actually determine prices for products they trade 
with patrons- The normative model developed by Royer was used as a 
basis for studying pricing practices. From a survey of cooperatives in 
Iowa, models were statistically defined using ordinary least squares 
for the feed and fertilizer models and generalized least squares for the 
corn and soybean models. It was discovered that characteristics of 
cooperatives could be used to describe part of the variance in the 
prices for products across cooperatives. The feed and fertilizer models 
used information from sixty-eight Iowa cooperatives to develop pricing 
models for anhydrous ammonia fertilizer and a 40 percent hog concentrate 
feed ratio. The anhydrous ammonia model found that plant storage 
capacity in tons of anhydrous ammonia, the service charge in dollars for 
delivery and application of aniiydrous ammonia to the patron, the percentage 
of grain production which is com in the county of the firm's home office, 
and the amount of capital in millions of dollars employed by the coopera­
tive all have a negative effect (i.e. , the higher is the value of the 
variable the lower is the price of fertilizer) on the price of anhydrous 
ammonia. The equipment storage capacity in tons and leverage ratio of the 
firm (debt/total liabilities) had a positive effect on the price of 
anhydrous ammonia. 
The model estimated for the 40 percent hog ration found that the 
leverage ratio and number of laying hens in thousands in the county of 
the firm's home office had a positive effect on the price of the hog 
ration whereas the amount of capital employed by the cooperative had a 
negative effect on the price of the hog ration. 
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Models for 35 and 5C percent cattle feed rations were unable to 
be estimated. Data were collected concerning these variables but meas­
urement error appeared to make it impossible to fit a suitable model. 
Com and soybean prices were collected from the cooperatives in 
the form of a weekly time series manning from January, 1977, to June, 
1979. The Chicago Board of Trade price for each d^ y was subtracted from 
the cooperative price to get the basis level as the dependent variable. 
A generalized least squares regression analysis was used because the 
data consisted of time series and cross-sectional information. Two 
models were estimated for each of the corn and soybean price data sets. 
One model consisted of the time series variables trend, monthly 
seasonal dummy variables, and a trigonometric seasonal term which al­
lowed for multiplicative seasonal effects. The second model contained 
the same variables plus a storage utilization variable. In addition 
to these time series variables, twenty-two cross-sectional variables 
were used in the regression analysis. The models allowed for effects 
from the time series variables, effects from the crcss-sectionai vari­
ables, and effects from the interaction of the cross-sectional and tin^ ie 
series variables. 
Of the twenty-two cross-sectional variables used in che regression 
analysis, no one variable consistently had a positive or negative effect 
on the price of either grain. The different months of the year either 
produced different effects from the cross-sectional variables, or 
else the cross-sectional variable was not consistently significant. 
The study of the financial structure of cooperatives was a normative-
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prescriptive study of a multi-product marketing and supply cooperative 
which served both member and nonmember patrons. This part of the 
study involved the development of a model and then defining the economic 
implications of the model. Developrnent cf thz zodsl began with the 
construction of a model for a typical patron for determination of 
whether to become a member. The typical patron was assumed to be a 
profit maximizer who purchased inputs from and sold unprocessed products 
to the cooperative association. 
From the optimality conditions determined for this model, a member­
ship function was derived for the cooperative association. Tlie prices 
for products set inside and outside the cooperative association, the 
quantity of public goods produced by the cooperative association, the 
proportion of patronage dividends paid in cash, the number of years 
deferred patronage dividends are deferred, the discount of thm member, 
the expected dividend rates of the member, the dividends on common stock, 
and the price of a share of common stock are the variables which determine 
jo-î7-<=."i of membersîiio within the cooperative association. 
The cooperative decision-maker was assumed to maximize the total 
collective profits of the present membership. The optimality conditions 
for the general model of the cooperative were analyzed. Simplified 
models, including that where membership and capital were fixed, and 
that where just membership was fixed, were also analyzed and the 
results were compared to the results obtained in nest of the literature. 
In the model where membership and capital were fixed it was dis­
covered that the cooperative should employ debt to a point where the 
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marginal interest cost of debt is less than the negative of the average 
discount rate for the membership. These results differ from the results 
derived in most other models which assume a fixed membership level and 
fixed capital level. Most other studies which make these assumptions state 
that the cooperative should employ debt to the point where the marginal 
interest cost equals the negative of the average discount rate of the 
membership. The empirical results of most financial structure studies 
have found that cooperatives generally have not used debt up to the 
point where the marginal interest cost equals the negative of the average 
discount rate of the membership, but that the marginal interest cost is 
in fact less than the average discount rate. These empirical studies 
would support the hypothesis that cooperative decision-makers use the 
criteria for decermining the financial structure as developed in the 
model presented in this text. 
Adding capital as a variable in the model did not substantially 
change the results from those derived in the previous model which had a 
fixed membership level ana a rixea capital level. It did c-llow clie 
L.\_/ Lne the level of capital to empio; where ths 
variation in profit to the membership is less than the average disco^ Jnt 
rate of the membership. 
Adding the final assumption that the level of membership is vari­
able along with the amount of capital being variable gives the general 
model that was first discussed. The main conclusion derived from the 
general model is that with a variable membership.- the effect of the 
choice variables on u.er:ùier5hip vrill alter the results cf the simplified 
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model. If the form of the membership function, total sales revenue 
function, and operating income function are known, the specific solutions 
for each of these variables should exist. 
The principal conclusion decermined in this study is that the task 
of the cooperative decision-maker is difficult. The cooperative decision­
maker must be concerned about the short-run and long-run decisions which 
affect the economic positions of the cooperative and it's member 
patrons. The optimality conditions derived for the short-run production 
and pricing model point to the complexity of maximizing the member 
patrons' total collective profits. 
The optimality conditions derived for the long-run model for 
determining the financial structure of the cooperative also point to 
the difficulty of the task of the cooperative decision-maker. Not 
only are the optimality conditions complex, but there is a great amount 
of information which is necessary to evaluate them. Nevertheless, 
many of the results obtained in this model should be useful. Although 
•ir is doubtful that any coo-KjeraLive association could maxiniize the 
total collective profits of the member patrons, the results should be 
useful for providing simple rules which might help the cooperative 
decision-maker in striving for this goal. 
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Suggestions for Further Research 
In studying the pricing practices of the cooperatives in this 
study, it was pointed cut that the data for the cattle feed models was 
inadequate to yield a model which was statistically significant. The 
models which were developed for anhydrous ammonia and hog feed were 
simple models which should be able to be improved. To do this would 
require a more extensive survey. The sample should be expanded to 
include more firms so that a more precise model could be developed. 
It would also be interesting to see how cooperatives differ from 
proprietary corporations in the pricing of products. This would re­
quire a survey of proprietor corporations to see if the pricing mechanism 
differs between the two types of corporations, and by how much. 
Finally, it would be interesting to try to develop a programming 
model of the cooperative association which could be used in a positive-
descriptive analysis of cooperative financing. The model developed 
in this dissertation should provide an economic basis for development of 
the programming model. 
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